[From Z Magazine, May 2002]
QUESTION & ANSWER
Background To The Israel-Palestine Crisis
STEPHEN R. SHALOM
What are the modernorigins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
Who were the Jews who came to Palestine?
Who were the indigenous people of Palestine?
How did the Zionists acquire land in Palestine?
Was Palestinian opposition to Zionism a result of anti-Semitism?
What was the impact of World War II on the Palestine question?
What were the various positions in 1947?
What did the UN do and why?
Didn't Palestinians have a chance for a state of their own in1947, but they rejected it by going to war with Israel?
Didn't Israel achieve larger borders in 1948 as a result ofa defensive war of independence?
Why did Palestinians become refugees in 1948?
Why did Israel expel the Palestinians?
How did the international community react to the problem ofthe Palestinian refugees?
Did the Arab countries take steps to resettle the Palestinianrefugees?
Hasn't there been a population exchange, with Jews fromArab lands coming to Israel and replacing the Palestinians?
How were the Palestinians who remained within Israeltreated?
Following 1948, didn't the Arab states continually try todestroy Israel?
How were the Occupied Territories occupied?
How did the international community respond to the Israelioccupation?
How did the United States respond to the Israeli occupation?
What progress was made toward justice for Palestinians duringthe first two decades of the occupation?
What was the first Intifada?
What were the Oslo Accords?
How did Israel respond to the Oslo Accords?
What was the impact of the Oslo accords?
What was U.S. policy during this period?
What caused the second Intifada?
Who is Ariel Sharon?
How did Israel respond to this second Intifada?
What has U.S. policy been?
What caused the current crisis?
Is there a way out?
Don't the Arabs already have 22 states? Why do they needanother one?
How can terrorists be given a state?
Won't an independent Palestinian state threaten Israelisecurity?
Isn't the Palestinian demand for the right of return just aploy to destroy Israel?
Don't Palestinians just view their own state as the firststep in eliminating Israel entirely?
Is a two-state solution just?Â
During World War I, Britain made three different promises regarding historic Palestine.Arab leaders were assured that the land would become independent; in the Balfourdeclaration, Britain indicating its support for a Jewish national home in Palestine; andsecretly Britain arranged with its allies to divide up Ottoman territory, with Palestinebecoming part of the British empire. Historians have engaged in detailed exegesis of therelevant texts and maps, but the fundamental point is that Britain had no moral right toassign Palestine to anyone: by right Palestine belonged to its inhabitants.
In the late years of the 19th century, anti-Semitism became especially virulent inRussia and re-emerged in France. Some Jews concluded that only in a Jewish state wouldJews be safe and thus founded Zionism. Most Jews at the time rejected Zionism, preferringinstead to address the problem of anti-Semitism through revolutionary or reformistpolitics or assimilation. And for many orthodox Jews, especially the small Jewishcommunity in Palestine, a Jewish state could only be established by God, not by humans. Atfirst Zionists were willing to consider other sites for their Jewish state, but theyeventually focused on Palestine for its biblical connections. The problem, however, wasthat although a Zionist slogan called Palestine "a land without people for a peoplewithout land," the land was not at all empty.
Following World War I, Britain arranged for the League of Nations to make Palestine aBritish "mandate," which is to say a colony to be administered by Britain andprepared for independence. To help justify its rule over Arab land, Britain arranged thatone of its duties as the mandatory power would be to promote a Jewish national home.
The early Zionist settlers were idealistic, often socialist, individuals, fleeingoppression. In this respect they were like the early American colonists. But also like theAmerican colonists, many Zionists had racist attitudes toward the indigenous people andlittle regard for their well-being.1
Some Zionists thought in terms of Arab-Jewish cooperation and a bi-national state, butmany were determined to set up an exclusively Jewish state (though to avoid antagonizingthe Palestinians, they decided to use the term Jewish "national home" ratherthan "state" until they were able to bring enough Jews to Palestine).
Jewish immigration to Palestine was relatively limited until the 1930s,.when Hitlercame to power. The U.S. and Europe closed their doors to immigration by desperate jews,making Palestine one of the few options.
Pro-Israel propaganda has argued that most Palestinians actually entered Palestineafter 1917, drawn to the economic dynamism of the growing Jewish community, and thus haveno rights to Palestine. This argument has been elaborated in Joan Peters' widely promotedbook, From Time Immemorial. However, the book has been shown to be fraudulent andits claim false.2 The indigenous populationwas mostly Muslim, with a Christian and a smaller Jewish minority. As Zionists arrivedfrom Europe, the Muslims and Christians began to adopt a distinctly Palestinian nationalidentity.
Some was acquired illegally and some was purchased from Arab landlords with fundsprovided by wealthy Jews in Europe. Even the legal purchases, however, were often morallyquestionable as they sometimes involved buying land from absentee landlords and thenthrowing the poor Arab peasants off the land. Land thus purchased became part of theJewish National Fund which specified that the land could never be sold or leased to Arabs.Even with these purchases, Jews owned only about 6% of the land by 1947.
