If vigilante action is an index of the state’s failure tomaintain law and order, then events in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh overthe past months are a clear demonstration of the twisted nature of policiesdesigned to counter left-wing extremism.
Chhattisgarh is one of the worst Naxal-affected states --Naxalites are active in eight out of the state’s 16 districts: Bastar,Dantewada, Kanker, Surguja, Jashpur, Koriya, Rajnandgaon, and Kawardha. An antiNaxalite movement, euphemistically called Salva Zudoom (peaceinitiative), is currently being led by Mahendra Karma, a Congress party leaderand Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly.
Sources indicate that as many as 250 villages of the Bastarregion have been mobilized under this movement, which commenced in mid-June2005. Apart from holding relatively large meetings, releasing anti-Maoistposters and pamphlets and maintaining vigils at the local level, the villagershave killed three Maoists. In rapid retaliation against these killings andanti-Maoist demonstrations, the Maoists have killed at least 32 tribals inseparate incidents. Ominous indications of the prospects of vigilante action arevisible in some of the more prominent of the recent Maoist attacks:
August 9, 2005: Maoists killed two persons related toMahendra Karma, including one of his brothers, in the Dantewada district.
July 28, 2005: Cadres of the Communist Party of India– Maoist (CPI-Maoist) attacked the Karemarka and Muder villages and killedseven persons. According to police sources, the attack was in retaliation for arally on July 24 in which 117 Maoist sympathisers had surrendered.
July 19, 2005: Maoists killed two civilians in theBijapur village of Dantewada district in retaliation for their participation inanti-Maoist demonstrations in the preceding weeks.
July 16, 2005: Seven villagers and two Maoists werekilled and at least 12 villagers sustained injuries during Maoist attacks on sixvillages in the Dantewada district. Targeting the villagers, who wereparticipating in the Salva Zudoom, over 250 armed-Maoists attacked theKutru, Ambeli, Pharsgaon, Uskapatnam, Badekarkeli and Chhotekarkeli villages.While two villagers were killed on the spot, the Maoists abducted five others,whose dead bodies were subsequently found in the Sagmeta jungle of Pharasgaonpolice station jurisdiction. The villagers told the police that at least twoNaxalites were also killed in the incident, when the villagers retaliatedagainst the Maoists who had attacked the homes of tribal activists of SalvaZudoom.
June 19, 2005: Naxalites killed eight villagers andwounded at least 100 others near Kotrapal village in Dantewada district foropposing their activities. The incident occurred when people of 45 villages werereturning after attending a Salva Zudoom meeting called to oppose theNaxalite movement in their areas. According to available information,approximately 3,000 villagers had gathered at the Taalmendri and Matwadavillages where they unanimously resolved to boycott the Naxalites. Aftervillagers held similar meetings in the Kutru, Bedre, Pharsegarh and Janglapolice station areas of Dantewada district, Maoists attacked the villagers nearKotrapal. In another related Naxalite attack a day earlier, a civilian of theNemed village was killed.
The vigilante initiative has reportedly also spread to theSurguja district in the wake of the ‘overwhelming response’ in Bastar. Thetribals have articulated their anger against the Maoists in meetings anddemonstrations in the Ramnujganj, Kusmumi, Balirampur, Pratappur and Rajpurareas of Surguja.
Buoyed by what is being claimed as an ‘unprecedentedsituation’, the Chhattisgarh police have reportedly decided to offer weaponsto anti-Naxalite groups and also selectively appoint people involved in the SalvaZudoom action as Special Police Officers. Inspector General of Police (Bastarregion), M. W. Ansari, disclosed that people would be provided arms in areaswhere the police force and government machinery find it difficult to move.
The state government has pledged to provide ‘ideologicalsupport’ besides food and medicines to the villagers who have raised thebanner of revolt against the Maoists. Chief Minister Raman Singh stated in amedia interview, "The tribal uprising is a welcome trend. People are vexedwith the Naxal violence. My government will certainly provide security to anyonewho opposes the Naxalites." He, however, clarified, further, "But weare not organising this programme."
It is not clear how the government will ‘providesecurity’ to those who ‘oppose the Naxalites’ in areas ‘where the policeforce and government machinery find it difficult to move’, but on August 25,the government announced that it had set up a Committee headed by ChiefSecretary A.K. Vijayvargiya to provide direct support to the tribal‘insurrection’. This is the first such Committee set up to support thoseopposing the Maoists at the local level, and it is expected to look into issuessuch as logistics, arms and funding. Little attention appears to have been paidto the fact that the decision to ‘empower’ the tribals could lead to evengreater violence against them in the region and elsewhere in the state.
There are at least some suggestions that Salva Zudoom is,in fact, a political exercise aimed at boosting the dwindling support base ofthe Congress among the tribals, a crucial vote bank in the state. While it wonall the three seats in the Dantewada district (including Karma’s seat in theDantewada constituency), the party lost all nine seats in the Bastar and Kankerdistricts during the 2004 state elections. Mahendra Karma, a tribal fromFaraspal, is also struggling to emerge from the shadows of Ajit Jogi, the nowbeleaguered former Chief Minister and Congress leader. Karma’s recent commentthat "it would take only three years to defeat them (the Naxals)"because of "people’s power" is a significant indicator of the strongelectoral factor involved – the state is scheduled for elections in threeyears.
