FOR the tea industry, the nightmare in Assam is far from over. Even as Tata Tea's pointsman in Guwahati, Brajen Gogoi, continues to be in judicial custody for his alleged links with the banned United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the authorities have come across fresh clues about the tea giant's dealings with another outlawed organisation, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Officials of another tea major, Williamson Magor, which was under the microscope for having regularly paid Bodo militants, also had to face interrogation by the Assam Police on October 16.
Four days earlier, Tata Tea's outgoing managing director R.K. Krishna Kumar and executive director S.M. Kidwai were grilled once again by the police for having withheld information about the company's dealings with the NDFB. According to documents available with the authorities, Tata Tea had bought air tickets to and from Delhi for four top NDFB militants and held a meeting with them in a Delhi hotel this February. During an earlier interrogation session, neither Krishna Kumar nor Kidwai had mentioned this.
A top official involved in investigating the case said: "We wanted the company's version on this episode and that is why they were summoned here. The four persons in question are the main militants of the outfit. Had they been taken care of, there would be no NDFB today."
The Tatas, of course, have their own defence. Quarter-page ads in local dailies issued by Tata Tea refuted the state government's claims that the company had not kept the authorities informed. The company claimed that after one of its managers was shot at in early January, it had written to the state police chief and the then home commissioner asking for additional security, but none was provided. As a result, the company said, "our officials were forced to meet NDFB representatives in order to prevent further threats to the lives of company employees." Tata Tea, however, admitted to having paid for the air fare to the militants since "they wanted to meet outside Assam".
The Tatas feel they are being singled out in a witchhunt, a charge chief minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta denies. "I have no personal enmity towards the Tatas but what I find amazing is that they are still not saying they will not help the militants and that they will cooperate with the government," Mahanta told Outlook. He said other tea companies are also being investigated but pointed out that documentary evidence against most others is not as extensive as in the Tata Tea case. "In this case, we have found several letters, minutes of the meetings between the top militant leaders and company officials; whereas in the case of other tea companies, all that we have so far is account books of the NDFB."
As if the state government's determination to make an example out of the company is not enough, Tata Tea is faced with the wrath of Paresh Barua, chief of the ULFA's militant wing. In a rare statement mid-week, Barua warned the company of "dire consequences" for maintaining double standards in its dealings with the out-fit. Barua is irked with the company for having kept the Intelligence Bureau (IB) informed about its representatives meeting him in Bangkok last year.
Apparently, Tata Tea had kept the then IB additional director, Rattan Sehgal, in the picture about the meeting with Barua. "If Tata Tea is keeping the IB informed of its dealings, it is logical to assume that they have also been taking instructions from the IB as to how they should go about the dealings. This cannot but be regarded as hatching a conspiracy against the ULFA," Barua pointed out. Sehgal is now under investigation and may be questioned by the Assam Police.
Even the chief minister is peeved with the way the IB has chosen to remain silent on the issue. "The IB has no right to authorise Tata Tea to negotiate with the ULFA," Mahanta said. Asked whether he was happy with the way the Central government has dealt with the whole issue, he replied: "There has been no interference at the political level, but at the official level there is an attempt to put obstacles in our way."
Mahanta may be firm on a crackdown, but there are still doubts about the efficiency of the state police force. Over the last seven years, it has been unable to tackle the militants on its own. Hampered by constant political interference, obsolete weaponry, a severe resource crunch and low morale, the 50,000-strong Assam Police is not capable of taking on the militants. In fact, had the police been strong-willed enough, insurgency in Assam wouldn't have mushroomed, security analysts note. "In its early days, the insurgents benefited from the police's tendency to look the other way," a retired bureaucrat points out. Indeed, in the late '80s and early '90s, the constabulary of the state police was largely seen as sympathetic to the ULFA.
"The average policeman regarded the ULFA militants as 'our boys' and hence turned a blind eye to their activities. Today we are reaping the bitter harvest," a former police official complains. The army often used to complain about the 'non-cooperative' attitude of the police force in its fight against insurgency in Assam.
That may be changing now (see box) but it will be a long haul, as is evident from the case of the captured NDFB documents. These were seized in last December by the Army and an FIR was filed, but it is only now that the police have begun acting on them. These captured accounts books of the banned outfit have become the basis on which at least 10 state government officials of various departments such as sales tax, transport and forests have been arrested for having regularly paid money to the NDFB. Most of these officials were posted at the Srirampur check gate, the gateway to the Northeast. Some 30 others have secured anticipatory bail. Top state government officials insist the crackdown will be across the board irrespective of the company, individual or official involved. The question being asked now is: why has it taken the police 10 long months to initiate arrests? Quite clearly, political and bureaucratic will has been lacking till now.