Anti-Semitism in the Arab world was generally far less severe than in Europe. Beforethe beginning of Zionist immigration, relations among the different religious groups inPalestine were relatively harmonious. There was Palestinian anti-Semitism, but no peoplewill look favorably on another who enter one's territory with the intention of setting uptheir own sovereign state. The expulsion of peasants from their land and the frequentZionist refusal to employ Arabs exacerbated relations.
As World War II approached, Britain shrewdly calculated that they could afford toalienate Jews -- who weren't going to switch to Hitler's side -- but not Arabs, so theygreatly restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine. But, of course, this was preciselywhen the need for sanctuary for Europe's Jews was at its height. Many Jews smuggled theirway into Palestine as the United States and other nations kept their borders closed tofrantic refugees.
At the end of the war, as the enormity of the Holocaust became evident, for the firsttime Zionism became a majority sentiment among world Jewry. Many U.S. Christians alsosupported Zionism as a way to absolve their guilt for what had happened, without having toallow Jews into the United States. U.S. Zionists, who during the war had subordinatedrescue efforts to their goal of establishing a Jewish state,3 argued that the Holocaust proved more than ever the need for aJewish state: Had Israel existed in 1939, millions of Jews might have been saved.Actually, Palestine just narrowly avoided being overrun by the Nazis, so Jews would havebeen far safer in the United States than in a Jewish Palestine.
During the war many Jews in Palestine had joined the British army. By war's end, theJewish community in Palestine was well armed, well-organized, and determined to fight. ThePalestinians were poorly armed, with feudal leaders. The Mufti of Jerusalem had beenexiled by the British for supporting an Arab revolt in 1936-39 and had made his way toBerlin during the war where he aided Nazi propaganda. From the Zionist point of view, itwas considered a plus to have the extremist Mufti as the Palestinians' leader; as DavidBen Gurion, the leader of the Jewish community in Palestine and Israel's first primeminister, advised in 1938, "rely on the Mufti."4
Both the Palestinians and the Zionists wanted the British out so they could establishan independent state. The Zionists, particularly a right-wing faction led by MenachimBegin, launched a terror campaign against Britain. London, impoverished by the war,announced that it was washing its hands of the problem and turning it over to the UnitedNations (though Britain had various covert plans for remaining in the region).
The Zionists declared that having gone through one of the great catastrophes of modernhistory, the Jewish people were entitled to a state of their own, one into which theycould gather Jewish refugees, still languishing in the displaced persons camps of Europe.The Zionist bottom line was a sovereign state with full control over immigration. ThePalestinians argued that the calamity that befell European Jews was hardly their fault. IfJews were entitled to a state, why not carve it out of Germany? As it was, Palestine hadmore Jewish refugees than any other place on Earth. Why should they bear the full burdenof atoning for Europe's sins? They were willing to give full civil rights (though notnational rights) to the Jewish minority in an independent Palestine, but they were notwilling to give this minority the right to control immigration, and bring in more of theirco-religionists until they were a majority to take over the whole of Palestine.
A small left-wing minority among the Zionists called for a binational state inPalestine, where both peoples might live together, each with their national rightsrespected. This view had little support among Jews or Palestinians.
In November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into twoindependent states, a Jewish state and an Arab state, joined by an economic union, withJerusalem internationalized.
In 1947 the UN had many fewer members than it does today. Most Third World nations werestill colonies and thus not members. Nevertheless, the partition resolution passed onlybecause the Soviet Union and its allies voted in favor and because many small states weresubject to improper pressure. For example, members of the U.S. Congress told thePhilippines that it would not get U.S. economic aid unless it voted for partition. Moscowfavored partition as a way to reduce British influence in the region; Israel was viewed aspotentially less pro-Western than the dominant feudal monarchies.
In 1947 Jews were only one third of the population of Palestine and owned only 6% ofthe land. Yet the partition plan granted the Jewish state 55% of the total land area. TheArab state was to have an overwhelmingly Arab population, while the Jewish state wouldhave almost as many Arabs as Jews. If it was unjust to force Jews to be a 1/3 minority inan Arab state, it was no more just to force Arabs to be an almost 50% minority in a Jewishstate.
The Palestinians rejected partition. The Zionists accepted it, but in private Zionistleaders had more expansive goals. In 1938, during earlier partition proposals, Ben Gurionstated, "when we become a strong power after the establishment of the state, we willabolish partition and spread throughout all of Palestine."5
The Mufti called Palestinians to war against partition, but in fact very fewPalestinians responded. The "decisive majority" of Palestinians, confided BenGurion, "do not want to fight us." The majority "accept the partition as afait accompli," reported a Zionist Arab affairs expert. The 1936-39 Arab revoltagainst the British had mass popular support, but the 1947-48 fighting between the Mufti'sfollowers and the Zionist military forces had no such popular backing.6
But even if Palestinians were fully united in going to war against the partition plan,this can provide no moral justification for denying them their basic right of self-determination for more than half a century. This right is not a function of this or thatagreement, but a basic right to which every person is entitled. (Israelis don't lose theirright to self-determination because their government violated countless UN cease-fireresolutions.)
