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A Spectre Of Failed Countries

The strategy of nation-states explains the place and action of the Jamaat

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A Spectre Of Failed Countries
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For Mawdudi, the establishment, realisation and pursuit of religion (iqamat-i-din) means the effort to institute directly the superstructure of social conduct and political action raised on the basis of the divine 'caliphate', the 'divine sovereignty', entirely different from the secular state in all its details and ramifications. Its name is the Islamic state, brought about by the Islamic revolution wrought by a movement, the Jamaat-i-Islami, founded in 1941. His stern warning—one that must alert secular republics across the globe—was: "Whoever really wants to root out mischief and chaos from God's earth...should stand up to finish the government run on wrong principles, snatch power from wrongdoers, and establish a government based on correct principles and following a proper system."

The vagaries of Pakistani politics, in the aftermath of Partition, gave Jamaat the opportunity to implement its utopian programme. Initially, the government endeavoured to dismantle the party and diminish its role in politics, but Mawdudi, both in and out of jail, insisted on moving Pakistan in the direction of Islamisation. The 1956 Constitution accommodated many of his demands. Ayub Khan gaoled Mawdudi in 1964 and 1967, but was compelled to temper his opposition to Islamic activism. In 1970, the Jamaat participated in national elections, though its hopes were dashed to the ground when the party won only four seats in the National Assembly, and four in the various provincial assemblies.

During Zia-ul-Haq's 11-year rule—from 1977 to 1988—the Jamaat moved from strength to strength, though this was barely reflected in Pakistan's national election of 1985, as also in 1988 and 1999. Yet, the Jamaat has remained a powerful ideological force among politicians, bureaucrats, intellectual leaders, and the armed forces. This does not augur well for the future of secularism in Pakistan. This does not augur well for the prospect of cordial Indo-Pak ties. Though Pervez Musharraf may pay heed to the US clamour to hand over Osama bin Laden and ultimately destroy terrorist outfits, the President will have a tough time isolating hot-headed jehadis, many of whom subscribe to the Jamaat's ideology of overthrowing liberal and secular regimes. At present, the battle-lines are drawn, but the outcome is not easy to predict. It is truly a defining moment for Pakistan, a country finding itself between the devil and the deep sea.

Frederic Grare, a French scholar, sets out to delineate the strategies of the Jamaat in Pakistan. This book provides the wider perspective at which he aims: to explore the regional and international strategies of the Jamaat. I do not think he is trying for more in this slim monograph, and what more can a reader on the lookout for a handy book expect? He is painting on a vast canvas, and it is not surprising that the colours are more vivid in some parts than in others.

Grare is persuasive when he writes about the Jamaat acting as the "torch-bearer of irredentist ambitions". He is insightful when he argues that the destabilising potential of the Islamist parties generally is much less potent when they are integrated with the nationwide political or electoral processes. And he is instructive in concluding that Islamism seems essentially to be the problem of failed, and above all, politically deadlocked, Muslim countries.

Quoting the scholar Olivier Roy, Grare argues that the strategy of the nation-states rather than the existence of a mythical Islamist international outfit explains the place and action of the Jamaat. This is what the West needs to understand. This is what the protagonists of the clash of civilisation thesis need to know.

Who would have thought before September 2001 that terrorists would venture to lay violent hands on a country that claimed invincibility? Who would have said a few years ago that Muslim fundamentalism, though fuelled by America's belligerence in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Palestine, would lead inexorably, step by step, to its worldwide legitimacy in many Muslim countries? You may not find answers to some of these questions in this book, but there is much that is refreshingly new.

For me, this book has a great deal to recommend it. Grare has a readability I find compelling. His assumptions command today a wide assent and therefore deserve some scrutiny.

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