"We'll Go Nuclear"

The BJP's strident line is markedly different from that of other parties, which argue that India should keep its nuclear options open but refrain from exercising it. The BJP's 1996 manifesto spoke of "re-evaluating the country's nuclear policy and exercising the option to induct nuclear weapons". Says Mishra: "The BJP has been consistently promoting the idea that to merely say that India must retain the nuclear option is meaningless."

 So, would the BJP favour a nuclear test? "It all depends on what is necessary. We have not determined in advance that a nuclear test should be carried out by India. This will depend on the situation as we perceive it when we come to power. But India must develop the means of delivery of such weapons. The Prithvi programme is not enough for our purposes. We must move from the Prithvi to Agni I and II. The Agni I programme, which has been halted, will be revived and carried to its logical conclusion and the Agni II programme will be taken further."

But what does the strategic community make of the BJP's nuclear strain? "For the BJP, exercising the option means making the bomb. The party has been long identified as the pro-bomb lobby. But almost as a precondition it requires an absolute majority to take this decision," says Savita Pande, fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. She feels that to go nuclear, testing the bomb is necessary. "Neither a soldier nor a scientist will be satisfied with an untested bomb."

Former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit argues that "given the strategic environment around India and the present stance of all the nuclear weapon powers about their respective nuclear arsenals, it would be logical for India to weaponise itself." But he feels that if India is not going to weaponise itself due to various reasons, then "we must take a decision to that effect and take advantage of the dividends which may accrue to us by being in the mainstream of the thinking of these nuclear powers. The time for remaining ambiguous has passed".

Leading defence and security analyst K. Subrahmanyam argues that if the Chinese, Pakistanis, the Russians, the British, the Americans and the French think they need nuclear weapons, and all industrial countries under the protection of a nuclear umbrella think so too, then what is it which makes India think differently? "We should play the game as it is being played by the international community. If we have to play it differently, then we should explain how it is different."

Many in India find the BJP's electoral promise somewhat disconcerting. Agrees a senior strategic affairs analyst: "For 55 years since the bomb came into existence, the Indian political establishment still finds it hard to come to terms with a nuclear bomb. The liberals, the Left, the Gandhians and the socialists were never comfortable with this. For them the bomb was bad. It is only a small group of strategic analysts and quite separately, the right-wing formations in the country, who say that we should have a bomb. What everyone agrees on, however, is that India should not sign away the nuclear option by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

 But he feels that the BJP too is hedging. "It is thundering about the nuclear option, but is not talking about the tests. It is using the word 'exercise' so that it is seen as a toughie at home and also sends a message of restraint to the outside world."

The US position has also changed over a period of time. Earlier, it used to speak of capping, rolling back and eliminating the nuclear programmes of nuclear threshold states like India. Now it has moved to accepting India's ambiguous position on the nuclear issue, but it does not want India to test the bomb or declare itself overtly nuclear. "The West wants India to formalise some of the restraints we have. Then it can do business. The BJP's position leaves some room for compromise," says one expert.

But as Pande points out, if the BJP wants to exercise the nuclear option, it must first get a total majority in the elections. In a way that is the crux of the matter. Without a majority, the BJP may not be in a position to carry out its promise. Michael Krepon, who heads the Stimson Centre in Washington, says "political parties use this kind of rhetoric while campaigning for elections. Rhetoric is one thing and what they actually do is another." Americans hope the BJP's nuclear-speak remains just that—rhetoric.

Among Indian parties, Sitaram Yechuri of the CPI(M) finds the BJP's nuclear line dangerous. "Our idea of keeping the option open is to ensure that there is no nuclear arms race. But by making the bomb, we will formally start the race. True to its ideology, the BJP's philosophy will be to make a Hindu bomb against an Islamic bomb, which will create greater tensions in the region." According to Yechuri, the BJP is treading a jingoistic path.

The Congress is equally opposed to exercising the option. Jairam Ramesh, party joint secretary, views it as the BJP's "great intellectual machismo. This is the same thesis as Dr A.P.J. Kalam's that only if we have a N-bomb, will we be taken seriously, that we will have a nuisance value."

Ramesh wonders what's the point in being a military superpower but an economic basketcase. "If the country is economically strong, it will be taken seriously. A bomb won't help you get into the United Nations Security Council. We love to be taken seriously, but this is not the way to be taken seriously." He says that exercising the option will have far-reaching political and economic implications for the country, which is still paying the price for carrying out the 1974 test. "Our peaceful nuclear programme took a severe beating because of that test. It's only nice soundbite to say they will exercise the option."

