Nineteen million Sri Lankans heaved a collective sigh of relief when the newMahinda Rajapakse government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam agreed tohold another round of talks in Geneva between April 19 and 21, at their meetingat the same location after a three-year hiatus. Despite a four-year ceasefire,(it was signed on February 22, 2002, four years to the day when last week’stalks commenced), talks have been stalled since April 2003, when the Tigerspulled out after being shut out at a donors’ meeting in the US.
A little over a month before the latest round of talks, violence, especiallyin the north east had pushed the truce to its brink. Claymore mine attacksbecame rampant, targeting the armed forces. The Sri Lanka Navy became one of themain targets when its craft came under repeated attacks in the north eastern andnorth western waters. In one of the major hits, 13 sailors died and the Israelibuilt Dvora attack craft, in which they were patrolling the north eastern watersoff Trincomalee, was sunk on January 7, in what the Navy now suspects to be anattack launched by an LTTE suicide cadre.
The fresh wave of attacks commenced on December 4, 2005, a week after LTTEleader Velupillai Prabhakaran warned, in his annual Heroes’ Day speech, thatthe Tigers would ‘have no option’ but to return to hostilities if PresidentRajapakse failed to come up with a viable power devolution proposal. Rajapaksehad been sworn in just seven days before the speech, after winning the tightlycontested election by a slim 140,000 votes, that too with the help of hard-lineparties in the south, who oppose wide power-sharing with the Tigers.
The Tigers, however, denied any role in December-January attacks andresponsibility was claimed by a shadowy front organisation calling itself theTamil Resurgence Force (TRF). The TRF claimed, in a number of letters, includingone to the truce monitors, that it consisted of ‘armed civilians’ inside government-controlledareas, on the ready to attack the security forces. Significantly, the Tigersimparted basic military training to civilians in areas under their rule beforethe attacks commenced.
Government forces, however, clearly blamed the attacks on the Tigers andtheir active supporters, claiming the cover of civilians. In the ensuingviolence, 120 persons, including 80 service and police personnel and scores ofcivilians, have died. In one particularly ugly incident, five Tamil youth werekilled in Trincomalee in execution style just five days before the Navy gunboatwas blown up. Thirteen members of the Sri Lanka police have been taken in forquestioning on suspicion for the attack.
More than 16,000 people have fled government areas to Tiger-controlledterritory, and the northern Jaffna Peninsula, which is under the government,once again looked like a garrison town.
Only international pressure – the Americans made a not-so-veiled threat inColombo that they would assist the government in the event that hostilitieserupted again – and doggedness on the part of the Norwegian peace brokerssalvaged the situation and reopened negotiations. However, when the two sideswere making last minute preparations for talks in Geneva, Norwegian SpecialPeace Envoy Erik Solheim cautioned against entertaining high expectations. Hisanxiety was partly influenced by the violence of the last two months, as also bythe fissures that had erupted between the two sides since they last met. Infact, other than the Norwegians, only three of the 2003 representatives had madeit back to negotiating table. Consecutive government changes in Colomboguaranteed that the entire government delegation was new. From the Tigers’side, only chief negotiator Anton Balasingham, Political Wing Head S.P.Tamilselvan and Balasingham’s wife, Adele, who acts as a secretary at talks,remained. Crucially, one of their former co-negotiators, VinayagamoorthiMuralitharan alias Karuna, had broken ranks in early 2004 and launched arebellion against Prabhakaran’s leadership in the eastern parts of Sri Lanka.The Karuna rebellion constitutes a serious headache for the Tigers, and was oneof its main complaints at the Geneva talks.
The government side had its own list of grievances, the most prominent ofwhich was the August 2005 assassination of former Foreign Minister, LakshmanKadirgamar, blamed on the Tigers.
The talks got off to a rough start, with the two sides bickering over whoshould have first claim on the floor, and over talking to the Press. Both sidescame to Geneva pushing widely divergent agendas. The government wanted the truceagreement, signed by the 2002 government under the stewardship of a politicalopponent, amended. The Tigers had the disarming of the Karuna faction on the topof their list.
In his opening remarks, Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva, the head of the governmentdelegation, declared: "Our delegation affirms and emphasizes the position ofthe government of Sri Lanka that the Ceasefire Agreement entered into betweenthe then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe and Mr. V. Prabhakaran, the leaderof the LTTE, on 22nd February 2002 is contrary to our Constitution and law."He added further that the LTTE had taken "undue and unfair advantage of theceasefire to strengthen its military capability". Balasingham countered in hisopening statement with the argument: "I should say that it is the truceagreement that has helped to avert the outbreak of an all-out war and createdthe present environment where both the parties could engage in dialogue."
At times the talks appeared to be little more than a trading of charges. DeSilva listed 3,519 cases of ceasefire violations by the Tigers and a further5,368 cases of under-aged combatants in Tiger ranks. Balasingham said that28,830 house-owners had been forcibly evicted and 13,000 acres of farm landtaken over by the Army to establish High Security Zones in Jaffna. The onlypoint of apparent convergence was that the truce agreement was the only way topursue a negotiated settlement. At the end of the two-day meeting, theNorwegians released a short statement seeped in diplomatic jargon, but with fewspecifics:
The government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE are committed to taking measures to ensure that there will be no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions or killings.
The LTTE is committed to taking all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the security forces and police. The government of Sri Lanka is committed to taking all necessary measures in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement to ensure that no armed group or person other than government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations.
Both sides hailed the outcome of the talks as a victory for their respectivedelegations, and the Norwegians declared that the result had exceeded theirexpectations.
Finally, however, everything will boil down to the manner in which theagreements arrived at in Geneva will be implemented on the ground back in SriLanka. In the past, both parties have been reluctant to carry outrecommendations made by the truce monitors, and there is no indication thatthere has been any radical change of attitude.
Further, even while the Geneva talks were on, Karuna warned that he expectedthe government forces not to move on his loyalists who operate in the east, hisformer base. In any case, there are influential allies of the Rajapakseadministration who feel that the Karuna factor is one of the biggest cards the governmenthas up its sleeve.
Nevertheless, at least for the time being, Sri Lanka has won a temporarydeferment of war, and can breathe relatively easily, till the next round oftalks pushes up the stakes again.
Amantha Perera is Lecturer, Sri Lanka College of Journalism, Colombo.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia TerrorismPortal
