The recently signed Indo-US nuclear deal welcoming India to the world ofrecognized nuclear power has been termed historic, and for once that may not beusual media hyperbole. Though only the future will determine its truesignificance, there is little doubt that the nuclear pact is an emphaticacknowledgment of India’s transformation from a regional to a global power, animportant step in transforming the rules of the world order to accommodate theaspirations of a rising power. Beyond these obvious implications, the measure ofthe tectonic shift that the Indo-US entente implies will be revealed in itsimpact on both the world’s non-proliferation regime as well as India’sstrategic posture, its economic-development and foreign-policy orientation. Asthe fallout from the nuclear deal becomes clear, India may be seen to have madean immediate strategic gain while underestimating the long-term politicalconsequences.
The deal was supposed to be a balancing act between India’s desire tomaintain maximum autonomy over its military nuclear program and the rest of theworld’s desire to cap that program. While all the details are not available,at this juncture it appears that the deal gives a distinct advantage to India atthe expense of the global non-proliferation goal. While India has agreed tosafeguards for its civilian reactors in perpetuity, it has artfully tied them toassurances on an uninterrupted fuel supply. India has retained the right todesignate future nuclear plants as civilian or military, it can divertindigenous fuel entirely for military use, and the number of plants kept outsidethe purview of inspection seems large enough to allow a credible militaryprogram. It will be difficult to argue that this deal significantly caps India’snuclear capability. If the deal goes through, India will have managed totransform the rules of the international order without sacrificing its militaryautonomy.
Will accommodating India weaken the non-proliferation regime, as many criticshave claimed? As a practical matter, it could be argued that states like Iranand North Korea will do whatever they wish, regardless of the choices made withrespect to India. The choices of countries to go nuclear will be determined moreby their perception of security threats and the compulsions of their domesticpolitics than choices made by third countries. India’s treatment as anexception is not arbitrary but principled. India satisfies the criteria of whatis called a "responsible" nuclear power: a democratic country that does notengage in proliferation. Iran, Pakistan, North Korea or, for that matter, Chinado not meet this criteria. But while a principled case can be made for acceptingIndia, this deal further legitimizes the possession of nuclear weapons. Iflegitimizing nuclear weapons as such poses a risk to the world order, this dealenhances those risks.
On the economic front the interdependence of India’s economy with that ofthe US is only bound to increase. India now becomes an attractive market fornuclear and advanced technologies worth billions of dollars. Both sides justifythe deal in economic terms. India’s ruling classes are convinced that nuclearpower is necessary for its energy security. It is the only viable answer toIndia’s acute power shortages. The US also wants to re-legitimize theworldwide use of nuclear power as the only alternative to burning hydrocarbons.But will dependence on nuclear power really give India the energy security itsneeds? Although the terms of the deal safeguard the import of uranium, will itbe wise for India to base its energy security on imported supplies of uranium?And are the economic arguments in favor of nuclear power over alternativesources so compelling that it becomes the cornerstone of India’s developmentstrategy?
While the desirability of India’s energy strategy can be debated intechnical terms, the political consequences of this deal are far more uncertainthan India acknowledges. The nuclear deal is simply one aspect of an Indo-USrelationship that is acquiring unprecedented momentum. For the first time in itshistory, the fortunes of India’s elites are comprehensively and intimatelytied with the fate of America. Can India be so materially and culturally boundwith the US and yet resist seeing world geo-politics through American eyes?While formally India acknowledges that it will not always align with the US,there are signs that India is subtly internalizing the terms of discoursethrough which the US describes the world order. Take for instance, the war onterrorism. India and the US have emphatically reiterated their common interestin defeating terrorism. But it is still not clear that it makes sense for Indiato buy into the idea that there is a single kind of terrorism or a united waragainst it. India was a victim of terrorism that had its roots in thegeo-politics of South Asia, not in the militant Islam that targets the West.Both are different entities that require different responses. India’s strategyof military self-restraint in the face of terrorism has also been politicallyprudent, while US military actions have, arguably, given terrorism more aid andsuccor. Is India now in the danger of being drawn into the confrontation betweenmilitant Islam and the West, a confrontation that is not of its making?
Of the foreign policy dilemmas that the deal will produce, the most importantone revolves around China.. The US projects India as some sort of counterweightto Chinese power. It is odd not to help build India while the Chinese juggernautroles on unabated. While not acknowledging it overtly, India is also preoccupiedwith containing Chinese influence. What effect will the deal have on India’srelations with China? The answer to this question depends on how US-Chinarelations evolve in the future. If relations between the US and China worsen,India, by aligning with the US, risks becoming a frontline state in thatconfrontation. But while the prospects of such a scenario should not beexaggerated, there is more immediate cause for worry. While the US hasemphatically rejected equating India and Pakistan in any nuclear order, willChina do the same? Some argue that China will assist Pakistan, regardless ofwhat India does. So does an increasing alignment with the US raise China’sstakes in the subcontinent? Will it be licensed to scale up its nuclearcooperation with Pakistan? China has also offered Bangladesh civilian nuclearcooperation. The prospect of Pakistan and Bangladesh possessing significantnumbers of civilian nuclear reactors is not one that the world, at thisjuncture, should contemplate with equanimity. As the Iran crisis hasdemonstrated, the line between civilian and military nuclear use is, to put itmildly, a contentious one. In the chess board of great power politics, the movesof every nation, knight or rook, are equally important.
Coming months and years will show that the Indo-US deal is not just abilateral pact; it will have consequences for the behavior of other nations. Andprudence requires that India acknowledge the unpredictability of thoseconsequences and brace itself.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta is president of the Center for Policy Research in NewDelhi, India. Rights: © 2006 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. YaleGlobalOnline.
