The Iranian Chessboard

The campaign's greatest hits are widely known: "The ayatollahs" arebuilding a Shi'ite nuclear bomb; Iranian weapons are killing American soldiersin Iraq; Iranian gunboats are provoking U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf --Iran, in short, is the new al-Qaeda, a terror state aimed at the heart of theUnited States. It's idle to expect the American mainstream media to offer anytools that might put this orchestrated blitzkrieg in context.

Here are just a few recent instances of the ongoing campaign: Secretary ofDefense Robert Gates insists that Iran "is hell-bent on acquiring nuclearweapons." Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,admits that the Pentagon is planning for "potential military courses ofaction" when it comes to Iran. In tandem with U.S. commander in Iraq Gen.David Petraeus, Mullen denounces Iran's "increasingly lethal and maligninfluence" in Iraq, although he claims to harbor "noexpectations" of an attack on Iran "in the immediate future" andeven admits he has "no smoking gun which could prove that the highestleadership [of Iran] is involved."

But keep in mind one thing the Great Saddam Take-out of 2003 proved: that a"smoking gun" is, in the end, irrelevant. And this week, the U.S. isominously floating a second aircraft carrier battle group into the Persian Gulf.

But what of Iran itself under the blizzard of charges and threats? What tomake of it? What does the world look like from Tehran? Here are five ways tothink about Iran under the gun and to better decode the Iranian chessboard.

1. Don't underestimate the power of Shi'ite Islam: Seventy-fivepercent of the world's oil reserves are in the Persian Gulf. Seventy percent ofthe Gulf's population is Shi'ite. Shi'ism is an eschatological -- andrevolutionary -- religion, fueled by a passionate mixture of romanticism andcosmic despair. As much as it may instill fear in hegemonic Sunni Islam, someWesterners should feel a certain empathy for intellectual Shi'ism's almostSartrean nausea towards the vacuous material world.

For more than a thousand years Shi'ite Islam has, in fact, been a galaxy ofShi'isms -- a kind of Fourth World of its own, always cursed by politicalexclusion and implacable economic marginalization, always carrying an immenselydramatic view of history with it.

It's impossible to understand Iran without grasping the contradiction thatthe Iranian religious leadership faces in ruling, however fractiously, a nationstate. In the minds of Iran's religious leaders, the very concept of thenation-state is regarded with deep suspicion, because it detracts from the umma,the global Muslim community. The nation-state, as they see it, is but a waystation on the road to the final triumph of Shi'ism and pure Islam. To venturebeyond the present stage of history, however, they also recognize the necessityof reinforcing the nation-state that offers Shi'ism a sanctuary -- and that, ofcourse, happens to be Iran. When Shi'ism finally triumphs, the concept ofnation-state -- a heritage, in any case, of the West -- will disappear, replacedby a community organized according to the will of Prophet Muhammad.

In the right context, this is, believe me, a powerful message. I brieflybecame a mashti -- a pilgrim visiting a privileged Shi'ite gateway toParadise, the holy shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad, four hours west of theIran-Afghan border. At sunset, the only foreigner lost in a pious multitude ofblack chadors and white turbans occupying every square inch of the huge walledshrine, I felt a tremendous emotional jolt. And I wasn't even a believer, just asimple infidel.

2. Geography is destiny: Whenever I go to the holy city of Qom,bordering the central deserts in Iran, I am always reminded, in no uncertainterms, that, as far as the major ayatollahs are concerned, their supreme missionis to convert the rest of Islam to the original purity and revolutionary powerof Shi'ism -- a religion invariably critical of the established social andpolitical order.

Even a Shi'ite leader in Tehran, however, can't simply live by preaching andconversion alone. Iran, after all, happens to be a nation-state at the crucialintersection of the Arabic, Turkish, Russian, and Indian worlds. It is the keytransit point of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus,and the Indian subcontinent. It lies between three seas (the Caspian, thePersian Gulf, and the sea of Oman). Close to Europe and yet at the gates of Asia(in fact part of Southwest Asia), Iran is the ultimate Eurasian crossroads.Isfahan, the country's third largest city, is roughly equidistant from Paris andShanghai. No wonder Dick Cheney, checking out Iran, "salivates like aPavlov dog" (to quote those rock 'n roll geopoliticians, the RollingStones).

Members of the Iranian upper middle classes in North Tehran might spin dreamsof Iran recapturing the expansive range of influence once held by the Persianempire; but the silky, Qom-carpet-like diplomats at the Ministry of ForeignAffairs will assure you that what they really dream of is an Iran respected as amajor regional power. To this end, they have little choice, faced with theenmity of the globe's "sole superpower," but to employ a sophisticatedcounter-encirclement foreign policy. After all, Iran is now completelysurrounded by post-9/11 American military bases in Afghanistan, Central Asia,Iraq, and the Gulf states. It faces the U.S. military on its Afghan, Iraqi,Pakistani, and Persian Gulf borders, and lives with ever tightening U.S.economic sanctions, as well as a continuing drumbeat of Bush administrationthreats involving possible air assaults on Iranian nuclear (and probably other)facilities.

