Several books have been written on the 1947 Partition of British India. Historians are still grappling with its causes. Shashi Joshi’s new book deals with the subject differently. It is set apart from other books on two counts. First, it is based exclusively on the private papers of Lord Mountbatten, which have not so far been accessed in their entirety by other historians. Secondly, the book is written not as conventional history but as drama: the dialogue among various participants presents in fact statements and events recorded in the Mountbatten archive. In fictionalizing the settings in which the conversations occur, the author has not deviated from the archival record.
This makes the book fascinating for both, the young seeking information about that momentous event, and for serious historians still searching for the truth behind it. The dramatized form makes it easy reading which leaves its indelible mark on memory. For serious historians the book contains a wealth of information. Its slender look is deceptive: the 190 odd pages are packed with recorded statements as dialogue . The statements sometimes offer clues to what was left unsaid. Lord Mountbatten was of course the central figure of the Partition. The Last Durbar, then, is based on his record of words and views, which obviously cannot be considered all inclusive. There is little doubt that the archive records faithfully the statements made, and that it reflects therefore the truth. But it cannot be considered the whole truth. We know what many of the actors in that drama said. We must fathom what they thought. And that perhaps holds true most of all for Lord Mountbatten himself.
Lord Mountbatten’s appointment itself as India’s last Viceroy was something of a mystery. British Prime Minister Attlee was advised by the King to appoint him. It should be recalled that British Intelligence, MI5 and MI6, are accountable ultimately to the Sovereign, and not the PM. British Central Intelligence had advised the British Secretary of State, as early as 1939, to partition India. The script of the Partition, then, may well have been written elsewhere. Mountbatten read his lines with great panache. Perhaps this is what renowned British journalist James Cameron was hinting at in a BBC programme on India:
"Mountbatten did an extraordinary job of political manipulation without knowing anything about politics. Very, very interesting. He had this strange intuition that he got the information and somehow or other he computerized it and came up with the right answer. But I don’t think he could have ever told you how he came to that conclusion. Very, very, very interesting."
Mountbatten describing his appointment to an interviewer long after his departure from India said that he had long wanted "to be Viceroy. Always had. I spoke about it once or twice to my wife and then it happened." Lady Mountbatten was the grand-daughter of Sir Ernest Cassels, personal banker of King Edward the Seventh. Sir Ernest was an extremely powerful and influential figure behind the scenes.
The popular belief is that Mountbatten guided Nehru. But from remarks in the book it would seem that he himself often took key decisions only after clearance from Nehru. The political aspect of their relationship appeared to be therefore of two equal officers serving the same establishment—not necessarily a relationship of mentor and disciple. One might recall in this context Lord Wavell’s complaint to an aide during his tenure as Viceroy, that often Nehru got information from Whitehall before he himself did. The implications of this are chilling. Wavell must have known what was going on. Was that what Lady Wavell meant when she is quoted in the book telling her husband on the eve of their departure: "Stop worrying about India now. You heard what Churchill said—‘This is Operation Scuttle’."
Jinnah of course had a distinctly uneasy relationship with Mountbatten. But he had secret interaction with Churchill through letters written to a lady who passed them on to Churchill. There has been no satisfactory explanation up to now about this curious mode of communication, or of what was being communicated. Not surprisingly, Mountbatten turned to Churchill for help to make Jinnah accept dominion status in the Commonwealth. In London , an ailing Churchill told Mountbatten: "Give a message from me—tell him: This is a matter of life and death for Pakistan if you do not accept this offer with both hands." Pakistan, of course, did join the Commonwealth as a dominion. Should it surprise us then that a pork-eating, whiskey drinking brown Englishman, Jinnah, represented the Muslims, and that a Harrow and Cambridge educated brown Englishman, Nehru, spoke for the Hindus? It was not required of the Brits to give them orders. Generally, gentle advice in "the old boy network" sufficed. They were suitably ‘programmed’.
The crucial component that made Partition inevitable was of course the bloody riots. When sworn in as Viceroy, on 24 March 1947, Mountbatten declared that the British would quit India by June 1948. He accomplished it actually within five months of taking his oath. The riots facilitated it. When Mountbatten arrived, a great deal of tension existed, created by Congress-Muslim League acrimony. On arrival Mountbatten asked Nehru what was the most pressing problem. Nehru mentioned the economic situation. Mountbatten demurred. "Isn’t the problem of communalism more serious . . . the situation in Punjab cannot wait—the deadlock between the three communities is increasingly grave." Grave, yes, but there were no riots to speak of in March-April, when this conversation took place, were there? The riots flared with Mountbatten’s arrival. Much later, Sardar Patel told Mountbatten: "Since you have come out here, things have got much worse. There is a civil war on and you are doing nothing to stop it. You won’t govern yourself, and you won’t let the central government govern. . . . If you will not act yourself, then turn over full authority to the central government." Indeed, observers have commented on Mountbatten’s inexplicably maladroit deployment of troops, given his military experience: the maladroit deployment of troops facilitated riots. Describing the riots to British officials John Christie and Penderel Moon, Patel’s confidant VP Menon complained: "Not a shot (by the police) was fired, Christie. I have even heard that several British officers, who were appealed to for help by panic-stricken Hindus, told them to seek protection from Gandhi, Nehru and Patel."
One may go on and on and on. The book really needs to be read widely. It offers, on page after page, a rude reminder of the sheer absurdity of Partition. The Congress partitioned the assemblies of Bengal and Punjab even before the Partition of India had been fully decided. Sovereign India and Pakistan were created even before their boundaries had been determined. The farcical handling of Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and other princely states comes out vividly.
After the Kashmir ceasefire Sheikh Abdullah told Mountbatten: "I have been thinking Lord Mountbatten about the suggestion you made to me when I had dinner with you in October, that Kashmir should stand independent but have close relations with both India and Pakistan. Do you still think independence is feasible?"
Mountbatten: "I am afraid true independence is not feasible. But I am trying to expand the Joint Defence Council and through it Kashmir can be dealt with as a state acceding to both dominions rather than to only one." (Are you listening Dr Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf? After 60 years perhaps the time for that to happen has come?)
In effect, the record of all the statements leaves three lasting impressions.
First, about how effectively Mountbatten manipulated all the Indian leaders. After planting an idea in a leader’s mind, Mountbatten would advise him not to mention that they had met.
Secondly, the almost servile deference with which the Indian leaders dealt with him. Even Gandhi sought Mountbatten’s advice about whether he should go to Punjab or Noakhali to defuse communal tension. Mountbatten refused to proffer advice. Years later, in a post-retirement interview, Mountbatten had said: "Krishna Menon and VP Menon were my . . . spies is the wrong word; they were my contacts, my links." Perhaps the word he searched for was "agents". The conversations of the two with Nehru and Patel in this book tend to vindicate this. Incidentally, Nehru and Krishna Menon were the only two to address Mountbatten in private as Dickie.
And thirdly, the conversations of the Congress leaders repeatedly make clear that they were fully aware of reneging on their assurances to the Indian public. In other words, that they were perpetrating a conscious betrayal.
One fervently hopes this book is prescribed in every university of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is not dry history. It recalls men of flesh and blood, full of human frailties, enacting a Greek tragedy of immeasurable magnitude. Young people should know what we were and what we have become. How close we were and how far apart we have drifted. Hopefully, they might then reflect on what went wrong, and what must be done to set it right.