For all its hype, the Salva Zudoom exercise isrestricted to only some 250 of the 3,766 villages in the Bastar region. Indeed,most of the activities and violence are restricted to the Dantewada district,Karma’s bastion. Nor, indeed, have these actions in any measure forced theMaoists into a retreat. The Naxalites have, in fact, retaliated violently andcontinue to respond poorly to announcements of the government’s surrender andrehabilitation policy announced on June 25, 2005.
Chhattisgarh falls under the Maoists’ 'Dandakaranya SpecialZone Committee' (which covers Bastar, Kanker and Dantewada in Chhattisgarh;Chandrapur, Gadchiroli and Bhandara in Maharashtra; Balaghat in Madhya Pradeshand parts of northern Andhra Pradesh). The Maoists reportedly function in thisarea through 18 Guerrilla Squads (Dalams) under four ‘divisionalcommittees’ – South Bastar (5 Dalams), North Bastar (4 Dalams),Bhandara-Balaghat (4 Dalams) and Gadchiroli (5 Dalams). TheMaoists in Bastar region and elsewhere in the state run virtual parallel governmentsin many areas, holding Jan Adalats (‘People's Courts’) to settle bothcivil and criminal disputes, imposing penalties that range from simple fines tomutilation and death.
In November 2004, the state’s then Home Minister Brij MohanAggarwal had stated in New Delhi, that there were about 2,000 Naxalites activein the region. Current Home Minister Ramvichar Netam informed the stateLegislative Assembly on July 12, 2005, that Chhattisgarh witnessed 697Maoist-related incidents between January 1, 2004 and June 24, 2005, in which 93civilians, 37 police personnel and 20 Maoists died. According to Netam,Dantewada district bordering Andhra Pradesh witnessed 287 incidents while theBastar district recorded 160 and Kanker 127. According to the Institute forConflict Management’s data, fatalities in Chhattisgarh related to Maoistactivities have already mounted to 66 in 2005, with Dantewada the worstaffected:
District-wise fatalities, 2005
District |
Civilians
SFs
Maoists
Total
Dantewada
35
12
2
49
Bastar
1
0
3
Surguja
1
5
1
7
The Bastar region comprises the tribal-dominated districts of Dantewada, Bastarand Kanker, and is one of the poorest areas in the country in terms of economicdevelopment and various social indicators. Tribal resentment against theNaxalites has crystallized around the perception that the rebels have become astumbling block to the limited developmental efforts in the region.
The Maoists, for instance, have long opposed the constructionof roads to villages in the area, fearing that these would bring the Police totheir doorstep. Naxalite activity has also affected the plucking of tendu leaves(used in the manufacture of bidis, Indian cigars) precisely when the statehad begun to improve revenue from the production of better quality tenduleaves. The Naxalites have also put a ban on weekly markets, the main sourceof income and goods for the tribals, causing great hardship to the people.
While public anger at Naxalite activity is understandable,the state’s policies are not. Since the creation of the new state (Chhattisgarhwas carved out of Madhya Pradesh in November 2000), the authorities have pursuedpolicies that, at best, can be termed muddled. Little attention has been paid tofundamentals, particularly the relative lack of preparedness of the Police forcein terms of equipment, arms, communications, transport and facilities, and theabysmal performance of institutions of civil governance in Naxalite-affectedareas.
Nor has there been a focus on the support structures of theNaxalite groups, their financial operations, augmentation of arms supplies, andlinkages across state borders. Bastar is, in fact, emerging as a ‘Base Area’for the unification of the Maoist movement and direction of operations acrossmultiple state boundaries. Police sources indicate that virtually the entireleadership of the Naxalites in Chattisgarh is drawn from Andhra Pradesh andMaharashtra; the locals only beef up low-level cadres. Summarizing the‘spill-over effect’, Chhattisgarh Director General of Police O.P. Rathoreremarked, "It's all Andhra Pradesh's problem. In fact, Chhattisgarh'sMaoist problem is exported by Andhra Pradesh. They sometimes enter into a truce,sometimes impose a ban and, in the final analysis, Chhattisgarh suffers."
Despite sustained Police and para-military operations in theregion, consequently, Naxalite influence and activity appear to be growing.Occasional incidents of mob fury against the Maoists – while they may reflectincreasing popular frustration with the ‘revolutionaries’ – cannot be asubstitute for coherent counter-terrorism strategy and tactics. Raising armiesof vigilantes, equipped by the state, cannot contain the Maoist menace and willinvite greater atrocities against large populations. The dangers of fashioningalternate policing institutions are palpable: they represent initiatives outsideof and, more often than not, uncontrolled by the state, and carry the risks ofcompounding, rather than resolving the problems of lawlessness and disorder.
Nihar Nayak is Research Associate, Institute for ConflictManagement. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal
