The Washington Post has run up some fever about India's alleged deployment of Prithvi. Quoting anonymous US officials, the Post reported on June 3 that India's military forces have moved a small number of Prithvi missiles to locations in Jalandhar and Amritsar which would bring Islamabad, Lahore, Faisalabad and Rawalpindi within striking range.
Despite the fact that the US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns acknowledged that he was not in a position to confirm the report, he warned India and Pakistan that "the US will react negatively if either India or Pakistan try to deploy ballistic missiles along their borders". He asserted that the US will consider such deployment a negative development, which would be contrary to the recently revived contacts between India and Pakistan.
There are three aspects of the controversy which merit analysis. The first is the assertive monitoring role the US has adopted about security and defence matters in the subcontinent; and its implications for India. The second aspect is the ground reality of India and Pakistan's military and defence postures; and their reasons for adopting such stands. The third is the impact of US attitudes on India's autonomy in exercising its options in technological and political terms to ensure its national security.
The latest official leak in the Post is part of a continuing pattern of such reports in the US media over the last seven years. In 1990, the US media heightened tensions in the subcontinent by publicising reports that there is a likelihood of a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan due to the increasing violence in J&K. US newspapers also leaked reports that India had deployed armour on the Rajasthan-Sindh border. This news was followed by official US démarches to India to avoid a military conflict with Pakistan. In 1995, the US media reported that India was about to conduct another nuclear weapons experiment.
The leitmotif of US policies in this matter seems to be to exert diplomatic, political and media pressure on India and Pakistan to conform to its terms to maintain peace in the subcontinent. These pressures are exerted without factual basis, without any provocative security developments. The pressure on India is greater because of US apprehension about India's defence capacities. In fact, in all Indo-US bilateral discussions on security issues since 1990, the constant US refrain has been that India should not deploy the Prithvi and that it should not carry on its research on the intermediate range of ballistic missiles, Agni. India's response: it has freedom of options and is free to develop its own technology.
As far as the ground realities of India's security environment are concerned, a factual analysis will be pertinent. The Prithvi has an estimated range of 250 km to 500 km, carrying a payload of 250 km to 500 km, carrying a payload of 250 kg; or a range of 150 km if it carries a heavier payload of 1,000 kg. In comparison, Pakistan has an arsenal of M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles obtained from China; and has developed the indigenous HATF I, HATF II, HATF III missiles, based on Chinese technology. While HATF I missile has a 60 to 100 km range carrying payloads of 500 kg, HATF II and HATF III, the solid state propellant missiles, have a range of 300 to 600 km carrying payloads matching and, in excess of, Indian missiles. While India's missile programme is transparent and has received much hype, Pakistan has not been subjected to the same kind of scrutiny.
Pakistan has been experimenting with its missile systems since 1988-89. Their former army chief Gen. Aslam Beg is on record that Pakistan had successfully test-fired missiles to the range of 80 to 300 km in 1990. Pakistan has 1,100 to 1,500 Stinger missiles supplied by the US, about 300 to 350 RBS-70 missiles acquired from Sweden and the surface-to-air-guided missile, ANZA. The missile system of Pakistan is backed up by better communications equipment like the AN-TPQ 37 Radar.
Since 1990, Gen. Beg and A.Q. Khan, chairman of the Kahuta project, have given clear indications that Pakistan has received substantive assistance from the Chinese in developing its missiles. In fact, Pakistan's missile armoury is a threat to India. So, it is logical for India to want to be self-reliant.
India had successfully test-fired the Prithvi in May 1992, when a decision was taken to deploy the missile by the end of the decade. This was no covert operation. The Indian Parliament as well as countries like the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia were kept informed about India's intentions. The flurry of leaks, speculations and warnings do not seem necessary, particularly because there is not confirmed information about India deploying these missiles. What's more, observers in the US have been sceptical about the unattributable official leaks in the Post.
This brings one to the third dimension-the US and its role in the subcontinent. One need not be critical of the US about it wanting to pre-empt prospects of military confrontation in the subcontinent. This is both logical and desirable, but the invasive monitoring and constant objections to India developing its defence technology affects India's discretion in dealing with vital aspects of national security. The emphatic warning issued by the US implies that it wishes to sit in judgement on India's threat perceptions and security predicament. This is unacceptable.
There are larger US concerns underpinning its policies on the missile issue. An Indo-Pakistan missile war will compel the US to consider political and economic sanctions not only against them but also against China, because of its involvement with Pakistan's missile programme. A development the US would like to avoid, given its interest in maintaining happy relations with China. The US has legitimate reasons for wanting to temper India's military capabilities. There is, however, no substance in the talk that the Post report was aimed at disrupting Indo-Pak dialogue. The leak was perhaps motivated by the US' larger strategic interests in Asia. The negative impact on Indo-Pak ties, if any, would be a side-effect.
The Pakistan foreign office spokesman has expressed serious concern about Prithvi but both Nawaz Sharif and his spokesman have confirmed that this would not affect foreign secretary-level talks on June 19. Pakistan army chief Gen. Jehangir Karamat says if the India missile deployment is true, it only stresses the need for the Pakistani army to become self-reliant.
But Pakistan's existing missile arsenal is formidable. India's missile programme did not evolve in a vacuum-it's a response to the evolving security environment.
