Well, Kandahar is back in news. Under intense attack over the way he handled the Kandahar hijack crisis asexternal affairs minister in 1999, senior BJP leader Jaswant Singh says in hismemoirs, A Call to Honour, that he was initially opposed to any compromise with the hijackers butadmits, "...slowly, as the days passed, I began to change".
The book makes no sensational disclosures about the IC 814 flight that washijacked from Kathmandu to Kandahar in Afghanistan on Christmas eve in 1999 with161 passengers and crew on board but reveals some behind-the-scenes nuggets about whathe describes as a "most demanding and emotionally a most draining period"of his life.
The senior BJP leader has been under attack from Congress and others for whyhe had to personally travel with three terrorists, in detention in Indian jails to Kandahar, andswap them for hostages. Was it because he was carrying 200 million dollars asransom? The book only mentions it as one of the demands of the hijackers, thoughit is a question that has arisen many times before and has been addressed by himin Rajya Sabha as well.
Excerpts from the book, released by PTI today:
'Reject the Demands'
Singh recounts that the hijacking had taken place about an hour after he hadbecome a proud grandfather. On learning about the landing of the hijacked aircraft at Amritsar thatevening, the former minister says that he had almost yelled into the telephoneforgetting all diplomatic decorum, "Get your bloody fingers out now. Forheaven's sake, do anything, don't let the ...(expletive) aircraft leave Amritsar."
He recalls that the hijackers had demanded "dollars 200 million asransom money, release of some 36 proven terrorists, the interred bones of oneterrorist at least".
The Union Cabinet was unanimous and had said in one voice: "Reject thedemands, go an tell the press in appropriate words."
Pressure, TV Coverage
Singh is scathing inhis attack on those who had held demonstrations to pressure the government toget the hostages in Kandahar released:
"I am ashamed even as I recollect how - initially perhaps spontaneouslybut thereafter as part of some sponsored embarrassment to the government - gangsof political activists were persuaded to block roads, interrupt press briefingsand, to my mind and memory, so shamingly roll on the roads as if in a kind ofcollective hysteria.
"I still don't know what they were demonstrating by this undignified anddemeaning behaviour. But it certainly did succeed in shaming India, in the eyesof the international community."
The Threat, The Deal
"The threat was real, it could not be brushed off: what if the aeroplaneis blown up? I could not, in any sense, accept the responsibility of letting 166innocent men and women and one child, some of whom were not even Indian, beblown apart on the midnight of 31 December as the millennium changed.
"For that was the intelligence that had firmly and convincingly come ourway, that if there was no resolution, the hijackers would do just that -preferably in a suicide mission, with the aircraft in the air. That was to betheir welcome to AD 2000."
"At first I stood against any compromise, then, slowly, as the dayspassed, I began to change"
Why He?
About his flight to Kandahar, accompanied by three terrorists released fromIndian jails, Singh says it was not easy to go there but he had been pressed byofficials who wanted somebody who could take decisions on the spot as there wasno time to "keep referring matters to Delhi."
His Son's Offer
He had calledhis younger son in Jaisalmer before leaving for the Afghan town, he recounts,whovolunteered to go with him to Kandahar and "totally sincerely" toldhim:
"'Offer me as thehostage, your son for all those innocents'. Of course, I could not, though not because I would not."
At Kandahar Airport
"Some desultory talk, stilted, rehearsed and insincere. I mouthedappreciation and some (sincere) gratitude for what they had done, (well, theyhad actually goaded the negotiations on the hijackers at least upto apoint)."
The Agreement
The agreement with the Taliban authorities, says Singh, about thesequence of events was that, first, the detenues were to be"identified", then the passengers would be deplaned and only then werethe detenues to be handed over to the hijackers:
"This was violated. At the very last minute, this agreed- to-contractwas stood on its head.... The knife was not just at my throat, it was now, yet again, on the throatsof all those 161 who remained on IC-814."
ISI Hand
The role of forces inimical to India, specificallyPakistan's ISI, in the hijack "became so obvious and visible as eventsbegan to further unfold".
The issue of 'identification' ofreleased TADA detenues was "another giveaway of the ISI hand":
"The friends/relatives of the detenues to be exchanged were brought toKandahar by them [ISI] from Pakistan and they confirmed the 'correctness' of thereleased person. Only then were the hijackers assured that the TADA detenuesbrought were genuine and that a 'trick' was not being played upon then by thewily Indians."
He recalls that he had to wait for the step-ladder as it was whisked awayafter the three prisoners deplaned:
"And so there I stood in the opendoorway of the aircraft even as the evening dark began to gather, gloom deepenedand the cold began to close in. Finally, Muttavakil arrived."
If He Had Not Gone?
Winding up his visit to Kandahar, Singh asks Talibanofficial Rehmatullah Hashmi whether at any time, the Taliban authorities weredistressed enough to consider storming the plane:
"He said that while the inevitability of such a course was discussed inthe beginning, it was shelved once I arrived on the scene and it became knownthat India was sending its negotiating team."
The Red Bag
Singh recalls that even as he was winding up the Kandahar visit, he came toknow "that one of the hijackers had mentioned that they had left a'millennium present for the government of India on board the aircraft'".
It was also conveyed to him that the Taliban were not prepared to let IC-814fly and they were delaying its refuelling and were keen to take one bag thatbelonged to the hijackers.
He recalled rushing to meet Afghan Foreign minister Vakil Ahmed Muttawakil,apprising him of the problem and requesting him to advise authorities tofacilitate the early departure of the aircraft.