Arab armies crossed the border on May 15, 1948, after Israel declared its independence.But this declaration came three and a half months before the date specified in thepartition resolution. The U.S. had proposed a three month truce on the condition thatIsrael postpone its declaration of independence. The Arab states accepted and Israelrejected, in part because it had worked out a secret deal with Jordan's King Abdullah,whereby his Arab Legion would invade the Palestinian territory assigned to the Palestinianstate and not interfere with the Jewish state. (Since Jordan was closely allied toBritain, the scheme also provided a way for London to maintain its position in theregion.) The other Arab states invaded as much to thwart Abdullah's designs as to defeatIsrael.7
Most of the fighting that ensued took place on territory that was to be part of thePalestinian state or the internationalized Jerusalem. Thus, Israel was primarily fightingnot for its survival, but to expand its borders at the expense of the Palestinians. Formost of the war, the Israelis actually held both a quantitative and qualitative militaryedge, even apart from the fact that the Arab armies were uncoordinated and operating atcross purposes.8
When the armistice agreements were signed in 1949, the Palestinian state haddisappeared, its territory taken over by Israel and Jordan, with Egypt in control of theGaza Strip. Jerusalem, which was to have been internationalized, was divided betweenIsraeli and Jordanian control. Israel now held 78% of Palestine. Some 700,000 Palestinianshad become refugees.
The Israeli government claim is that Palestinians chose to leave Palestine voluntarily,instructed to do so via radio broadcasts from Arab leaders who wanted to clear a path fortheir armies. But radio broadcasts from the area were monitored by the British andAmerican governments and no evidence of general orders to flee has ever been found. On thecontrary, there are numerous instances of Arab leaders telling Palestinians to stay put,to keep their claim to the territory.9People flee during wartime for a variety of reasons and that was certainly the case here.Some left because war zones are dangerous environments. Some because of Zionist atrocities-- most dramatically at Deir Yassin where in April 1948 254 defenseless civilians wereslaughtered. Some left in panic, aided by Zionist psychological warfare which warned thatDeir Yassin's fate awaited others. And some were driven out at gunpoint, with killings tospeed them on their way, as in the towns of Ramle and Lydda.10
There is no longer any serious doubt that many Palestinians were forcibly expelled. Theexact numbers driven out versus those who panicked or simply sought safety is stillcontested, but what permits us to say that all were victims of ethnic cleansing is thatIsraeli officials refused to allow any of them to return. (In Kosovo, any ethnic Albanianrefugee, whether he or she was forced out at gunpoint, panicked, or even left to make iteasier for NATO to bomb, was entitled to return.) In Israel, Arab villages were bulldozedover, citrus groves, lands, and property seized, and their owners and inhabitantsprohibited from returning. Indeed, not only was the property of "absentee"Palestinians expropriated, but any Palestinians who moved from one place within Israel toanother during the war were declared "present absentees" and their propertyexpropriated as well.
Of the 860,000 Arabs who had lived in areas of Palestine that became Israel, only133,000 remained. Some 470,000 moved into refugee camps on the West Bank (controlled byJordan) or the Gaza Strip (administered by Egypt). The rest dispersed to Lebanon, Syria,and other countries.
In part to remove a potential fifth column. In part to obtain their property. In partto make room for more Jewish immigrants. But mostly because the notion of a Jewish statewith a large non-Jewish minority was extremely awkward for Israeli leaders. Indeed,because Israel took over some territory intended for the Palestinian state, there hadactually been an Arab majority living within the borders of Israel. Nor was the idea ofexpelling Palestinians something that just emerged in the 1948 war. In 1937, Ben Gurionhad written to his son, "We will expel the Arabs and take their places ... with theforce at our disposal."11
In December 1948, the General Assembly passed Resolution 194, which declared that"refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighborsshould be permitted to do so" and that "compensation should be paid for theproperty of those choosing not to return." This same resolution was overwhelminglyadopted year after year. Israel repeatedly refused to carry out the terms of theresolution.
Only in Jordan were Palestinians eligible for citizenship. In Lebanon, the governmentfeared that allowing Palestinians to become citizens would disturb the country's delicateChristian-Muslim balance; in Egypt, the shortage of arable land led the government toconfine the Palestinians to the Gaza Strip. It must be noted, however, that thePalestinians were reluctant to leave the camps if that would mean acquiescing in the lossof homes and property or giving up their right to return.
It is sometimes implied that the lack of assistance to Palestinians from Arab nationsjustifies Israel's refusal to acknowledge and address the claims of the refugees. But ifyou harm someone, you are responsible for redressing that harm, regardless of whether thevictim's relatives are supportive.
