The 'peace' in Sri Lanka hasheld out for four years - though a string of killings, including some highprofile political assassinations, continued recruitment and training ofLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres, the abduction and forciblerecruitment of children by the rebel group, a continuous arms buildup, and awide range of activities manifestly inconsistent with the idea of peace havepersisted without interruption throughout this 'peace'. The sheer relief ofhaving avoided open and large-scale warfare, however, has encouraged both theSri Lankan government and the 'international community' to look the other way,or merely register formal protests, even while the LTTE continues to consolidateits military and political power in its areas of domination.
Procuring adequate financeslies at the heart of this process of consolidation, and fundraising remains theLTTE's lifeline. A range of front organizations, both in Sri Lanka and among theLankan Tamil Diaspora, play a crucial role in keeping this lifeline intact.
The Tamil Diaspora has longbeen a source of easy and regular finance for the LTTE. In the early years ofthe insurgency and particularly following the 1983 anti-Tamil riots, the exodusof a number of Tamils from the northern parts of the country and capital Colombowas viewed as a setback for the LTTE's recruitment for their the Eelam war. Overtime, however, this created significant advantages as the Diaspora wasincreasing organized and tapped to meet the rebels' financial needs. Estimatesvary, but the number of Sri Lankan Tamils has been put in the region ofapproximately 200,000-250,000 in Canada; 110,000 in the United Kingdom; 50,000in Germany, and about 30,000 each in Switzerland, France, and Australia; noauthoritative figures are available for the US, but estimates vary between amodest 50,000 to 300,000. In recent years, this ready source has come under somepressure in the United States and United Kingdom, due to the ban imposed on theoutfit - though front organizations are quick to reinvent their identities andresume operations - but in Canada and in the European Union nations, the TamilDiaspora groups continue to act without any significant legal constraints tosecure funds for the LTTE. .
A well-established andefficient mechanism for the collection and handling of LTTE finances has beenset up across international borders. All Diaspora activities operate under its 'InternationalSecretariat", which operates from Kilinochchi in Sri Lanka and has designated 'countryrepresentatives' who exercise coercive influence over all Tamil expatriateactivity in each country through their respective Tamil Coordinating Committees(TCC). To facilitate the transfer of Diaspora contributions, a number ofcountry-specific organisations have been formed, but a pivotal role has beenplayed by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) that was established in1985, with an extensive network of branches operating in at least 13 countries.Sources indicate that the TRO also maintains a number of bank accounts in thesecountries including the Barclays Bank in Paris, the Spatkasse Monchengladbachbank in Germany, the BG Bank in Denmark and the TD Canada Trust Bank in Canada.
Following the Tsunami ofDecember 26, 2004, the TRO was able to collect a huge amount in donations byTamil expatriates. According to sources, between January 1st and August 15th2005 alone, the TRO had received a sum of US$ 9,383,923 as donations. Apart itscomprehensive fundraising mechanisms, the Diaspora also acts a powerful pressuregroup that has substantially created the margins within which the LTTE is ableto continue with its activities. It is significant that, in 2000, the CanadianSecurity Intelligence Service (CSIS) had identified eight nonprofitorganizations in Canada as fronts of the LTTE. And noted, "Most funds raisedunder the banner of humanitarian organizations such as the TRO are channeledinstead to fund the LTTE war effort." The CSIS recommended that the LTTE beadded to the list of banned organizations under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and thisrecommendation had been put up to the Cabinet on several occasions. However, thelarge number of Tamils present in the country, and the political and electoralinfluence they wield in certain constituencies, has precluded effective actionagainst the LTTE, and the Cabinet has rejected the CSIS recommendations eachtime.
In January 2005, the Canadianex- Justice Minister Irwin Cotler conceded quite frankly, "Toronto I think hasthe largest number of Tamils... outside of Sri Lanka, so we've got to be verycareful just in terms of our own relationships." Such 'concern' has beenadvantageous for the Liberal Party, securing overwhelming support from the Tamilconstituency during elections. It is useful to note that, while the February2006 Parliamentary Elections paved the way for the Conservative Party to gainvictory over the Liberal Party after a gap of nearly 12 years, the Conservativesfailed to win a single seat in the three major cities of Toronto, Vancouver andMontreal, which host a significant Tamil Diaspora.
In the run-up to the elections,the Conservatives had declared their intentions to ban the LTTE. On January 19,2006, the Conservative Party's Deputy Leader and Public Safety Critic, PeterMacKay, had stated, "I think we have to be definitive in saying that wecertainly support the Tamil community, but there is a very clear and distinctline that has to be drawn when it comes to terrorist fundraising that we feel ishappening in Canada right now, based on CSIS reports".
