The book's contents are a fascinating study of the vital facets of the running of a colonial army. It stems from the fact that there was so much to learn from the mistakes then committed, yet they were repeated when India attained Independence and ran its own army, and continue to be so repeated. The book highlights the incompetence of many of the British commanders in various states, a consequence of which was the mutinies that took place; the inadequacies of a system that perpetuates promotions at the highest levels purely on the basis of seniority; the myth of the 'martial race' theme, to which a complete chapter has been devoted; manipulations that are part of any bureaucratic structure, whether civilian or military; and many others.
Particularly impressive is the manner in which Menezes deftly weaves in strands of the political movements of the time into what is a historical record of the Indian army. The post-Independence period is dealt with in two chapters; one dealing with the Nehru years and the other with the post-Nehru years. While the actions undertaken by the Indian army during these periods is documented in brief, the author is inexorably drawn into the political drama of the time. Various other actions of the Indian army, from operations in Jammu and Kashmir in '47-48, to counter-insurgency in the Northeast and in j&k since 1989, are all briefly touched upon.
The post-script is more a review of the national security perspective from a political point of view rather than a continuation of the theme of the history of the Indian army. Though it was added to the earlier edition that dealt with events up to about 1992, Menezes takes us back well beyond 1992 in some cases to highlight the points he has set out to make. Even so, for analysts of contemporary events, the points he makes are most relevant, and cover various themes stressed from time to time in the last few decades; like the inadequacy of a national security strategic culture, civilian control over the military being taken to mean bureaucratic control rather than political control, the totally outdated form of higher defence organisation, and so on.
In all, a must for all military institutions and those dealing with national security.
