On October 25, 2004, General Pervez Musharraf 'floated' some 'new ideas' formoving ahead on the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) issue in the ongoing dialogueprocess between India and Pakistan. He called for 'identifying' seven distinctregions in J&K on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). Two regions thathe alluded to are Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the Northern Areas now underPakistani control. The remaining five regions on the Indian side he was alludingto appear to include the Jammu Region (Hindu majority), the Poonch Region andthe Valley of Kashmir (Sunni Muslim dominated), the Kargil Sector (Shia Muslimdominated) and the Ladakh Region (Buddhist majority).
General Musharraf spoke of 'demilitarizing' these regions. He added that theyshould either be granted 'independence', placed under 'Joint Indo-Pakistancontrol,' or under 'UN Mandate'. Faced with criticism in Pakistan for notinsisting on UN Resolutions, he hastened to clarify that all he had done was tofloat a few trial balloons.
The Manmohan Singh Government in New Delhi was placed in an awkward situation byGeneral Musharraf's 'loud thinking'. Musharraf's proposals were very close tothose put forward a few years earlier by the Washington based Kashmir StudyGroup headed by Kashmiri business tycoon Farookh Katwari, who was encouraged bythe Clinton Administration in his efforts. Katwari's proposals sought to divideJ&K on religious lines and to secure a semi-independent status for theKashmir Valley.
There were few takers for these suggestions in New Delhi. Sensing that he hadno option but to respond to General Musharraf's 'trial balloons', Prime MinisterManmohan Singh set out India's position in unambiguous terms when visitingSrinagar on November 17, 2004. Dr. Singh asserted: "I have made it quiteclear that any redrawing of the international border is something which is notgoing to be acceptable to us… Any proposal which smacks of a further divisionof our country on the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to us…Within these two limits we are ready to look into any new proposals".
While the Pakistan Foreign Office predictably termed Dr. Manmohan Singh'sresponse as disappointing and repeatedly kept urging 'flexibility', thepresently unbridgeable gap between India's bottom line on the issue of J&Kand Pakistan's expectations came into clear focus. It is obvious that no amountof diplomatic sophistry can bridge the vast divide between the two countries onwhat Pakistan calls the 'core issue'. Any possibility of a 'solution' to theKashmir issue in the foreseeable future can thus be ruled out.
The question that arises is how the two countries can evolve a frameworkwhich enables them to live with these differences, while demonstrating thattensions are being reduced and that ordinary Kashmiris are proceeding with theirlives with safety, dignity and economic progress.
Pakistan can derive some satisfaction from the fact that it has got New Delhito discuss issues pertaining to J&K in a sustained manner thirty two yearsafter the Simla Agreement was signed. New Delhi, in turn, can now be satisfiedwith the fact that this dialogue is taking place after a public pledge byGeneral Musharraf that he would not allow territory under Pakistan's control tobe used for terrorist activities against India. Pakistan also realizes that itsquest for third party mediation has reached a dead end in world capitals thatmatter - Washington, Moscow, London, Paris and Beijing.
There now appears to be some recognition in Islamabad that while it must keepharping on words like 'core issue' and 'solution' while referring to J&K,what it can practically hope to achieve for the present is an unfreezing of the statusquo in J&K, while simultaneously discussing a wide range of issues toreduce tensions and enhance confidence between the two countries.
Given the predominance of the Army establishment in determining policiestowards India, even a rational economic thinker like Prime Minister Shaukat Azizhas no option but to place a long list of conditions to normalization of tradeand economic relations. But Shaukat Aziz has indicated that such relations couldexpand as negotiations for a South Asian Free Trade Area (scheduled to belaunched in January 2006) pick up momentum. One hopes that credible securityguarantees will be obtained from Iran before the gas pipeline project throughPakistan is finally inked. This project can move ahead once the prices areagreed upon and India completes arrangements for alternate modes oftransportation, should supplies be cut.
A wide range of issues have been discussed under the 'Composite DialogueProcess' between India and Pakistan in recent months. The Foreign Secretaries ofthe two countries have met twice. Foreign Minister Kasuri has visited India andExternal Affairs Minister Natwar Singh was in Pakistan last month. Despite thesemeetings, differences remain over hydroelectric projects like Baglihar andKishenganga in J&K, with Pakistan either seeking World Bank interventionwhere its demands are not met, or stalling a mutually acceptable solution, as inthe Tulbul Navigation project, despite India stopping construction work indeference to Pakistani demands in 1988.
While there has been an inclination on both sides to remain inflexible onmany issues, the most notable achievement has been the agreement to establish abus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad last month. There is also to be abus service between Amritsar and Lahore and for the first time in 30 yearsPakistan has agreed to reopen the rail link between Munabao in Rajasthan andKhokrapar in Sind. A human dimension is now being given to the relationship withpoliticians, judges, lawyers, professionals and business men traveling acrossthe border. But these measures can be best implemented only if the existing visaregime is liberalized and Consulates to issue visas are reopened in Karachi andMumbai.
At the strategic military level, the pace of normalization has been could havebeen faster. The two countries agreed during the Lahore Summit in February 1999to conclude agreements for prior notification of missile tests and to avoidincidents at sea. These agreements are yet to be concluded. Contacts between theDirectors General of Military Operations and the Foreign Secretaries are beingupgraded. Mutual confidence could be further enhanced if there are direct linksbetween the Air Operations Directorates of the two Air Forces.
Further, while India has spelt out its nuclear doctrine to Pakistan, therehas been no reciprocity on this score. It is evident that Pakistan wishes tomaintain a posture of ambiguity on its nuclear doctrine in order to constantlyhold out the threat of Kashmir being a 'nuclear flashpoint' to the internationalcommunity, though this threat carries little credibility presently. New Delhirecognizes that while the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is 'India specific',Pakistan is not going to get into a suicide mode of using nuclear weapons unlessits very survival is at stake.
There are still a number of areas where cooperation, confidence and contactsbetween India and Pakistan can be expanded. India should ensure that a largenumber of tourists from Pakistan are welcomed in J&K throughout the touristseason. Srinagar should be expeditiously made into an international airport. Busroutes between Kargil and Skardu and Jammu and Sialkot are other measures thatcan be taken soon. Moves need also to be initiated for free trade across the LoC.
But amidst interest in such measures a degree of caution needs to beinjected. Because of threats posed to American interests and his own security,General Musharraf has curbed the activities of two ISI supported Pakistanigroups, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) inJ&K. But other groups like the Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) continue to operatewith support from the ISI.
While overall casualties and infiltration levels have gone down, Pakistanbased terrorist groups are now pointedly targeting vulnerable security forcesinstallations, government offices and politicians who do not toe Islamabad'sline in Jammu and Kashmir. The infrastructure for promoting terrorism in Jammuand Kashmir still remains intact. Pakistan is also arming and training insurgentgroups operating in India's northeast with active cooperation from the KhaledaZia government in Bangladesh.
New Delhi appears to believe that it can and should move ahead on the process ofnormalization even if General Musharraf does not fully keep the promise he madeon January 6, 2004, to end all support for terrorism on Pakistan controlledterritory. It, however, remains to be seen how the military establishment inPakistan acts in coming months on its policies of wanting to 'weaken India fromwithin' and 'bleeding India with a thousand cuts'.
The picture will become clearer when the winter snows melt in the Himalayas.
G. Parthasarathy is a columnist and former Indian High Commissioner toPakistan. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South AsiaTerrorism Portal