This argument makes individual Palestinians responsible for the wrong-doing of Arabgovernments. Jews left Arab countries under various circumstances: some were forced out,some came voluntarily, some were recruited by Zionist officials. In Iraq, Jews feared thatthey might be harmed, a fear possibly helped along by some covert bombs placed by Zionistagents.12 But whatever the case, there areno moral grounds for punishing Palestinians (or denying them their due) because of howJews were treated in the Arab world. If Italy were to abuse American citizens, this wouldnot justify the United States harming or expelling Italian-Americans.
Most Arabs lived in the border areas of Israel and, until 1966, these areas were alldeclared military security zones, which essentially meant that Palestinians were livingunder martial law conditions for nearly 20 years. After 1966, Arab citizens of Israelcontinued to be the victims of harsh discrimination: most of the country's land is ownedby the Jewish National Fund which prohibits its sale or lease to non-Jews; schools forPalestinians in Israel are, in the words of Human Rights Watch, "separate andunequal"; and government spending has been funneled so as to keep Arab villagesunderdeveloped. Thousands of Israeli Arabs live in villages declared"unrecognized" and hence ineligible for electricity or any other governmentservices.13
After Israel's victory in the 1948-49 war, there were several opportunities for peace.There was blame on all sides, but Israeli intransigence was surely a prime factor. In1951, a UN peace plan was accepted by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, but rejected byIsrael. When Nasser came to power in Egypt, he made overtures to Israel that wererebuffed. When Nasser negotiated an end to British control of the Suez Canal zone, Israeliintelligence covertly arranged a bombing campaign of western targets in Egypt as a way todiscourage British withdrawal. The plot was foiled, Egypt executed some of the plotters,and Israel responded with a major military attack on Gaza.14 In 1956, Israel joined with Britain and France in invading Egypt,drawing condemnation from the United States and the UN.
In June 1967, Israel launched a war in which it seized all of Palestine (the West Bankincluding East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt), along with the Sinaifrom Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. Large numbers of Palestinians, some living incities, towns, and villages, and some in refugee camps, came under Israeli control. (In2001, half the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories lived in refugee camps.15 The Israeli conquest also sent a new wave ofrefugees from Palestine to surrounding countries.)
Israel's supporters argue that although Israel fired the first shots in this war, itwas a justified preventive war, given that Arab armies were mobilizing on Israel'sborders, with murderous rhetoric. The rhetoric was indeed blood-curdling, and many peoplearound the world worried for Israel's safety. But those who understood the militarysituation -- in Tel Aviv and the Pentagon -- knew quite well that even if the Arabs struckfirst, Israel would prevail in any war. Nasser was looking for a way out and agreed tosend his vice-president to Washington for negotiations. Israel attacked when it did inpart because it rejected negotiations and the prospect of any face-saving compromise forNasser. Menachem Begin, who was an enthusiastic supporter of this (and other) Israeli warswas quite clear about the necessity of launching an attack: In June 1967, he said, Israel"had a choice." Egyptian Army concentrations did not prove that Nasser was aboutto attack. "We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him."16
However, even if it were the case that the 1967 war was wholly defensive on Israel'spart, this cannot justify the continued rule over Palestinians. A people do not lose theirright to self-determination because the government of a neighboring state goes to war.Sure, punish Egypt and Jordan -- don't give them back Gaza and the West Bank (which theyhad no right to in the first place, having joined with Israel in carving up the stillbornPalestinian state envisioned in the UN's 1947 partition plan). But there is no basis forpunishing the Palestinian population by forcing them to submit to foreign militaryoccupation.
Israel immediately incorporated occupied East Jerusalem into Israel proper, announcingthat Jerusalem was its united and eternal capital. It then began to establish settlementsin the Occupied Territories in violation of the Geneva Conventions which prohibit aconquering power from settling its population on occupied territory. These settlements,placed in strategic locations throughout the West Bank and Gaza were intended to"create facts" on the ground to make the occupation irreversible.
In November 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 242. Theresolution emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory bywar" and called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territoryoccupied in the recent conflict." It also called for all countries in the region toend their state of war and to respect the right of each country "to live in peacewithin secure and recognized boundaries."
Israel argued that because resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal from"territories," rather than "the territories," occupied in the recentconflict, it meant that Israel could keep some of them as a way to attain"secure" borders. The official French and Russian texts of the resolutioninclude the definite article, but in any event U.S. officials told Arab delegates that itexpected "virtually complete withdrawal" by Israel, and this was the view aswell of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.17
Palestinians objected to the resolution because it referred to them only in calling for"a just settlement to the refugee problem" rather than acknowledging their rightto self- determination. By the mid-1970s, however, the international consensus -- rejectedby Israel and the United States -- was expanded to include support for a Palestinian statein the West Bank and Gaza, perhaps with insignificant border adjustments.
Prior to the 1967 war, France, not the United States, was Israel's chief weaponssupplier. But now U.S. officials determined that Israel would be an extremely valuableally to have in the Middle East and Washington became Israel's principal military anddiplomatic backer.