The Iranian counter-response to sanctions and to its demonization as a rogueor pariah state has been to develop a "Look East" foreign policy thatis, in itself, a challenge to American energy hegemony in the Gulf. The policyhas been conducted with great skill by Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, whowas educated in Bangalore, India. While focused on massive energy deals withChina, India, and Pakistan, it looks as well to Africa and Latin America. To thehorror of American neocons, an intercontinental "axis of evil" airlink already exists -- a weekly commercial Tehran-Caracas flight via Iran Air.

Iran's diplomatic (and energy) reach is now striking. When I was in Boliviaearly this year, I learned of a tour Iran's ambassador to Venezuela had taken onthe jet of Bolivian President Evo Morales. The ambassador reportedly offeredMorales "everything he wanted" to offset the influence of"American imperialism."

Meanwhile, a fierce energy competition is developing among the Turks,Iranians, Russians, Chinese, and Americans -- all placing their bets on whichfuture trade routes will be the crucial ones as oil and natural gas flow out ofCentral Asia. As a player, Iran is trying to position itself as the unavoidablebazaar-state in an oil-and-gas-fueled New Silk Road -- the backbone of a newAsian Energy Security Grid. That's how it could recover some of the preeminenceit enjoyed in the distant era of Darius, the King of Kings. And that's the mainreason why U.S. neo-Cold Warriors, Zio-cons, armchair imperialists, or all ofthe above, are throwing such a collective -- and threatening -- fit.

3. What is the nuclear "new Hitler" Ahmadinejad up to?: Eversince the days when former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami suggested a"dialogue of civilizations," Iranian diplomats have endlessly repeatedthe official position on Iran's nuclear program: It's peaceful; theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found no proof of the militarydevelopment of nuclear power; the religious leadership opposes atomic weapons;and Iran -- unlike the US -- has not invaded or attacked any nation for the pastquarter millennium.

Think of George W. Bush and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the newBlues Brothers: Both believe they are on a mission from God. Both are religiousfundamentalists. Ahmadinejad believes fervently in the imminent return of theMahdi, the Shi'ite messiah, who "disappeared" and has remained hiddensince the ninth century. Bush believes fervently in a coming end time and thereturn of Jesus Christ. But only Bush, despite his actual invasions and constantthreats, gets a (sort of) free pass from the Western ideological machine, whileAhmadinejad is portrayed as a Hitlerian believer in a new Holocaust.

Ahmadinejad is relentlessly depicted as an angry, totally irrational,Jew-hating, Holocaust-denying Islamo-fascist who wants to "wipe Israel offthe map." That infamous quote, repeated ad nauseam but out of context,comes from an October 2005 speech at an obscure anti-Zionist student conference.What Ahmadinejad really said, in a literal translation from Farsi, was that"the regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the pages of time."He was actually quoting the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, AyatollahKhomeini, who said it first in the early 1980s. Khomeini hoped that a regime sounjust toward the Palestinians would be replaced by another more equitable one.He was not, however, threatening to nuke Israel.

In the 1980s, in the bitterest years of the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini also madeit very clear that the production, possession, or use of nuclear weapons isagainst Islam. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei later issued a fatwa-- a religious injunction -- under the same terms. For the theocratic regime,however, the Iranian nuclear program is a powerful symbol of independence vis-à-viswhat is still widely considered by Iranians of all social classes andeducational backgrounds as Anglo-Saxon colonialism.

Ahmadinejad is mad for the Iranian nuclear program. It's his bread and butterin terms of domestic popularity. During the Iran-Iraq War, he was a member of asupport team aiding anti-Saddam Hussein Kurdish forces. (That's when he becamefriends with "Uncle" Jalal Talabani, now the Kurdish president ofIraq.) Not many presidents have been trained in guerrilla warfare. Speculationis rampant in Tehran that Ahmadinejad, the leadership of the Quds Force, anelite division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), plus thehardcore volunteer militia, the Basij (informally known in Iran as "thearmy of twenty million") are betting on a U.S. attack on Iran's nuclearfacilities to strengthen the country's theocratic regime and their faction ofit.

Reformists refer to Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Tehran lastOctober, when he was received by the Supreme Leader (a very rare honor). Putinoffered a new plan to resolve the explosive Iranian nuclear dossier: Iran wouldhalt nuclear enrichment on Iranian soil in return for peaceful nuclearcooperation and development in league with Russia, the Europeans, and the IAEA.

Iran's top nuclear negotiator of that moment, Ali Larijani, a confidant ofSupreme Leader Khamenei, as well as the Leader himself let it be known that theidea would be seriously considered. But Ahmadinejad immediately contradicted theSupreme Leader in public. Even more startling, yet evidently with the Leader'sacquiescence, he then sacked Larijani and replaced him with a longtime friend,Saeed Jalili, an ideological hardliner.

4. A velvet revolution is not around the corner: Before the 2005Iranian elections, at a secret, high-level meeting of the ruling ayatollahs inhis house, the Supreme Leader concluded that Ahmadinejad would be able to revivethe regime with his populist rhetoric and pious conservatism, which then seemedvery appealing to the downtrodden masses. (Curiously enough, Ahmadinejad'scampaign motto was: "We can.")