"I then advised Capt Suri that we better vacate the plane and get backto the lounge. But the Taliban authorities were still trying to see the hold andlook for a red suitcase of the hijackers," the former minister said.
Singh later found Muttawakil's red Pajero parked right in front of the holdwith its headlights on.
"It could not be confirmed as to who was in theaircraft as it had tinted glasses. Capt Rao had started the engine with a jetstarter and the APU (auxillary power unit) was still running. Some workers werestill working in the hold and Capt Rao told me at that time that he had seenpeople taking every red bag from the hold and showing it to the car and takingit back to the hold.
"Two and two put together, we both felt that perhaps either one or moreor the hijackers or someone close to them who could identify the famous redsuitcase were comfortably parked in that car and were trying out every red bagto identify the real bag and take it out. Capt Suri found out from a localworker that they had found one bag and there were five grenades in it.
The "red bag", he says, belonged to one of the hijackers, containedexplosives and possibly, the real passports too:
"In their hurry, they had forgotten it in the hold. By the time theycame back to recover it, the hostages had been released. Yet Muttavakil himselfacted illegally, betrayed our trust and got the hold forcibly opened and all thebags taken out," Singh says.
Later, he says:
"No one knew what had happened to the famous bagafter it was unloaded and taken to the city".
'You Betrayed All Of Us'
Recounting his interactions with the released hostages on the return flightto Delhi, he says an overwrought young mother clutched at his throat and yelledas loudly as she could:
"Why have you come so late? Where were you all thistime? You have betrayed all of us. Where are my children? Where is my family?And she banged her head against my chest angrily and finally broke down, cryingbitterly."
Champagne To Celebrate
Singh recalls that while political opponents were baying for his blood onissues like "national prestige, "security", "compromise withterrorism" and "why to Kandahar", the congratulatory messages andtelegrams and sentiments he received from around the world were striking incontrast.
"One such telephone call was from US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbottwho said, "Jaswant, this is Strobe...I want you to know how glad Brooke andI are...You did the right thing - there was no other way. Congratulations. And ahappy New Year."
Singh tells us that he had invited officials of external affairsMinistry who had worked with him to have champagne at his home in New Delhi onhis return from Kandahar on December 31 after securing the release of thepassengers and crew in exchange for three dreaded terrorists held in Indianjails.
Old Dilemmas
Even as he secured the release of the hostages, Singhadmits that he found himself confronted with "old dilemmas, all over again,in the backdrop of Kandahar":
"How, in governance, do you choose between two equally valid, andrelevant 'moral rights'? Here as posed, between the 'right' act of saving 166lives, or standing up against terrorism and letting them all 'go', for all todie - will that be another 'right' act? By choosing that which is otherwiseextinguished for always - life, for, in any event this fight against terrorismwill continue, from one challenge to another.
"And the other - Between public and private duty: here the calls ofoffice or attending to a sick and lonely mother, which does one choose? This, incomparison, is easy."
...
"I do not really know what to term my mission - a rescue mission, anappeasement exercise, a flight to compromise or a flight to the future?"
But The US Won't
Singh says that India has repeatedly asked the US to hand overTaliban Foreign minister Muttavakil for prosecution but Washington only provided"limited access".
"Repeatedly India has asked the United States, now the virtual ruler ofAfghanistan, that it should hand over Muttavakil for prosecution. The UnitedStates has provided limited access but no more. That is the extent of itscooperation with India, so far, in this 'joint fight against terrorism' "
Money To The Hijackers?
When queried about allegations that he had carried money and explosives toKandahar along with three terrorists on a special plane, he calls it "anamazing assertion" and says "there is no question of any money beingcarried. I must have had Rs 100 with me since I went from work."
He also dismisses as "totally false" the contention that then Homeminister L K Advani and another Cabinet colleague Arun Shourie had opposedrelease of the terrorists. "It was a totally unanimous decision," hemaintains.
Snoop In The PMO
Not only that, his book also says that someone in the PMO during P VNarasimha Rao-led Congress government had been leaking nuclear secrets to the USand "we are still being snooped".
"Yes, there was a person in the PMO. I have evidence, a letter whichgives graphic details," Singh told a magazine when asked to elaborate onhis contention that there was a mole in the PMO of the previous Congressgovernment.
Without naming anybody, he claimed that "somebody in the PMO was givinginformation about India's nuclear programme to the US. It was during theprevious Congress regime..."
He said "the honour of the Prime minister's Office, to an extent, was atstake. We were snooped, we are still being snooped."
He said the letter (which talked about the PMO mole) came to him a decadeback. "I do not want to sensationalise it. I did not use it then.
"I did not use it when in government, I did not bring it up with the USgovernment to tell them look here, this is what you were doing. All governmentsdo try to find what is happening in which country. Diplomacy requiresinformation.
Asked why he, as a responsible person, did not report this, the BJP leadersaid "what should I have done? It is a call to honour (of the PMO)."
And why he revealed it now, Singh said he had decided so in view of the July18, 2005 Indo-US Joint Statement.
"If you read the letter (that talks about the mole) in the context ofthe debate that has seized India about the July 18 agreement -- about what theUS expects of India -- I am struck by the fact that the US policy has had acontinuity with regard to non-proliferation. It is India's policy that has notreflected the same continuity," he said.
The former external affairs minister, who had been engaged in nuclear talkswith Washington for about five years, said he wanted the countrymen know"what the US really wants".
Queried whether he did not think whatever is in the letter is reflected inthe July 18 Joint Statement, Singh said "I agree. There is a reflection. Ifyou read the full text of the letter you will find echoes of the continuance ofthe US policy in the July 18 agreement."
All inputs from PTI
