Last month, Finland joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a full member, thus ending speculations on whether it will embrace the Cold War-era Western security organisation. Though a European country joining NATO is an expected geopolitical move, what raises apprehensions is the timing of Finland’s admission after maintaining neutrality even during the height of the Cold War.
As Russia and Ukraine have been locked in a full-blown war for the last one year, in this context, the admission of Finland is raising more apprehensions regarding whether Finland’s move will influence the future course of the war? Secondly, after Finland’s admission into this West-sponsored military bloc, will there be a confrontation between Russia and NATO?
Looking at the present strategic move of Finland and NATO, it appears that it will have a spill-over effect on strategic developments in European and Eurasian security. The question that arises is whether Finland is aggravating its security by joining NATO? Will Finnish policymakers emulate the Baltic countries who have joined NATO as its frontline ally against Russia? Some of these questions need to be discussed at length.
Finland-Russia relationship in historical context
To study the context and repercussions of Finland joining NATO, it is necessary to study the dictum of geostrategy outlined by German geo-strategist Carl von Clausewitz in his classic book The Principles of War. In this book, he highlighted, “This encirclement of the enemy necessitates a greater deployment of forces in the front line for the aggressor.”
Applying the logic of ‘encirclement’ highlighted by Clausewitz, the move to admit Finland is a well-calculated move on by NATO to give Russia a strategic surprise, thus posing a substantial threat. In geostrategic terms, the move is to a large extent shaped by the historical context. Therefore, going by the logic, it can be argued that, unlike Ukraine, Russia shares a historical rivalry with the Nordic countries of Europe. The same was more prominently reflected in the 18th-century geopolitics of Europe where there was an intense move within Europe to checkmate the rise of Russia. The same was reflected in Frederick Bernard Singleton’s book A Short History of Finland (1998).
In this book, Singleton argues that there was a sense of apprehension among the Finnish political elites —'Hats’ and ‘Caps— regarding the nature of the alliance with Russia. The Hats with extensive support from Sweden and France entered a war during 1741-43. Russia "routed" the Swedish and Finnish army, which was operating "under the patronage of" France. The decisive battle took place in Lappeenranta, as the book suggests. However, as the Singleton’s study suggests, the Caps group advised not to wage war with Russia after understanding its severe consequences for Finland. Analysing the historical strategic trajectories is necessary to understand the present move of Finland. One question that needs to be underlined here is how far Finland will benefit by joining NATO or if it is a Waterloo — as happened in the 18th century. This question requires an in-depth analysis.
The geopolitical context of Finland-NATO relationship
After maintaining its neutral position for a long time, Finland joined NATO quite hurriedly. Explaining this, the government said, “Finland reassessed its security policy situation and applied for NATO membership.” The Finland government further said “NATO membership will strengthen stability and security in Finland and throughout the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe”. Similarly, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Twitter underlined that “Finland is safer and NATO is stronger with Finland as an Ally Welcome to our Alliance”.
As expected, Russia responded to Finland’s joining NATO membership quite firmly. The spokesperson of Russia's Presidential Administration, Dmitry Peshkov, stated, “The Kremlin believes that this is yet another escalation and that NATO’s expansion is posing a threat to our security and the interests of the Russian Federation. We will take countermeasures to ensure our own security both tactically and strategically.”
Finland expects that, under clause 5 of the membership provision, Finland will get the necessary protection from NATO in case of war. However, it is necessary to look at strategic developments that have taken place in the past one month since Finland joined NATO.
Just after joining NATO, Director General for Defence Policy Janne Kuusela said, “Nuclear weapons have a central role in the deterrence and defence built by NATO. We will also enjoy the protection from them. Therefore, it is a positive matter for Finland to participate in full in different ways and by no means shut itself out of it.”
This statement of Kuusela is contrary to Finland’s earlier position that it will not permit the deployment of nuclear weapons. One can infer that it may recreate a form of ‘security dilemma’ as witnessed during the Cold War.
As expected, Russia's response to the war is also entirely on the desired line. Just after Finland joined NATO, Russia was reported to be moving its nuclear weapons to strategically-located Belarus. However, it is a symbolic move by Russia to counter NATO’s strategy of encirclement. But it raised a potential question regarding the future course of the Russia-Ukraine War. Numerous reports suggest that Russia is also beefing up the security at the 1,300-kilometer Russia-Finland border by deploying sophisticated missiles.
Strategic consequences of Finland joining NATO
Despite considerable support among the Finnish population for joining NATO in contrast to the earlier approach, it certainly generates a sense of apprehension regarding the long-term consequences of Finland’s strategic move. This is a cause for larger concern.
One significant strategic consequence of Finland joining NATO will be felt in the Arctic region where Russia and Finland share a border, along with other Arctic littoral countries. All the littoral countries of the Arctic have not-so-friendly relations with Russia. Russia's move to beef up its Arctic presence can be evident from the Rogachevo airfield in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. Since the airbase is located near the Northern Sea Route and will station all the advanced fighter planes, the geopolitics of the Arctic region is likely to undergo a tectonic shift.
It may be recalled here that Russia has a military brigade known as the Alakurtti. One may remember here that before joining NATO, it and Norway carried out military exercises in March 2023. Russia also carried out similar activities near the borders of Finland and Norway in January 2023.
If the Russia-Ukraine War shifts to the Arctic frontier, it will give a new twist to Arctic geopolitics and may also have repercussions for the adjoining Indo-Pacific Region.
What are India’s concerns?
If the security of the Arctic region is volatile, it is also a cause of concern for India. India has considerable interest in Russia’s Siberia and Far East energy sectors.
Similarly, India also has an observer status in the Arctic Council, where Russia and Finland are members. At the same time, India shares excellent relations with Finland and the Nordic countries through an institutional framework of the India-Nordic Summit.
On the bilateral front, India and Finland cooperate in information technology, climate change, and renewable energy sectors. Thus, any hostile security environment, whether in the Arctic or the Nordic Frontier, is a cause of concern for India.
Conclusion
Despite a strategic convergence between Finland and NATO over the Russia-Ukraine War, Finland may face strategic repercussions of joining NATO in the long-run.
These apprehensions mainly emanate because Finland is located in the vicinity of Russia’s border. Any NATO military presence in its vicinity might provoke Russia to respond quite aggressively.
Finland has committed a strategic blunder by giving up its buffer status and Cold War posturing of neutrality. As discussed above, Finland’s political leadership should follow the logic the ‘Caps’ group gave in the 18th century.
(Nalin Kumar Mohapatra is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The views expressed are personal to the author.)