But the ruling ayatollahs miscalculated. Since they controlled all key leversof power -- the Supreme National Security Council, the Council of Guardians, theJudiciary, the bonyads (Islamic foundations that control vast sections ofthe economy), the army, the IRGC (the parallel army created by Khomeini in 1979and recently branded a terrorist organization by the Bush administration), themedia -- they assumed they would also control the self-described "streetcleaner of the people." How wrong they have been.

For Khamenei himself, this was big business. After 18 years of non-stopinternal struggle, he was finally in full control of executive power, as well asof the legislature, the judiciary, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij, and thekey ayatollahs in Qom.

Ahmadinejad, for his part, unleashed his own agenda. He purged the Ministryof Foreign Affairs of many reformist-minded diplomats; encouraged the InteriorMinistry and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to crackdown on allforms of "nefarious" Western influences, from entertainment industryproducts to colorful made-in-India scarves for women; and filled his cabinetwith revolutionary friends from the Iran-Iraq War days. These friends proved tobe as faithful as administratively incompetent -- especially in terms ofeconomic policy. Instead of solidifying the theocratic leadership under SupremeLeader Khamenei, Ahmadinejad increasingly fractured an increasingly unpopularruling elite.

Nonetheless, discontent with Ahmadinejad's economic incompetence has nottranslated into street barricades and it probably will not; nor, contrary toneocon fantasyland scenarios, would an attack on Iran's nuclear facilitiesprovoke a popular uprising. Every single political faction supports the nuclearprogram out of patriotic pride.

There is surely a glaring paradox here. The regime may be wildly unpopular --because of so much enforced austerity in an energy-rich land and the virtualabsence of social mobility -- but for millions, especially in the countrysideand the remote provinces, life is still bearable. In the large urban centers --Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz -- most would be in favor of a move toward amore market-oriented economy combined with a progressive liberalization of mores(even as the regime insists on going the other way). No velvet revolution,however, seems to be on the horizon.

At least four main factions are at play in the intricatePersian-miniature-like game of today's Iranian power politics -- and two others,the revolutionary left and the secular right, even though thoroughlymarginalized, shouldn't be forgotten either.

The extreme right, very religiously conservative but economically socialist,has, from the beginning, been closely aligned with the Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood. Ahmadinejad is the star of this faction.

The clerics, from the Supreme Leader to thousands of provincial religiousfigures, are pure conservatives, even more patriotic than the extreme right, yetgenerally no lovers of Ahmadinejad. But there is a crucial internal split. Thesubstantially wealthy bonyads -- the Islamic foundations, active in alleconomic sectors -- badly want a reconciliation with the West. They know that,under the pressure of Western sanctions, the relentless flight of both capitaland brains is working against the national interest.

Economists in Tehran project there may be as much as $600 billion in Iranianfunds invested in the economies of Persian Gulf petro-monarchies. The best andthe brightest continue to flee the country. But the Islamic foundations alsoknow that this state of affairs slowly undermines Ahmadinejad's power.

The extremely influential Revolutionary Guard Corps, a key component ofgovernment with vast economic interests, transits between these two factions.They privilege the fight against what they define as Zionism, are in favor ofclose relations with Sunni Arab states, and want to go all the way with thenuclear program. In fact, substantial sections of the IRGC and the Basij believeIran must enter the nuclear club not only to prevent an attack by the"American Satan," but to irreversibly change the balance of power inthe Middle East and Southwest Asia.

The current reformists/progressives of the left were originally formerpartisans of Khomeini's son, Ahmad Khomeini. Later, after a spectacular mutationfrom Soviet-style socialism to some sort of religious democracy, their new iconbecame former President Khatami (of "dialogue of civilizations" fame).Here, after all, was an Islamic president who had captured the youth vote andthe women's vote and had written about the ideas of German philosopher JurgenHabermas as applied to civil society as well as the possibility ofdemocratization in Iran. Unfortunately, his "Tehran Spring" didn'tlast long -- and is now long gone.

The key establishment faction is undoubtedly that of moderate HashemiRafsanjani, a former two-term President, current chairman of the ExpediencyCouncil and a key member of the Council of Experts -- 86 clerics, no women, theHoly Grail of the system, and the only institution in the Islamic Republiccapable of removing the Supreme Leader from office. He is now supported by theintelligentsia and urban youth. Colloquially known as "The Shark,"Rafsanjani is the consummate Machiavellian. He retains privileged ties to keyWashington players and has proven to be the ultimate survivor -- moving like askilled juggler between Khatami and Khamenei as power in the country shifted.

Rafsanjani is, and will always remain, a supporter of the Supreme Leader. Asthe regime's de facto number two, his quest is not only to"save" the Islamic Revolution, but also to consolidate Iran's regionalpower and reconcile the country with the West. His reasoning is clear: Heknows that an anti-Islamic tempest is already brewing among the young in Iran'smajor cities, who dream of integrating with the nomad elites of liquid globalmodernity.

If the Bush administration had any real desire to let its aircraft carriersfloat out of the Gulf and establish an entente cordiale with Tehran,Rafsanjani would be the man to talk to.

5. Heading down the New Silk Road