National Security Management

In December 1998, on the recommendations of this task force, a three-tier structure was set up, consistingof a National Security Council (NSC), a Strategic Policy Group (SPG) and a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).The Indian NSC, like its US counterpart, is essentially a high-powered political body chaired by the PrimeMinister and consisting of important members of his Cabinet directly concerned with national security issues.The SPG , which is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, consists of serving senior officials responsible forpolicy-making and follow-up action  in matters concerning national security plus the chiefs of the Army,the Navy and the Air Force and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), theexternal intelligence agency. Its main task is to make policy recommendations to the NSC.

The NSAB consists of senior retired officials, civilian as well as military, who had dealt with nationalsecurity during their career as well as distinguished academics and non-governmental scholars. The head of theNSAB was designated as its Convenor. K.Subramanyam, the highly distinguished doyen of the community of Indianstrategic analysts, was designated as the first Convenor  and, after he had completed a tenure of twoyears in June, 2001, C.V. Ranganathan, a retired officer of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), who had, interalia, served as the Indian Ambassador to China and France, was designated as the second Convenor inDecember 2001 and he has since completed his two-year term. There have so far been four NSABs, two headed bySubramanyam and two by Ranganathan. The fifth NSAB is yet to be nominated.

The Task Force also recommended the creation of a post of National Security Adviser (NSA) to the PrimeMinister and the setting-up of a National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), similar to its US counterpart.These recommendations were accepted. However, instead of appointing a separate officer as the NSA,A.B.Vajpayee, the outgoing Prime Minister, reportedly on the recommendation of Brajesh Mishra, his PrincipalSecretary, ordered that Mishra would hold additional charge as the NSA.

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Cabinet Secretariat, patterned after its British counterpart,was converted into  the NSCS and entrusted with the tasks of assessment of intelligence, theco-ordination of the functioning of intelligence agencies and tasking them  and acting as the interfacebetween the NSC, the SPG and the NSAB and servicing their meetings. In the US, the NSA acts as the adviser tothe President and as the national co-ordinator in all national security related matters and, at the same time,as the administrative and professional head of the NSCS, in which capacity he or she is responsible for itsday-to-day running  and maintaining a high level of professional competence.

Presumably in view of the dual charge of Mishra, this system was modified  and a post of Secretary,NSCS, was created and the holder of the post was made responsible for the day-to-day running of the NSCS andits professional competence. Satish Chandra, a serving officer of the IFS, who was previously the Indian HighCommissioner in Pakistan, was appointed to this post and he has been asked to continue after his retirement. Initially, the NSCS was part of the Cabinet Secretariat, but in 2002, it was decided that it should be part ofthe Prime Minister's Office (PMO).

The Task Force on the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the outgoing Government in June2000 in the wake of the enquiry into the Kargil conflict of 1999 by a high-powered Kargil Review Committee (KRC),chaired by K.Subramanyam, had, inter alia, recommended the creation of a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA),a new agency for the collection of technical intelligence (TECHINT), a counter-terrorism centre in the IB toco-ordinate the counter-terrorism role of all agencies having a responsibility in this matter and a committeechaired by the NSA to co-ordinate the functioning of the intelligence agencies. These recommendations havebeen accepted and implemented and the NSCS has been given the additional task of follow-up action andmonitoring in this regard.

The NSCS also monitors the implementation of the various recommendations made by three other  specialTask Forces set up by the Government to examine and report on internal security management, border managementand defence management, which have been accepted by the Government.

Ever since this NSM infrastructure was set up, there has been a debate on certain aspects of it. The firstrelates to the advisability of the same individual holding both the posts of the Principal Secretary to thePrime Minister and the NSA. Many analysts and the KRC had advocated the appointment of a separate NSA, dealingexclusively with national security without any other responsibility. This was, however, not accepted by theBJP-led Government.

The second criticism related to the lack of expertise and experience of the NSA in matters relating tointernal security management, law enforcement and intelligence management and the need for the Prime Ministerto have the benefit of the advice of someone well versed in these fields.

The third criticism was about the NSCS. It was felt by many that while it had developed considerable areaexpertise, it was lacking in subject or domain expertise in fields such as counter-insurgency,counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, counter-proxy war, counter-psywar etc.

After the KRC submitted its report towards the end of 1999, the late R.N.Kao, the founding father of theR&AW, had written to  Prime Minister Vajpayee expressing his misgivings over some aspects of itsreport. The Prime Minister had sent for him for a detailed discussion on the report. It is understood that thethree aspects mentioned were among the subjects which had figured in the discussions.

