Especially since the visit to Arunachal Pradesh in early November by theIndian Minister of External Affairs, Mr PranabMukherjee, views are being expressed at regular intervals by a section ofthe strategic community close to the authorities in the People’s Republic ofChina (PRC) that a fresh Sino-Indian border conflict may be possible. While theofficial Chinese response to what was stated during the visit by Mr Mukherjee,has mainly remained confined to reiteration of Beijing’s territorial positionand expression of ‘deep regret’, the studies of the PRC’s expertsare in the nature of looking at the boundary issue in a strategic dimension,especially in the context of their perceptions about India’s alleged militaryreinforcements in the border and counter-measures required for China. What isimportant is that they are not ruling out the eruption of a ‘partial borderwar’ between the two nations. At this juncture when Sino-Indian relations arebeing described officially by China as marking the ‘best period’ in history,it becomes imperative for New Delhi to understand the real meaning of suchviews, which are being conveyed through Chinese language publications meant forthe domestic audience.
First deserving attention is the comment (in Chinese language, ChinaInstitute of International Strategic Studies, 20 November 2008) of "Zhan Lue",believed to be a high level cadre. He visualises ‘two crises’ for thePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the immediate sense:
- Situation in North Korea if Kim Jong Il succumbs to his reported illness and
- India’s border provocation to divert attention from its economic crisis resulting from the global financial meltdown, began in October 2008.
Regarding the former, the strategist feels that the PLA cannot afford toremain a silent spectator if the US and South Korea intervene in North Koreaonce Kim is dead. On India’s provocation, he points out that in recent years,the economic development factor has been responsible for promoting thatcountry’s military and nuclear weapon development programme; this mayencourage New Delhi to incite Beijing. Already, since June 2008, he says, Indiahas been intruding into China’s territory in the border many times in anattempt to create incidents. In the opinion of the analyst, New Delhi would liketo shift attention from the emerging contradictions in India’s economicstructure following the global meltdown, to provoking China, even launching a‘partial war’ against China.
Zhan Lue also refers to another source of challenge that can contribute to a ‘new large-scale Sino-Indian military clash’-- India’s opposition toChina’s proposal to carry out projects aimed at diverting Brahmaputra riverwaters to its Northeastern parts. Expected to be protracted, such a clash mayresult in setback for China – damage to Tibet highways and railways. Theanalyst adds that the PRC should be prepared for India’s projection of itsmilitary strength vis-à-vis China in the border including the Western sector,and also in the Indian Ocean; Beijing should also take into account the possible‘restriction’ at the same time of China by the US and Russia, respectivelyin Taiwan Straits and Ussuri river border.
It may be worth referring to what another article said two days earlier (zhonghua.net, military section, Chinese language, 18 November 2008). It observed thatthe border issue is only a symbol of Sino-Indian friction; the basic pointconcerns New Delhi’s thinking that Beijing is the ‘greatest obstacle’ toIndia’s rise. Saying that India’s occupation of ‘Southern Tibet’(China’s name to Arunachal Pradesh) is a security threat to China, it suggeststhat in counter, the PRC may adopt a strategy aimed at weakening the control ofthe Indian central government through steps like ‘splitting’ and‘dismembering’ India. In that way, India, which is inferior to China interms of comprehensive national strength, cannot challenge the PRC in future.
The subject of another war with India is also figuring in contributions ofChinese analysts, most of them from military, to the Bulletin boards of severalstrategic research and military websites, all apparently receiving supervisionof the government. It is true that by their very nature, they cannot be said toreflect official opinion, but what could be important is that their publicationwould not have been possible without some sort of patronage from theauthorities. Worth mentioning are four such articles. One raises (Global Timesnet, by a Tibetan cadre, 19 October 2008) a key question as to why some Chineseexperts are making references to ‘disputed border ’ with India, whereas theentire Southern Tibet, now under Indian occupation, is a Chinese territorywithout any dispute (the same theme was discussed in C3S Paper No. 104 of 4February 2008). It demands that the Central Government should tell the publicclearly about its position – whether it would recover Southern Tibet ormaintain status quo. A second report alleges (chinaiiss.org, 27 October 2008)that India is building in large-scale, new airports and military installationsin the border, for ‘defeating China in a war’. According to a third comment(chinaiiss.org, 15 November 2008), if a war breaks out again with India, theChinese aim should be to recover Southern Tibet; as such that war would bebasically a ‘partial’ one, without affecting other border fronts. In thiswar, China should make Pakistan as its ally and help the latter in recoveringKashmir.
