THERE is a saying, "War is the mother of lies," and there is yet another saying, "Truth is the first casualty of war." These two sayings have been amply illustrated during the recent Kargil war— a war that should never have happened. However, as war did take place and it captivated the entire nation for two months, there is a need to assess it objectively and to get to the truth even if, like peeling an onion layer by layer, it takes time to get to the core.
Unfortunately, because of the general elections in the country, there was a perceptible slide from nationalism to jingoism and all critical discussion on the political and military causes of the war, the accountability of the government, intelligence agencies and the defence services was sought to be silenced by the injunction that no one should belit-tle the sacrifices of the "heroes of Kargil". Thus, an impression was created by the government and some parties that anyone who was critical of the conduct of the war was anti-national. The services too consider criticism of their organisation and leadership as "not in good taste". Thus, both the government and the services have built halo around themselves which they hope will be reinforced by the three-man committee reviewing the war. However, as Captain Liddell Hart, a brilliant strategist and author of
Indirect Approac h, has said, "Whoever habitually suppresses the truth, will produce a deformity from the womb of his thought..." and that "the growth of public criticism is a healthy one— evidence of vitality, not of despondency". Therefore, if we have to see vibrant natio-nal, foreign and defence policies emerge after Kargil, then we must analyse the Kargil war in depth— fearlessly and obj-ectively. Flaunting patriotism is hardly a substitute for a balanced, realistic and objec-tive appraisal of the war.
That there was an intelligence failure is obvious, as both the government and the army were taken by surprise. All the intelligence agencies— RAW, IB, the army and the BSF as well as the provincial units— failed to provide a clear picture of the Pakistani build-up. In other words, if we were alert and inquisitive, we ought to have got indica-tions of the build-up, unless the deception plan of Pakistan was exceptionally brilliant.
Unfortunately, most intelligence agencies generally give vague, repetitive and unprocessed informa-tion, which can't be really called intelligence. Like earlier wars, well-processed and analysed intelligence seems to have been at a premium even in this conflict. In future, then, every attempt must be made to coordinate all intelligence systems (from satellite imagery, air reconnaissance, remote-controlled vehicles reconnaissance, wireless interceptions, electronic sensors to human agencies). All the intelligence agencies han-dling these systems also must coordinate to provide the defence services and the government a comprehensive picture. The present Joint Intelligence Committee is not adequately structured to deal with this and what the defence services need is an equivalent of the Defence Intelligence Agency, an organisation which the US forces possess and which closely interacts with the CIA and possibly the FBI.
One of the things which the Kargil war will be most remembered for is that the political euphoria created by the "bus diplomacy" seems to have clouded everybody's judgment. Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's calling the intrusion a betrayal by Pakistan testi-fies to such a perception. The higher military leadership also seemed to have got carried away by political assessments and might have concluded that Pakistan had no aggressive intentions. Such mis-readings are not new in history Lord Chamberlain and Stalin had both misread Hitlers aims and intentions. But what amazes one is the lack of moral courage on the part of both the political and mil-itary leadership to accept that besides inadequate intelligence, it was their own assessment which went wrong. It is not clear why even the army, which always has its ear to the ground, was unable to appreciate the impending threat realistically.
The troops on the ground are never adequate to hold all of the LoC, especially in the Kargil sector which stretches about 150 km. Deployments are made based on likely routes of ingress, with the shoulders of the valleys being strongly held. The gaps between the main positions are covered with lighter deploy
ONCE the intrusions of the Pakistani troops and militants were discovered, the government and the army made many initial blunders. Defence minister George Fernandes declared that the intru ders would be thrown out in 48 hours, while the army kept reacting to the intrusions piecemeal. They sent forw a rd a small body of troops without adequate preparations and with plans which were not well-coordinated. Without adequate information and insufficient artillery or air support, these troops were beaten back with heavy casualties. The government , the army and the nation were bewildered and disori-ented for almost 20 days before a cohesive responsse in terms of air attacks, proper build-up of troops, fire support means and logistics was in place and well-coordinated attacks could be launched. Simultaneously, the government also swung into action on the diplomatic front to retrieve the situation.
The major decision that needed to be made was whether to cross the LoC so as to threaten Pakistani lines of communication, administrative build-up and communication and control centres or to fight the battle on our own side of the LoC. This is what Captain Hart has to say, "...in the face of the over-whelming evidence of history, no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack on an enemy firmly in position." Militarily it made sense to cross the LoC but politically it was decided to restrict operations to our side of the LoC and tell the world that we were restraining ourselves so as to prevent escalation of the war and the prospect of a nuclear confrontation. Was this political decision justified? Some of the issues which need to be debated are :
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A re we to assume that any nation whose borders have been violated, instead of opting to fight for what is militarily advantageous, opts to restrict its operations to its own areas even at considerable human cost, only to please the international community? Much has been made by the government and the media about the virtues of "restraint". But Pakistan did not respect the LoC, so why should we have respected it? Which western nation would have accepted the violation of its borders and not carried the war into enemy territory? The US and N AT O did not restrain themselves in Yugoslavia and besides inflicting heavy civilian casualties, they destroyed the entireinfrastructure of that country only to ensure that their ground troops did not have to fight and suffer casualties. One also cannot imagine China exercising such "restraint " .
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That a direct attack on our side of the LoC on fixed Pakistani positions will cause heavy casualties to our troops is known to every military mind. Are we to accept "body bags" in hundreds while western powers, who probably advocated and appreciated our "restraint", would not accept a single such "body bag" coming home? As General Patton used to say, he did not want his men to die for his country, he wanted the enemy to do so. In such decisions, military plans must override diplomatic requirement. The genius of diplomacy lies in being able to support military decisions and yet get favourable international opinion.
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We have declared from the treetops that Kashmir is an integral part of India, that any attack on Kashmir is an attack on India and therefore, we reserve the right to strike across the LoC. the stand which Lal Bahadur Shastri took in 65 when he ordered the army to cross the border and carry the battle into Pakistan. Doesnt our stand on Kargil weaken our stand on Kashmir?
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If there are to be "more Kargils" in the future, as some Pakistani leaders have said, are we to restrain ourselves again to get the backing of the international community, at heavy cost to our troops ?
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It is being presumed that had we crossed the LoC, the escalation might have led to a nuclear confrontation. If that was the government s assessment, Pakistan has obviously succeeded in using its nuclear capability to deter us. Should we have not called this bluff , especially with our superior conventional and nuclear capability? Would the Pakistani leadership be mad enough to use its nuclear weapon just because we crossed the LoC? They are likely to use the nuclear weapon only when the battle situation becomes so critical and desperate for them that the very existence of their nation is h reatened. Somehow, we are obsessed with a perception that the Pakistani leadership is prone to acting irr a t i o n a l l y. In international affairs, brinkmanship exists and in the case of Pakistan it has almost succeeded. Recently, when we unfolded our nuclear doctrine, a large number of Pakistani leaders and intellectuals logically asserted that it would be futile and costly to get into a nuclear arms race with
The army kept reacting to the intrusions piecemeal. They sent forward a small body of troops without adequate preparations and with plans which were not well-coordinated. Without sufficient information, these troops were beaten back with heavy casualties.
It is to the credit of tactical commanders, junior officers and our troops that the plan to recapture the heights dominating the Srinagar-Leh highway succeeded. The junior officers and troops fought with great grit, determination and courage in extremely trying conditions.
