“History shows that the Manipuri* cannot and will not give the hills an administration of the standard to which they are both entitled. We are under an obligation to the hill tribes to maintain to them a decent administration.”
— Robert Reid, a British colonial administrator in India, who was the Governor of Assam from 1937 to 1942 (*By Manipuri, he means a Meitei).
Two immutable factors inevitably created a cyst of social incommunicability between the Meiteis, who lived in the valley, and the tribal people, who lived in the hill territory — the Kangleipak kingdom was mainly confined to the valley of about 700 square miles (Sushil Kumar Sharma, 2017:17), and, to add to its exclusivity, it adopted Hinduism at the beginning of the 18th century.
Well aware of this lacuna in the relation between the Meiteis and the hill people, the British colonial rulers intended to create a further division by separating the hill administration on the basic premise that “the hill tribes are not Manipuris and have entirely different customs and languages”.
In the pre-colonial period, the hill people lived as independent and sovereign nations in their respective chiefdoms, free from any external control. Understanding this position, William McCulloch comments thus: “Before the connection of the British government with that of Manipur took place, the latter, not to speak of exerting influence over the tribes, was unable to protect the inhabitants of the valley from their exaction and blackmail, and even after the conclusion of peace with Burma, and fixation of boundary of Manipur, the majority of the tribes were independent, and known to us little more than by name.” (McCulloch, 1859:73).
A fundamental point of significance of British colonial policy was, on the whole, recognition and legitimisation of the institution of tribal chieftainship and to rule over the common people in accordance with their own customs and traditions. The decision of a village chief was the last and final word on a subject and binding on all members of the tribe. He was the lord of the soil within the territory he occupied, ruled and governed. He collected taxes and levies from his subjects free from any external interference.
To quote Gangmumei Kamei: “The state of Manipur did not interfere in the hill administration and the hill villages were autonomous political entity. The hill tribes were outside the jurisdiction of the administration of the kingdom of Manipur.” (Gangmumei Kamei, 2015.161).
By carefully using the well-known policy of ‘divide and rule’, a policy that played a crucial part in ensuring the stability, indeed, the viability, of nearly every colonial rule, the colonial officials thus created a big chasm, first between the Meiteis and the tribal people, and second, between the Kukis and the Nagas. Kukis were used to putting Nagas in check, and vice-versa. They armed one group and disarmed the other as per their whims and pleasure, and the innocent tribal groups, far from realising that they were mere pawns in the hands of a greater power, would go all out at each other without ever thinking who actually shook the jar.
Practically, there was no proper administration in the hill territory before 1891, and the only connection between the colonial officials and the hill people were the lam subedars (revenue officers). The whole hill territory was divided into five divisions known as lam. Five lam subedars were appointed by the political agent for each lam. The five lams were the Mao lam to the north; the Tangkhul lam to the northeast; the Tamu lam to the east; the Moirang lam to the southwest; and the Kabui lam to the west.
Under one lam subedar, seven lambus were again appointed for each division. Under the colonial system, a lambu was an interpreter, a process server and a peon, combined in one. He was primarily a messenger to inform the order and programmes of the government to the chiefs, like road making, construction of bridges, etc, through the enforcement of pothang.
Pothang is of two kinds. Under pothang bekari, the hill people were under compulsion to carry loads —luggages, goods, rations of touring officials— and to construct new bungalows, where and when necessary. Under pothang senkhai, every household was under an obligation to make provision, either in cash or kind — mostly chicken, eggs— to feed the touring officials. Failure on the part of the people to render the pothang services, would invite the harshest of punishments—mostly whipping and caning.
A hill house tax of Rs 3 was imposed on every household in the hill areas. Some Kuki elite were also recruited for this post. The lambus were the eyes and ears of the government. The pothang and collection of house tax was enforced by the lambus through the tribal chiefs and their councilors.
Each time, when the lambus toured the hill areas, they would remain tight-lipped, unless and until a jar of zu (rice-beer) and sumptuous feast of pork or chicken was offered to them. The lambus made good of their proximity to the high officials, acting as their interpreters, apart from performing multifarious functions. The colonial officials of the state became more and more dependent upon the former for information and advice.
There was little or no scope for direct interaction between the officials and the hill people; that is, between the ruler and the ruled; all modes of contacts were only through the official conduit — the arrogant and imperious lambus. Robert Reid, the governor of Assam, remarks thus: “Between the hill men and the British officers, there intervened a most unsatisfactory intermediary in the shape of the petty Manipur officers termed lambus.” (Robert Reid, 1944)
When Raja Churachand Singh was installed to the gaddi of Manipur on May 15, 1907, the Manipur state durbar was revived to assist him. Raja Churachand Singh was the president of the durbar, and an English officer was the vice-president. No hill representative was appointed in the state durbar. T C Tiankham, the first speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly (1948-49), comments thus: “The hill regions never had a representative in the Manipur state durbar; in fact, there was no need for one.
“The reason was that the hills and the valley had never been under one administration. The British had taken the responsibility of governance over the hills separately, even before the durbar came into existence; the hills had been looked after by the political agent.” (T C Tiankham, 1913-1996:49).