Catching attention is also a fourth Bulletin Board report authored by a possiblehigh level military analyst, entitled "Tibet Military District is fullyprepared to deal with a possible Sino-Indian border clash" (bbs.news.sina.com.cn,17.November 2008). Alleging that discordant notes regarding the Sino-Indianborder have very recently emanated from a ‘certain big power’ in South Asia(unmistakable reference to India, though not by name), it focuses on China’smilitary preparedness in Tibet in response. Revealing that the 52 and 53Mountain Brigades and the 149th Mobile Division of the 13th Group Army, act asmainstay in China’s defence of Tibet, it, in an unusual manner, gives outenormous data on the Orbat in Tibet Military District, particularly on theformation of various Brigades. The article further points out that in recentyears, facilities for communications and transport could be improved in Tibet;through the newly built Qinghai-Tibet Railway, troops and material can bequickly transported. New highways have been established in the Ali region andthe latest building of airports like Linzhi, have contributed to mobility oftroops, including that of Second artillery. At the same time a negative factoris that the Air Force is not permanently stationed in Tibet.
Why there is a talk in China now on the possibility of a limited Sino-Indianwar? It definitely looks like a scenario building exercise undertaken by theChinese strategists. However, there seems to be a hidden sense of urgency on thesubject among them; explaining this is their rationale that India’s new borderinfrastructure initiatives are in the nature of provoking China. While it cannotbe denied that if another war breaks out, even partial, Sino-Indian relationswould undoubtedly suffer much, the question arises - can such a war reallyerupt? The answer could be no, considering the present comfort level inSino-Indian ties. It would be pertinent to note in this connection that latestviews of Chinese specialists are not in tune with the official line of the PRC,which considers that each country is not a threat to the other and thatbilateral relations can be developed looking beyond the complex border dispute,which may take time to solve. India is in agreement with this line. Also, theirsentiments run counter to the excellent atmospherics now surrounding thebilateral relations at the moment-- mutual economic dependence level hasincreased, trade volume is going up, joint military exercises have started andthe ties are said to have assumed a global character.
At the same time, one does not fail to notice that China is speaking in twovoices on Sino-Indian ties. It would, however, be wrong to take them ascontradictory to each other; they only go to distinguish the different policypriorities of key agencies in China. To explain, a border war, as conceived byChinese strategists, may reflect the calculations of the military and securityestablishment in China for which no compromise is possible on the issue ofnational sovereignty (for e.g Taiwan and Tibet). On the other hand, in thediplomatic front, Beijing needs to show a benign face, hence its soft linetowards India under the ‘harmonious world’ foreign policy concept. But evenhere, Beijing does not hesitate to admit the existence of ‘cold peace’ withIndia (PRC Ambassador to New Delhi, Zhang Yan, Ifeng journal, 21 June 2008). Inany case, it should be borne in mind that the Chinese policy making mechanism attop levels provides space to integrate such differing priorities.
As far as India is concerned, such talks of war in China, to say the least, mayhave an ‘unsettling’ effect on it. A partial war with China may lookillogical for India at the moment; but prudence demands New Delhi to keep an eyeon any surprise Chinese move along the border. In a larger perspective, however,it would be important for India not to over react to signals, howsoeverconflicting they may look, emanating from China, taking into account the longterm benefits that may accrue to it from a policy of ‘engaging’ China.
D.S. Rajan is former Director, Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, NewDelhi, and, presently, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies.