 Krepon seems to agree: "There are tradeoffs between economic development and nuclear weapons. The next Indian government will have to decide how much economic growth it will have to sacrifice for the so-called status of testing nuclear weapons." He feels that the laws that the US government has passed speak for themselves."The laws are on the book and will not be changed. India has been through this before. The people in South Block have certainly been there before." A senior Clinton administration official, who did not want to be identified, echoes Krepon: "On testing, there are Congressional sanctions that would go into play if a country were to test nuclear weapons."

 However, he feels that there are no specific sanctions triggered by weaponisation or declaration of weaponisation, although Congress has been known to react after the fact. From the US standpoint, he says any step that India takes in a different direction would be a matter of great concern. India has shown restraint in the past and "we have said so. So, if the BJP were to move in the other direction, it would raise flags and send signals. It is one thing not to sign the CTBT, which we would want India to do. But it is another thing not to sign the CTBT and then move into an overt weaponisation programme."

 In fact, this official feels this step would put Indo-US ties in jeopardy. "But political parties often have things in their platforms, which they spend years wondering what to do about later. We are waiting and watching and hoping that status quo is maintained," the American official hopes.

The Americans have never hidden the fact that India will face sanctions if it goes nuclear. In fact, the last time when India is believed to have tried to carry out a nuclear test, in December 1995, then American ambassador Frank Wisner had met the Indian leaders and read the riot act to them.

"We know that there will be pressures on India if we exercise the nuclear option," says Mishra. "We believe that if such pressures are resisted, they will fade away after some time. If we perceive nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as necessary for our security we will have to go ahead with it." The Pakistani establishment, too, is apprehensive about the BJP's policies and not just on nuclear issues. For them, the BJP's handling of Kashmir and the Indo-Pak dialogue is of as much importance as the nuclear stand. In any case, says Shireen Mazari, a Pakistani strategic affairs analyst, Indians are all the time upgrading their nuclear programme. "It is a continuous process and it's wrong to assume otherwise. New Delhi has not signed the CTBT so what difference will the BJP make? At least they will be more open about it." It is felt that eventually the Indian establishment will override what the BJP wants in the foreign affairs or the security fields, as it did in the case of Gujral's initiatives vis-a-vis Pakistan.

As for the BJP, it is well aware of the US nuclear non-proliferation laws and its consequences. In fact, it is believed that during the 13 days in power in 1996, the BJP had asked officials to initiate work on an option paper—to assess the consequences and repercussions of conducting a nuclear test.

Dixit agrees that exercising the option will bring in all the stipulated restrictions in the various non-proliferation regimes and lead to the major advanced countries imposing export restrictions on technological items to India, hurt cooperation in space and nuclear energy fields and lead to these countries imposing general economic sanctions on purely political considerations.

It is almost certain that all multilateral aid will be blocked if a test is carried out. The US law clearly states that the secretary of treasury will instruct the executive director/president of international financial institutions to oppose any loans to non-nuclear weapon states as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that detonates a nuclear device.Besides, restrictions could be imposed on suppliers of those companies which supply technology to India.

American and British diplomats in Delhi have met defence and foreign affairs specialists of various political parties, particularly the BJP, about their post-election stances on nuclear and foreign policy issues. They are also believed to have met key Indian officials. Indian foreign secretary K. Raghunath is expected to go to the US in the next few weeks, when he will be accompanied by officials from the space and nuclear establishments. Nuclear and missile issues are bound to figure.

In fact, many in the strategic community, who want India to go nuclear, are agreed that India has the resilience to withstand sanctions. Says a former diplomat: "And if the market reforms go well, the nuclear powers may not want to keep sanctions for a long time."

According to Raja Mohan, a leading expert on nuclear issues, by simply talking of keeping the option open, not conducting any test, the country has been observing the various non-proliferation treaties without being a part of these—"We get the worst of both sides". He does not think it is enough to keep the option open. "We have to define our nuclear posture when our key neighbours have nuclear weapons."

Several Indian defence analysts argue that there could be some advantages of standing up to the Western pressure. For example, India refused to budge from its position on CTBT and now there is a perceptible change in the way nuclear powers view India. "Today, the outside world has begun to find ways to manage the problem," points out one expert. Already the developed countries are looking for ways of cooperating with India in the nuclear energy sector. French president Jacques Chirac's recent visit was a testimony to that. India and France have set up experts groups on energy cooperation, including nuclear energy. The West sees a great market in India's nuclear energy sector, but it wants something in return.

But there is a growing agreement in the Indian strategic affairs community that it's time for India to decide either way on the nuclear question. Says Raja Mohan: "I will rather prefer any decision on the nuclear issue than no decision which has been the main line of our policy. We have debated the nuclear issue for 40 years, it's time we clinch it and get on with other things." Maybe the BJP will end this uncertainty.