The Supreme Court on Tuesday said that the inherent powers of the court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) can only be applicable if there is no alternate remedy available in accordance with the law.
The apex court said that section 151 of the CPC, which deals with inherent powers of the court, cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing fresh suits, appeals, revisions, or reviews.
"A party cannot find solace in section 151 to allege and rectify historic wrongs and bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC," a bench headed by Chief Justice N V Ramana said.
The bench, also comprising Justices Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli, delivered its verdict on an appeal filed against the September 2021 judgement passed by the Telangana High Court which had allowed the recall of the final decree of 2013 in a property matter which started in 1953.
"Section 151 of the CPC can only be applicable if there is no alternate remedy available in accordance with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under the Code," the top court said.
The bench, while allowing the appeal observed should not have decided on the recall application based on an application filed under section 151 of the CPC.
It said section 151 of the CPC provides for civil courts to invoke their inherent jurisdiction and utilise the same to meet the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process.
The apex court said that in exercising powers under section 151 of the CPC, it cannot be said that civil courts can exercise substantive jurisdiction to unsettle already decided issues.
"A court having jurisdiction over the relevant subject matter has the power to decide and may come either to a right or a wrong conclusion," the bench said.
"Even if a wrong conclusion is arrived at or an incorrect decree is passed by the jurisdictional court, the same is binding on the parties until it is set aside by an appellate court or through other remedies provided in law," it said.
The top court said that the respondents in the case had access to recourse under section 96 of the CPC, which allows for appeals from an original decree.
"In the above circumstances, we are of the opinion that the high court should not have decided the recall application filed by the respondents, let alone pass such extensive orders which has the effect of unsettling proceedings and transactions which have a history of more than 60 years in a proceeding, basing on an application filed under section 151 of the CPC," it said.
The bench said it must clarify that the court is not, in any way, doubting the proposition of law that fraud nullifies all proceedings or that the court has the power to recall an order which was passed due to a fraud played on the court.
It also dealt with one of the grounds raised that the senior judge of the high court, who passed the order under challenge before it, had represented one of the opposite parties in certain collateral proceedings related to the property.
"The party ought to have raised this issue also at the time of arguments, particularly when the issue of recusal of the learned judge had been specifically raised on the other ground that he had been the presiding member of the bench which had dismissed the appeal filed by the State," it said.
The bench said when an issue was not raised before the division bench of the high court, it does not wish to "spill much ink" on this issue.
It noted that the annexure of the appeal paper book indicated that the senior judge, who was heading the division bench of the high court, while being an advocate, had represented the Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation in one of the connected proceedings related to this case.
"Although we have no doubt in our mind about the absence of bias of any form of the learned senior judge, we must at the same time also look at the issue of whether right-minded persons could consider there exists any real likelihood of bias," it said.
The bench referred to the well-established principle that not only must justice be done; it must also be seen to be done.
"In the present circumstances, it may have been more apposite for the concerned judge to have recused from this case. The appellant should have brought it to the notice of the learned senior judge at the very first instance, and not at this belated stage," it said.
-With PTI Input
