Washigton's decision to supply civilian nuclear technology to New Delhi was not well received in Islamabad. It raised concerns in Pakistan that India would use the ostensibly civilian technology to augment its nuclear weapons programme.
Since 1954, US-Pakistani ties have been episodic. After its forces clashed with China in the northeast in 1962, India began receiving US military hardware in sizeable quantities, causing consternation in Pakistan.
When the US slapped an arms embargo on both belligerents during the 1965 war, it affected Pakistan’s fighting capabilities without doing much damage to India’s. US-Pakistani ties regained momentum during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s but lapsed again in the 1990s when the Pressler Amendment stopped the transfer of US arms to Pakistan. In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested their nuclear capability, triggering US sanctions on both countries which were eventually lifted.
I asked Ambassador Teresita Schaffer of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies to comment on the significance of the US-India agreement. She has just authored a book, India and the United States in the 21st Century.
In the book, she says:
“The 10 years between India’s nuclear tests and the approval of the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement have seen remarkable changes in the way the United States and India deal with one another. Common international interests create the potential for a strategic connection. Still, India’s international ambitions send an ambivalent message. India sees the United States as a means of fulfilling its goals, but sometimes as a potential obstacle to them.”
I asked her if the war on terror had created a congruence of interests between the three countries. She said no, India and Pakistan do not perceive that as a “common interest”.
Then I turned to the issue at hand, Pakistani displeasure at the US decision to provide advanced nuclear know-how to India. Was Pakistan justified in seeing this as a significant tilt in US policy towards India?
She said that even during the strongest periods of US-Pakistan relations, the US has been unwilling to build its ties with Pakistan on hostility to India. India had to accept that the United States wished to maintain a strong relationship with Pakistan and the same logic holds for Pakistan. Unfortunately, she added, that idea has “never been easy for Pakistanis to accept”.
Tension continues to vex the triangle between the US, India and Pakistan since the latter two have a long-standing dispute with each other. The US, despite having close ties with both, seems unwilling to make a difference.
Asked whether she could envision a time when a South Asian Union would be formed along the lines of the EU, Schaffer said this was quite unrealistic in any but a very, very long time frame. She added that the countries of South Asia are very determined to maintain their individual sovereignty. They have shown no interest thus far in turning over their economic decision-making to a multi-national entity.
While agreeing that strong benefits would flow from regional economic cooperation, she was not confident that the US could do much to promote the idea. In her view the main obstacle was “Pakistan’s reluctance to allow economic relations with India to get out in front of [the] India-Pakistan discussion of Kashmir”.
She was asked if the US had any long-term interest in Pakistan beyond seeking its assistance in the war on terror; specifically, once the US pulls out militarily from the region, would the US continue to view Pakistan as a vital interest?
Her response was that the US had a very strong interest in Pakistan’s future peace, stability and prosperity. She noted that if Pakistan did well economically and politically, the South Asian region would become more peaceful, the risk of war would go down and that would be good for both countries.
I told her that there was a perception in Pakistan that the US desire to have close relations with India derived from a desire to counterbalance China. Thus, US closeness to India was perceived as hurting Pakistan directly (by making its rival stronger) and indirectly (by weakening China, Pakistan’s main ally). She disagreed, saying that the US desired strong relations with both India and China. She said this was a normal expectation since, in the next decade, both India and China were likely to grow economically and take a larger role in global deliberations.
I asked her where she saw India going in the next five to 10 years and whether its self-stated desire to become a regional or even great power would be fulfilled. She said that India was already a significant regional power and its economic footprint would grow larger in the future. With that, she said, would come a stronger military. Whether India would become a global power would depend on its ability to engage in give-and-take with other global powers on issues such as climate change, international financial reform, trade and non-proliferation.
The conversation then turned to Pakistan’s future. She said Pakistan’s success would depend on its ability to counter the ongoing insurgency and stabilise its economy in the next two to three years. She added that the country also needs to make long overdue investments in healthcare and education. If these changes take place, “it could turn a corner”.
Asked if the Pakistani military would stay out of politics, she said it all depended on how well the politicians governed the country. Which led to my final question: why has the Indian military left governance to the elected officials while the Pakistani military has not? She argued that India was fortunate in having strong democratic leadership at independence which ensured that it developed strong political institutions and allowed civil society to flourish. Unfortunately, that did not happen in Pakistan. At some point, the military took it upon itself to “step in and push the politicians out of the way when things were going badly”.
Of course, that raises the troubling issue of whether the military is justified in considering itself as the guardian of national security. Pakistan has a constitution that does not confer any such rights on the military. Did the military have an unwritten constitution of its own?
Ahmad Faruqui is the author of Musharraf’s Pakistan, Bush’s America and the Middle East