Why, given the U.S. concern for Middle Eastern oil, was Washington supporting Israel?This assumes that the main conflict was Israel vs. the Arabs, rather than Israel andconservative, pro-Western Arab regimes vs. radical Arab nationalism. Egypt and Syria hadbeen champions of the latter, armed by the Soviet Union, and threatening U.S. interests inthe region. (On the eve of the 1967, for example, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were militarilybacking opposite sides in a civil war in Yemen. Israel had plotted with Jordan againstPalestinian nationalism in 1948, and in 1970 Israel was prepared to take Jordan's side ina war against Palestinians and Syria.)
Diplomatically, the U.S. soon backed off the generally accepted interpretation ofresolution 242, deciding that given Israel's military dominance no negotiations werenecessary except on Israel's terms. So when Secretary of State Rogers put forward areasonable peace plan, President Nixon privately sent word to Israel that the U.S.wouldn't press the proposal.18 When AnwarSadat, Nasser's successor, proposed a peace plan that included cutting his ties withMoscow, Washington decided he hadn't groveled enough and ignored it. But after Egypt andSyria unsuccessfully went to war with Israel for the limited aim of regaining their lostterritory, and Arab oil states called a limited oil embargo, Washington rethought itsposition. This led in 1979 to the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Agreement under which Israelreturned the Sinai to Egypt in return for peace and diplomatic relations. Egypt thenjoined Israel as a pillar of U.S. policy in the region and the two became the leadingrecipients of U.S. aid in the world.
The Palestine Liberation Organization was formed in 1964, but it was controlled by theArab states until 1969, when Yasser Arafat became its leader. The PLO had many factions,advocating different tactics (some carried out hijackings) and different politics. Atfirst the PLO took the position that Israel had no right to exist and that onlyPalestinians were entitled to national rights in Palestine. This was the mirror image ofthe official Israeli view -- of both the right-wing Likud party and the Labor party --that there could be no recognition of the PLO under any circumstances, even if itrenounced terrorism and recognized Israel, let alone acceptance of a Palestinian state onany part of the Occupied Territories.
By 1976, however, the PLO view had come to accept the international consensus favoringa two-state solution. In January 1976 a resolution backed by the PLO, Egypt, Syria,Jordan, and the Soviet Union was introduced in the Security Council incorporating thisconsensus. Washington vetoed the resolution.19
The 1979 Camp David agreement established peace along the Egyptian-Israeli border, butit worsened the situation for Palestinians. With its southern border neutralized, Israelhad a freer hand to invade Lebanon in 1982 (where the PLO was based) and to tighten itsgrip on the Occupied Territories.
Anger and frustration were growing in the Occupied Territories, fueled by iron-fistedIsraeli repression, daily humiliations, and the establishment of sharply increasingnumbers of Israeli settlements. In December 1987, Palestinians in Gaza launched anuprising, the Intifada, that quickly spread to the West Bank as well. The Intifada waslocally organized, and enjoyed mass support among the Palestinian population. Guns andknives were banned and the main political demand was for an independent Palestinian statecoexisting with Israel.20
Israel responded with great brutality, with hundreds of Palestinians killed. The LaborParty Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, urged Israeli soldiers to break the bones ofPalestinian demonstrators. PLO leader Khalil al-Wazir, who from Tunis had advised therejection of arms, was assassinated (with the approval of Rabin); Israel was especiallyeager to repress Palestinian leaders who advocated a Palestinian state that would coexistwith Israel.21 By 1989, the initialdiscipline of the uprising had faded, as a considerable number of individual acts ofviolence by Palestinians took place. Hamas, an organization initially promoted by theIsraelis as a counterweight to the PLO,22also gained strength; it called for armed attacks to achieve an Islamic state in all ofPalestine.
Arafat had severely weakened his credibility by his flirtation with Saddam Husseinfollowing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. (The Iraqi leader had opportunistically tried tolink his withdrawal from Kuwait to an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.)Israel saw Arafat's weakness as an opportunity. Better to deal with Arafat while he wasweak, before Hamas gained too much influence. Let Arafat police the unruly Palestinians,while Israel would maintain its settlements and control over resources.
The Oslo agreement consisted of "Letters of Mutual Recognition" and aDeclaration of Principles. In Arafat's letter he recognized Israel's right to exist,accepted various UN resolutions, renounced terrorism and armed struggle. Israeli PrimeMinister Rabin in his letter agreed to recognize the PLO as the representative of thePalestine people and commence negotiations with it, but there was no Israeli recognitionof the Palestinian right to a state.
The Declaration of Principles was signed on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993.In it, Israel agreed to redeploy its troops from the Gaza Strip and from the West Bankcity of Jericho. These would be given self-governing status, except for the Israelisettlements in Gaza. A Palestinian Authority (PA) would be established, with a policeforce that would maintain internal order in areas from which Israeli forces withdrew. Leftfor future resolution in "permanent status" talks were all the critical andvexatious issues: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and borders. These talks were tocommence by year three of the agreement.
In September 1995 an interim agreement -- commonly called Oslo II -- was signed. Thisdivided the Occupied Territories into three zones, Area A, Area B, and Area C. (No mentionwas made of a fourth area: Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem.) In area A, the PA was givencivil and security control but not sovereignty; in area B the PA would have civil controland the Israelis security control; and area C was wholly under Israeli control (theseincluded the settlements, the network of connecting roads, and most of the valuable landand water resources of the West Bank). In March 2000, 17% of the West Bank was designatedarea A -- where the vast majority of Palestinians lived -- 24% area B, and 59% area C. Inthe Gaza Strip, with a population of over a million Palestinians, 6,500 Israeli settlerslived in the 20% of the territory that made up area C. Palestinians thus were givenlimited autonomy -- not sovereignty -- over areas of dense population in the Gaza Stripand small, non-contiguous portions of the West Bank (there were 227 separate anddisconnected enclaves),23 which meant thatthe PA was responsible chiefly for maintaining order over poor and angry Palestinians.
Whatever hopes Oslo may have inspired among the Palestinian population, most Israeliofficials had an extremely restricted vision of where it would lead. In a speech inOctober 1995, Rabin declared that there would not be a return to the pre-1967 borders,Jerusalem would remain united and under exclusive Israeli sovereignty, and most of thesettlements would remain under Israeli sovereignty. Rabin said he wanted the"entity" that Palestinians would get to be "less than a state."24 Under Rabin, settlements were expanded and hebegan a massive program of road-building, meant to link the settlements and carve up theWest Bank. (These by-pass roads, built on confiscated Palestinian land and U.S.- funded,were for Israelis only.)
In 1995, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli and he was succeeded as primeminister by Shimon Peres. But Peres, noted his adviser Yossi Beilin, had an even morelimited view than Rabin, wanting any future Palestinian state to be located only in Gaza.25 Yossi Sarid, head of the moderate left Israeliparty Meretz, said that Peres's plan for the West Bank was "little different"from that of Ariel Sharon.26 Settlementsand by-pass roads expanded further.
In May 1996, Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu who was openly opposed to the Oslo accords waselected prime minister. Netanyahu reneged on most of the already agreed on Israeli troopwithdrawals from occupied territory, continued building settlements and roads, stepped upthe policy of sealing off the Palestinian enclaves, and refused to begin the final statustalks required by Oslo.27
In 1999, Labor's Ehud Barak won election as prime minister. Barak had been a hardliner,but he had also confessed that if he had been born a Palestinian he probably would havejoined a terrorist organization28 -- sohis intentions were unclear. His policies, however, in his first year in office were moreof the same: settlements grew at a more rapid pace than under Netanyahu, agreed-upontroops withdrawals were not carried out, and land confiscations and economic closurescontinued. His proposed 2001 government budget increased the subsidies supportingsettlements in the Occupied Territories.29
The number of Israeli settlers since Oslo (1993) grew from 110,000 to 195,000 in theWest Bank and Gaza; in annexed East Jerusalem, the Jewish population rose from 22,000 to170,000.30 Thirty new settlements wereestablished and more than 18,000 new housing units for settlers were constructed.31 From 1994-2000, Israeli authorities confiscated35,000 acres of Arab land for roads and settlements.32Poverty increased, so that in mid-2000, more than one out of five Palestinians hadconsumption levels below $2.10 a day.33According to CIA figures, at the end of 2000, unemployment stood at 40%.34 Israeli closure policies meant that Palestinians had less freedomof movement -- from Gaza to the West Bank, to East Jerusalem, or from one Palestinianenclave to another -- than they had before Oslo.35
The United States has been the major international backer of Israel for more than threedecades. Since 1976 Israel has been the leading annual recipient of U.S. foreign aid andis the largest cumulative recipient since World War II. And this doesn't include all sortsof special financial and military benefits, such as the use of U.S. military assistancefor research and development in the United States. Israel's economy is notself-sufficient, and relies on foreign assistance and borrowing. During the Oslo years,Washington gave Israel more than $3 billion per year in aid, and $4 billion in FY 2000,the highest of any year except 1979. Of this aid, grant military aid was $1.8 billion ayear since Oslo, and more than $3 billion in FY 2000, two thirds higher than ever before.36
Diplomatically, the U.S. retreated from various positions it had held for years. Since1949, the U.S. had voted with the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly in callingfor the right of return of Palestinian refugees. In 1994, the Clinton administrationdeclared that because the refugee question was something to be resolved in the permanentstatus talks, the U.S. would no longer support the resolution. Likewise, although the U.S.had previously agreed with the rest of the world (and common sense) in considering EastJerusalem occupied territory, it now declared that Jerusalem's status too was to bedecided in the permanent status talks. On three occasions in 1995 and 1997, the SecurityCouncil considered draft resolutions critical of Israeli expropriations and settlements inEast Jerusalem; Washington vetoed all three.37
Permanent status talks between Israel and the Palestinians as called for by the Osloagreement finally took place in July 2000 at Camp David, in the United States, with U.S.mediators. The standard view is that Barak made an exceedingly generous offer to Arafat,but Arafat rejected it, choosing violence instead.
