Another Go At Peace

Atal Behari Vajpayee could not have timed his offer of a unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir any better. The month-long fasting for Ramazan begins today. It is a time when pious Muslims turn their thoughts to god, and even the most bigoted of zealots feels a qualm about killing people in his name. By the time Ramadan ends, Kashmir will be locked in the icy grip of winter. The mountain passes will be closed and the annual respite from terrorism will have begun. Resuming the proxy war will therefore be exceedingly difficult.

The prime minister has thus given everyone involved in the dispute several months to ask themselves where the confrontation in Kashmir is taking them, and to put out feelers to find an alternative to violence.

The reactions from Islamabad and Srinagar show that his offer has been taken very seriously. Pakistan's first reaction, conveyed by its foreign office, was guarded. It dismissed the ceasefire as a tactical move designed to help the security forces in imposing ‘a military solution on Kashmir' and reiterated that India's sincerity of purpose would be tested by its willingness to enter into tripartite talks with Pakistan and representatives of the Kashmiris. But just one day later, Islamabad changed its tune. This time it spoke through the Hizbul Mujahideen, whose spokesman sounded uncannily like Gen Pervez Musharraf when he spoke to a group of Indian journalists in Islamabad last July. According to him, a resolution of the Kashmir dispute had three components: first, India should acknowledge Kashmir as a disputed territory; second, there must be a dialogue between India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir and third, the solution should be acceptable to Kashmiris. In this context, the Hizb spokesman attached special importance to how the ceasefire offer would be received by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir.

It's therefore critically important to understand the reaction of the Hurriyat. Its response is important not just for what it said but for what it did not say. Unlike its hostile reaction to the ceasefire announced by Hizbul in July, it left no one in any doubt this time that it welcomed the Indian ‘change of heart'. Speaking from a prepared text, its spokesman said, "If the announcement is in tune with peace, prosperity, restoration of relations between neighbours and serious efforts devoid of traditional politics are made to resolve the Kashmir issue, it reflects the positive change in Indian thinking."

Although the spokesman insisted that Kashmir was not an internal matter for India, he did not specifically endorse Pakistan's July demand that India should enter into tripartite talks with it and the ‘Kashmiri people'. Both the statement and the omission were not accidental. On the contrary, they reflect the deep division that exists in the leadership between those like Prof Abdul Ghani Butt and Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who openly favour Kashmir's merger with Pakistan, and other leaders like Yaseen Malik and Mirwaiz Omar Farouq, who want greater independence for the state. As a result, the former was a blow to the sentiments of the pro-Pakistan elements in Hurriyat, while the latter was a concession to the champions of Kashmiriyat.

Where the Hurriyat leaders were on common ground was on their long-term goals for Kashmir. These are to find a solution that promotes peace and prosperity and restores (good) relations between neighbours, i.e., between Pakistan and India. To do so, it asked India to be willing to step outside the confines of ‘traditional politics'.In short it reminded Vajpayee of his August 7 offer to explore solutions to the Kashmir dispute that may lie outside the framework of the Constitution.

Regardless of the infighting that must have preceded it, there couldn't have been a more responsible and constructive response to Vajpayee's offer. That's why New Delhi would do well not to reject the Hurriyat's offer to act as a bridge between Pakistan and India by sending members of its executive council to both New Delhi and Islamabad. Like any foray into unknown territory, this is not without its risks. But back-door discussions with both the Hurriyat and Islamabad can greatly reduce them.

Pakistan's reactions also merit careful attention. Despite its initial reaction, Islamabad has not closed the door on talks with India via the Kashmiris. The divergent reactions of the foreign office and of the Hizbul mirror the division between the hardliners and those prepared to look for a compromise within the Musharraf government. It's possible that the Hizbul's reactions mirror only its own views. But given the way its statement echoed Musharraf's statement of July 2 (that while Pakistan must be a party to the resolution of the dispute, he would be inclined to accept any solution acceptable to the Kashmiri people), it is likely that it reflects Musharraf's views and thus his ascendancy within the Pakistani power structure. If true, the Hizb's statement opens the way to a compromise for it shows Pakistan's willingness to retreat from its original aim of annexing the whole of Kashmir, if not also Jammu and Ladakh. For, if the Kashmiris have a say in the final solution, they're likely to opt overwhelmingly for autonomy, however constrained, from both India and Pakistan.

There is, therefore, some room for optimism. But no one should harbour the illusion that it will be easy to arrive at a resolution of the dispute. India and Pakistan's positions are so far apart and the Pakistani state is now so fragile that it will be hard even for the Hurriyat to find the minimum of common ground needed for the talks to be fruitful. The most the two countries can do at this moment is to use the Hurriyat to pave the way for a dialogue, listen to each other and understand the domestic political constraints within which each is compelled to look for a solution.