Kao was learnt to have told the Prime Minister that while it was his  privilege  to combine thetwo posts, if he considered it necessary, and appoint anyone enjoying his confidence to the post, it had to berecognised at the same time that the present incumbent of the post of NSA had very little exposure to internalsecurity and intelligence management. He, therefore, suggested for the Prime Minister's consideration that anew post of Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) should be created and that it should be filled up bysomeone well versed in internal security and intelligence management.

This suggestion was not implemented while Kao was alive. However, after his death in January 2002, thedesignation of the Secretary, NSCS, another  officer of the Indian Foreign Service, was changed as Deputyto the NSA. Thus, both the top posts in the newly-created national security management infrastructure wereheld by retired officers of the IFS, with little exposure to internal security and intelligence management andwith practically no network of contacts in the internal security infrastructure of different Stateadministrations.

When the NSAB was set up, the idea was that it would prepare an annual strategic review identifying areascalling for attention and options for action, in addition to undertaking such other tasks as allotted to it bythe Government. The first NSAB submitted a report on the draft nuclear doctrine and a national securityreview. While its recommendation for releasing the draft nuclear doctrine to the public to encourage anational debate on it was accepted and it was released, its recommendation for releasing to the public itsexecutive summary of the annual national security review was not accepted.

The second and third NSABs also submitted an annual national security review. The fourth was reportedlyadvised to discontinue  the preparation of an annual national security review and to focus instead onsubmission of reports on topical areas of importance from the point of view of national security. It alsoreportedly undertook a detailed study of the subject of governance.

The NSABs  made their recommendations largely on the basis of open information and insights gainedduring interactions with serving officers. They had very little access to information at the disposal of theGovernment. As a result, their reports often tended to be of a general nature and lacked focus. This was acriticism often levelled by serving officers with regard to their reports.

The Congress (I)'s policy document titled  "ISSUES BEFORE THE NATION: SECURITY, DEFENCE ANDFOREIGN POLICY" draws attention to what in its view are the inadequacies in the national securitymanagement infrastructure, but is vague on how it is going to remove these deficiencies. It says:

"The Congress will formulate and implement a comprehensive multi-dimensional national security policy,which will cover vital aspects of energy security, food security, good governance and countering centrifugaltrends affecting the country. The institutional arrangements made by the BJP-led NDA Government have beencosmetic. In substance, national security is not underpinned by structured and systematic institutionalarrangements. The National Security Council, which was established since 1999, has not functioned withinstitutional cohesion. Important national security decisions have been taken in an ad hoc manner involvingjust a few individuals without utilizing the Cabinet Committee on Security, the Strategic Policy Group(comprising key secretaries, service chiefs and heads of intelligence agencies) and officials of the NationalSecurity Advisory Board. There has been no systematic interaction between the Strategic Policy Group and theNational Security Advisory Board (NSAB). Nor there has been any regular interaction between National SecurityAdvisor and the NSAB.The Congress will institutionalize regular meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security.It will ensure systematic and institutional interactions  between the National Security Advisor, theStrategic Policy Group and the National Security Advisory Board.The Congress will ensure necessaryconnectivity between the intelligence agencies of the Government of India and the National Security AdvisoryBoard, as well as between the intelligence agencies and the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs."

Its main points of criticism can be summed up as follows: 

• Lack of institutional cohesion in the NSC.
• Ad hocism in decision-making.
• Lack of proper utilisation of the SPG and the NSAB in policy and decision making.
  
  
• Lack of systematic interaction between the SPG and the NSAB.
• Lack of adequate interaction between the NSA and the NSAB.
• Lack of adequate interaction between the intelligence agencies and the NSAB.

• There were very few meetings of the NSC. Most decisions relating to national security were taken by theCabinet Committee on Security.
  
  
• The first NSAB had the benefit of some interactions with the Prime Minister and the NSA during the Kargilconflict of 1999. The second had two interactions with the NSA in its one-year tenure and none with the PrimeMinister. The third had three interactions with the NSA and one with the Prime Minister just before thewithdrawal of the Indian troops from the border in October,2002. One does not know about the fourth NSAB.
  
  
• The second NSAB had one interaction with the SPG and the third none. One does not know about the first andthe fourth.
  
  
• Neither the second nor the third NSAB had the benefit of any interaction with the chiefs of theintelligence agencies.
  
  
• Feed-backs from the Government on the reports and recommendations of the NSAB were few and far betweenand, even when received, tended to be vague.

The revamping of the intelligence apparatus is another theme which has received attention from the Congress(I). Its policy document says:

"The BJP/NDA Government’s management of India’s national intelligence institutions has beenequally abysmal.  There was the unpardonable failure in acquisition and utilization of advanceintelligence about the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane from Kathmandu to Kandahar, and aboutpre-empting the intrusions of the Pakistani Army into Kargil.The BJP/NDA Government failed to ensure necessaryconnectivity between intelligence agencies and the armed forces and the Ministry of External Affairs.