A U.S. participant in the talks, Robert Malley, has challenged this view.38 Barak offered -- but never in writing and neverin detail; in fact, says, Malley, "strictly speaking, there never was an Israelioffer" -- to give the Palestinians Israeli land equivalent to 1% of the West Bank(unspecified, but to be chosen by Israel) in return for 9% of the West Bank which housedsettlements, highways, and military bases effectively dividing the West Bank into separateregions. Thus, there would have been no meaningfully independent Palestinian state, but aseries of Bantustans, while all the best land and water aquifers would be in Israelihands. Israel would also "temporarily" hold an additional 10 percent of WestBank land. (Given that Barak had not carried out the previous withdrawals to which Israelhad committed, Palestinian skepticism regarding "temporary" Israeli occupationis not surprising.) It's a myth, Malley wrote,39that "Israel's offer met most if not all of the Palestinians' legitimateaspirations" and a myth as well that the "Palestinians made no concession oftheir own." Some Israeli analysts made a similar assessment. For example, influentialcommentator Ze'ev Schiff wrote that, to Palestinians, "the prospect of being able toestablish a viable state was fading right before their eyes. They were confronted with anintolerable set of options: to agree to the spreading occupation ... or to set up wretchedBantustans, or to launch an uprising."40
On September 28, 2000 Ariel Sharon, then a member of Parliament, accompanied by athousand-strong security force, paid a provocative visit approved by Barak to the site ofthe Al Aqsa mosque. The next day Barak sent another large force of police and soldiers tothe area and, when the anticipated rock throwing by some Palestinians occurred, theheavily-augmented police responded with lethal fire, killing four and wounding hundreds.Thus began the second Intifada.
The underlying cause was the tremendous anger and frustration among the population ofthe Occupied Territories, who saw things getting worse, not better, under Oslo, whosehopes had been shattered, and whose patience after 33 years of occupation had reached theboiling point.
Sharon was the commander of an Israeli force that massacred some seventy civilians inthe Jordanian village of Qibya in 1953. He was Defense Minister in 1982, when Israelinvaded Lebanon, causing the deaths of 17,000 civilians. In September 1982, Lebaneseforces allied to Israel slaughtered hundreds of Palestinian non- combatants in the Sabraand Shitila refugee camps, a crime for which an Israeli commission found Sharon to bearindirect responsibility. As Housing Minister in various Israeli governments, Sharonvigorously promoted the settlements in the Occupied Territories. In January 2001, he tookoffice as Prime Minister.
Israeli security forces responded to Palestinian demonstrations with lethal force eventhough, as a UN investigation reported, at these demonstrations the Israeli DefenseForces, "endured not a single serious casualty."41 Some Palestinians proceeded to arm themselves, and the killingescalated, with deaths on both sides, though the victims were disproportionatelyPalestinians. In November 2001, there was a week-long lull in the fighting. Sharon thenordered the assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, which, as everyonepredicted, led to a rash of terror bombings, which in turn Sharon used as justificationfor further assaults on the PA.42 By March2002, Amnesty International reported that more than 1000 Palestinians had been killed."Israeli security services have killed Palestinians, including more than 200children, unlawfully, by shelling and bombing residential areas, random or targetedshooting, especially near checkpoints and borders, by extrajudicial executions and duringdemonstrations."43
Palestinian suicide bombings have targeted civilians. Amnesty International commented:"These actions are shocking. Yet they can never justify the human rights violationsand grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions which, over the past 18 months, have beencommitted daily, hourly, even every minute, by the Israeli authorities againstPalestinians. Israeli forces have consistently carried out killings when no lives were indanger." Medical personnel have been attacked and ambulances, including those of theRed Cross, "have been consistently shot at."44 Wounded people have been denied medical treatment. Israel hascarried out targeted assassinations (sometimes the targets were probably connected toterrorism, sometimes not,45 but all ofthese extrajudicial executions have been condemned by human rights groups).
The Israeli government criticized Arafat for not cracking down harder on terrorists andthen responded by attacking his security forces, who might have allowed him to crack down,and restricting him to his compound in Ramallah.
Israeli opinion became sharply polarized. At the same time that hundreds of militaryreservists have declared their refusal to serve in the West Bank and Gaza(www.couragetorefuse.org), polls show 46% of Israelis favor forcibly expelling allPalestinians from the Occupied Territories.46
U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic support has made possible the Israelirepression of the previous year and a half.
Much of the weaponry Israel has been using in its attacks on Palestinians either wasmade in the United States (F-16s, attack helicopters, rockets, grenade launchers,Caterpillar bulldozers, airburst shells, M-40 ground launchers) or made in Israel withU.S. Department of Defense research and development funding (the Merkava tank).