Intelligence reports estimatethat, during the pre-ceasefire period, the LTTE were getting $10 million a yearfrom Canada alone. Following the declaration of cease-fire in 2002, reportsindicated a dip in collections, but recent Canadian media reports suggested aresurgence of fundraising and extortion efforts. In November 2005, members ofToronto's Tamil community disclosed that they were being asked for money bydoor-to-door LTTE fundraisers for 'Eelam War IV'. Community members said theywere told to make an immediate cash-contribution of $2,500, and that those whodidn't contribute would not be allowed to travel in Tamil-controlled parts ofSri Lanka when they returned for visits.
This threat is real, since theLTTE maintains a record of Tamil expatriates, ascertained through elaborateforms that have to be filled out by expatriate. On duly filling the forms, theexpatriate is provided with a 'Tamil Eelam Identity Card Number' that is usedfor future reference as well as during visits to the LTTE-controlled territoriesof Sri Lanka.
Within Sri Lanka itself, theLTTE has adopted a system called 'Nandavanan' to collect information regardingany person of Tamil origin who resides overseas. Each member of the TamilDiaspora is monitored from the moment they enter LTTE controlled areas. Suchindividuals are spotted by LTTE border guards and asked for proof that monthlyor yearly 'taxes' have been paid by the former in their host country. These 'taxes'or 'pledges' tend to be on the higher side (some reports peg them at $25,000 to$100,000 annually), if the person has a business establishment. If the LTTEcadre implementing 'Nandavanan' is of the view that persons had not contributedsufficiently to the cause, they are instructed to pay up immediately or write anundertaking to do so on return. Following this, all information is communicatedby the 'Nandavanan' cadre to the Tamil Coordinating Committee of the countryconcerned, with the order to obtain the balance sum 'due' to the LTTE from theindividual on return.
Even in countries where it isproscribed, such as Australia and the United States, the LTTE continues toeffectively raise funds through sympathetic social and cultural organisations.The US State Department has identified the World Tamil Association, World TamilMovement, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils, the Ellilan Force,and the Sangilian Force as front organizations of the LTTE, but the TRO is noton this list. In Australia, on the other hand, in January 2005, the AustralianForeign Minister Alexander Downer stated in the Federal Parliament that thegovernment had identified the TRO as an entity associated with the LTTE and thatthe government has not funded TRO's development program because of thisassociation. Nevertheless, proof of continuing LTTE activities in Australia wasprovided on November 23, 2005, when Australian Federal Police (AFP) raidedpremises of LTTE operatives in Melbourne and arrested more than 15 persons forquestioning, including Thillai Jeyakumar, head of the LTTE operations inAustralia and its 'Economic Advisor' Jeyarajan Maheswaran. The AFP also seizedcomputer hardware, passports, cash, diaries, bank receipts, and cheque booksfrom the operatives. Further, The Australian had reported that the TROhad collected close to $1.1 million in donations from Australia following theTsunami.
The European Union, on theother hand, continues to use the 'threat of ban' instead of actually banning theLTTE. On September 27, 2005, threatening to list the LTTE as a terroristorganisation, the European Union said its member states will no longer receivethe rebel delegations because of continued violence by Tigers in Sri Lanka.However, such threats are far from sufficient to deter the LTTE from continuingto consolidate its position, both financially and politically. For instance, onMarch 15, 2006, a Sri Lankan Tamil Social Democrat member of the Herning CityCouncil in Denmark, Arul Thilainadarasa, was expelled from his party followingthe disclosure of his links with the LTTE. The Tamil politician was exposed as aformer Chairman of the Tamil Coordination Committee in Denmark, which reportedlyran 28 'Mother Tongue' schools throughout the country and received funds fromthe city councils.
The LTTE continues to exploitthe lack of uniformity between countries in terms of significant action againstits mechanisms for fundraising and extortion. The prevalent period of 'no war'has also allowed the LTTE to secure greater bargaining power among westernaudiences, while the fear of an imminent threat of return to war has, at thesame time, helped it to corner more donations from the Tamil expatriatepopulation who, in turn, would not like to abandon the eelam in times of war.For the LTTE, it is, consequently, profitable to keep the pot boiling withoutletting it flow over.
Saji Cherian is ResearchAssociate, Institute for Conflict ManagementCourtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
