MOST service officers say little. But together, they know practically everything thereis to know of their subject. Often they are reticent out of courtesy, and only exchangeknowing glances when the narrative runs contrary to what they know. They, for instance,know that in 1952 defence secretary H.M. Patel swindled the chiefs into relegating theservice headquarters to becoming 'attached' offices of the ministry, along withother attached offices, such as the dance and drama division of the i&b ministry. Butwhat the officers also know, but are too polite to say, is that in 50 years almost 15chiefs per service failed to overturn the situation—with some not even putting up afight—until Vishnu Bhagwat came along. And of course, he paid the price.
The book begins in an easy style, with a complex subject made understandable for thelay reader and the author keeping many of the difficult reference material for theappendices. The professional reader or analyst would probably do better to read all theappendices first so as to get himself in a better position to fathom what Bhagwat wastaking on. The first 100 pages are probably the most lucid, where the author describes howhe carefully studied the bjp manifesto and attempted to harmonise the objectives of theIndian Navy with the national security objectives enumerated in the well-writtenmanifesto.
But it is unlikely that any of the villains in the 'sacking' of a chiefeither read the manifesto, or the many policy papers Bhagwat wrote, like the StrategicDefence Review and the 30-year Submarine Building Plan. The fight that Bhagwat foughtand the one that eventually humiliated him was fought on the 'streets' of SouthBlock—not over strategy or policy—but over 'controlling' the servicesby humiliating the chiefs, the principal staff officers and force commanders, by losingfiles, delaying cases, interfering with promotions and misleading the minister behind thebacks of the chiefs.
Despite the lapse of two-and-a-half years, Bhagwat won't go quietly. The scams hewrote about have come back to haunt some of the same actors. But just as the bureaucracywalked away whistling after Bhagwat left, they are likely to whistle their way through thedefence purchases scams too. To this day we have no elaboration of what constituted'persistent defiance of the cabinet'. Rather, after reading the book one comesto a clear position that:
- The sacking was illegal and not covered by the Regulations for the Indian Navy. The President did not approve;
- The placing of the service headquarters as attached offices of the ministry is illegal and violative of the Constitution;
- The use of the rules of business to circumvent the regulations governing the services and the Warrant of Precedence is illegal; and
- The use of shadow files by the MoD is illegal.
But who will fight the case, if the aggrieved party, that is, the services, will not takeup the matter? All of them have legal departments, staffed by mediocre legal officers. Butthe headquarters have the authority and the money to hire the best legal brains to buildup a case to destroy the nonsensical webs the bureaucracy has woven around them. All itrequires are two chiefs—out of three.
But some mysteries remain.Why did Bhagwat shift target, as they say in gunnery, fromthe bureaucracy to the minister? Why did George Fernandes, who on taking over promised theservices relief from the bureaucracy, end up supporting the one organisation thathamstrings the defence apparatus? There was obviously another plane to which the chiefswere not privy to, where the decisions were being taken without any written records. Certainly to ascribe a breach of security classification over the atv project toBhagwat's sacking and for the minister to survive thereafter, is in fact a damningindictment on the weakness of the opposition, and hence democracy. It is in this ambiencethat the press has to play a stronger role. But where are the press heroes? Bhagwat'stravails in finding a publisher, with many a fashionable editor developing cold feet inaccepting his manuscript, is a monumental disgrace and another proof of what Vinod Mehtacalled a conspiracy of silence.
The book could have done with some rigorous professional editing but Manas has shownrare courage. There are many issues covered by the book. Some of them are of permanentstrategic significance, some of interest only to the navy, and some only to a fewindividuals. A professional editor would have removed the personal bits and focused moreattention on the issues that shouldn't and won't go away. Many in the navy maynot agree with all that Bhagwat stands for but this book is likely to be a standard workof reference on any attempt to reorganise the national security apparatus.
(The author is a retired Rear Admiral.)