The vice-president, who was a European officer, looked after the hill administration at his personal discretion.
The re-organisation of the Manipur state durbar was affected in 1913, wherein the raja relinquished the post of the president of the durbar and a British ICS officer was appointed as the president and who, by dint of holding the president’s office, enjoyed discretionary and special powers in the administration of the hill territory under the overall direct and superintendence of the political agent. It is fitting to mention here that there was no mention of the hills in the Manipur state durbar’s budget.
The Anglo-Kuki war of 1917-18 (Vijay Chenji, 2022), caught the British Raj completely unaware. The war shook the foundations of British rule in the hill areas. The British had underestimated the industrious and ingenious freedom-loving Kuki-Zos, whose grievances were genuine, that is, the immediate cause for the war being the question of recruitment for the labour corps (during the WW I), which the Kuki-Zos had opposed vigorously.
The British high-handedness and ineptness in mishandling of the issue provided a spark which ignited a fire engulfing the hill areas of the state. To quote Robert Reid again: “The most serious incident in the history of Manipur and its relations with its hill subjects was the Kuki Rebellion, commencing in the closing days of 1917. It cost 28 lakhs of rupees to quell, and in the course of it, many lives were lost.”
Reid further stated that the conceited lambus were equally responsible in no small measure for the Kuki Rebellion of 1917-19. An enquiry was made to ascertain the reasons for the war; it was attributed to the misrule of the lambus as the principal reason for the Kukis going to war against the British Raj.
The most significant impact of the Anglo-Kuki war was the immediate overall streamlining and re-organisation of administration, which heralded a new period of direct administration and one of centralised control, which was extended to un-administered areas in the hills.
Consequently, three new sub-divisions were formed — the southwest sub-division with headquarters at Songpi was under the charge of B C Gasper; the northwest division with headquarters at Tamenglong was under William Shaw, and the northeast division with headquarters at Ukhrul was under L L Peter.
All these European officers were directly recruited from amongst the Anglo-Indian officers of the Assam provincial civil services. They were responsible to the political agent and the president of the durbar. But no remarkable improvement in the hill administration could be seen because of their incompetency and continual absence in their place of duty.
When the new administrative rules were introduced in 1919, the maharaja insisted that he should be involved in the hill administration. But the revised rule simply stated that the maharaja had a right to be consulted in all matters of importance relating to the hill tribes.
In real practice, the maharaja and his durbar had no knowledge of the hill affairs. The president (European officer) of the durbar issued all boundary papers to the tribal chiefs in his own name. The durbar as an institution exercised no direct control over the hill administration throughout the colonial period.
When reform for the management of the hill tribes came up on the principle of federation in 1935, the issue of hill administration continued to be one of the controversial subjects. The political agent, including the governor of Assam and also A C Lothian, the viceroy’s special representative, took a firm stand that no change in the internal arrangement be made on behalf of the state for the administration of the hill areas as a consequence of federating. Thus, the maharaja of Manipur, in his letter on July 21, 1939, finally agreed to federate on terms that covered the exclusion of the hills from the state of Manipur.
Towards the end of 1944, the debate on the future administration of the hill areas came up again. In July 1945, a proposal for some form of self-government for the tribal people was raised. However, the proposal did not materialise because of the divergent responses of the hill people.
The Mao and Maram Nagas, under the leadership of A Daiho, harboured the idea of secession and went underground to fight for seceding from the state. The Tangkhuls were emphatic that on no account did they wish to be handed over to the maharaja (Bimal J.Dev & Dilip K.lahiri, 1987:68). The Kukis under the Kuki National Assembly raised a separate Kuki state and the Hmars in Tipaimukh joined the Mizo Union movement for integration with Mizoram.
On the initiative of T C Tiankham and Teba Kilong, the Khul National Union—comprising Chiru, Gangte, Hmar, Kom, Paite, Pakan (Anal, Lamkang, Monsang, Moyon, Purum and Tarao) and Zou—was formed in 1946. The party, though short-lived, was a strong force to be reckoned with. This was the charged political atmosphere in Manipur just before the Union Jack was pulled down by G P Steward, the last political agent, on August, 14, 1947.
From what has been indicated above, it may be concluded that the hill territory, though included within Manipur, never formed an integral part of the general administration of the state. It was run completely on different lines throughout the historical period. One positive change was the demarcation of tribal lands and the issuance of boundary papers (patta) to the tribal chiefs, thereby ensuring their ownership of land which they occupied for more than 200 years even before the coming of British rulers in Manipur.
The colonial officials successfully protected the hill areas from direct exploitation by plainspeople by introducing an inner line system, but miserably failed to provide a decent administration as promised. More serious than the administrative and territorial division is the ethnic divide which makes the people, despite their common historical, linguistic and cultural roots, incapable of thinking and acting as one people, one nation!
(Dr Lal Dena is a retired professor of history, Manipur University, Imphal, and an alumni of JNU, New Delhi. Lal Robul Pudaite is senior advisor, Hmar Students’ Association, Churachandpur Joint Headquarters. Views expressed are personal.)