On March 26, 2001, the Security Council considered a resolution to establish aninternational presence in the Occupied Territories as a way to prevent human rightsviolations. The United States vetoed the resolution. Because Israel did not want the U.S.to get involved diplomatically, Washington did not name a special envoy to the region,General Zinni, until November 2001, more than a year after the Intifada began. Bush metfour times with Sharon during the Intifada, never with Arafat. In February 2002, VicePresident Cheney declared that Israel could "hang" Arafat.47
As the Arab League was meeting to endorse a Saudi peace proposal -- recognition ofIsrael in return for full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders -- a Hamas suicide bomberstruck. Sharon, no doubt fearing a groundswell of support for the Arab League position,responded with massive force, breaking into Arafat's compound, confining him to severalrooms. Then there were major invasions of all the Palestinian cities in the West Bank.There are many Palestinian casualties, though because Israel has kept reporters out, theirextent is not known.
In the early days of Sharon's offensive, Bush pointedly refused to criticize theIsraeli action, reserving all his condemnation for Arafat, who, surrounded in a few rooms,was said to not be doing enough to stop terrorism. As demonstrations in the Arab world,especially in pro-U.S. Jordan and Egypt, threatened to destabilize the entire region, Bushfinally called on Israel to withdraw from the cities. Sharon, recognizing that the U.S."demand" was uncoupled from any threat of consequences, kept up his onslaught.
A solution along the lines of the international consensus -- Israeli withdrawal fromterritories occupied in 1967, the establishment of a truly independent and viablePalestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with its capital in East Jerusalem -- remainsfeasible. It needs only the backing of the United States and Israel.
Not all Arabs are the same. That other Arabs may already have their right of self-determination does not take away from Palestinians' basic rights. The fact that manyPalestinians live in Jordan and have considerable influence and rights there, doesn't meanthat the millions of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation or who were expelledfrom their homes and are now in refugee camps aren't entitled to their rights -- any morethan the fact that there are a lot of Jews in the U.S., where they have considerableinfluence and rights, means that Israeli Jews should be packed off across the Atlantic.
If people whose independence movements use terrorism are not entitled to a state, thenmany current-day states would be illegitimate, not the least of them being Israel, whoseindependence struggle involved frequent terrorism against civilians.
Conquerors frequently justify their conquests by claiming security needs. This was theargument Israel gave for years why it couldn't return the Sinai to Egypt or pull out ofLebanon. Both of these were done, however, and Israel's security was enhanced rather thanharmed. True, the Oslo Accords, which turned over disconnected swatches of territory toPalestinian administration, may not have improved Israeli security. But as Shimon Peres,one of the architects of the Oslo agreement and Sharon's current Foreign Ministeracknowledged, Oslo was flawed from the start. "Today we discover that autonomy putsthe Palestinians in a worse situation." The second Intifada could have been avoided,Peres said, if the Palestinians had had a state from the outset. "We cannot keepthree and a half million Palestinians under siege without income, oppressed, poor, denselypopulated, near starvation."48 Israelis the region's only nuclear power. Beyond that, it is the strongest military power in theMiddle East. Surely it cannot need to occupy neighboring territory in order to achievesecurity. Nothing would better guarantee the Israeli people peace and security thanpulling out of the Occupied Territories.
Allowing people who have been expelled from their homes the right to return is hardlyan extreme demand. Obviously this can't mean throwing out people who have been living inthese homes for many years now, and would need to be carefully worked out. BothPalestinian officials and the Arab League have indicated that in their view the right ofreturn should be implemented in a way that would not create a demographic problem forIsrael.49 Of course, one could reasonablyargue that an officially Jewish state is problematic on basic democratic grounds. (Whyshould a Jew born in Brooklyn have a right to "return" to Israel while aPalestinian born in Haifa does not?) In any event, however, neither the Arab League norArafat have raised this objection.50
Hamas and a few other, smaller Palestinian groups object not just to the occupation butto the very existence of Israel. But the Hamas et al. position is a distinctly minoritysentiment among Palestinians, who are a largely secular community that has endorsed atwo-state settlement. To be sure, Hamas has been growing in strength as a result of theinability of the Palestinian Authority to deliver a better life for Palestinians. If therewere a truly independent Palestinian state, one can assume that Hamas would find far fewervolunteers for its suicide squads. It must be acknowledged, though, that the longer themutual terror continues, the harder it will be to achieve long term peace.
There is a broad international consensus on a two-state solution, along the lines ofthe Saudi peace proposal. Such a solution is by no means ideal. Palestine is a smallterritory to be divided into two states; it forms a natural economic unit. An Israelistate that discriminates in favor of Jews and a Palestinian state that will probably beequally discriminatory will depart substantially from a just outcome. What's needed is asingle secular state that allows substantial autonomy to both national communities,something along the lines of the bi-national state proposed before 1948. This outcome,however, does not seem imminent. A two-state solution may be the temporary measure thatwill provide a modicum of justice and allow Jews and Palestinians to move peacefullyforward to a more just future.
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Stephen R. Shalom teaches political science at William Paterson University and is theauthor of Imperial Alibis (South End Press).
Notes
