Big Gulps Of The Peace Pipe

Both New Delhi and Islamabad seem determined not to let the momentum of detente that was built up in Islamabad flag. Pakistan foreign minister Khursheed Ahmed Kasuri announced only days after the end of the SAARC summit that India and Pakistan could start discussing the opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road even before formal talks begin in February. The Samjhauta express is about to be flagged off. Best of all, L.K. Advani has lost little time in sending a written invitation to the Hurriyat, and Moulvi Abbas Ansari, the chairman of the majority moderate wing of the movement, has lost even less time in accepting it. The Kashmir chief minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed has welcomed both initiatives, and both he and Moulvi Ansari have been trying to get the Hurriyat hardliners under Ali Shah Geelani to join in the talks. There is thus a visible convergence taking place—a focusing of energies that augurs well for the future.

Compare this to the behaviour of these same actors in the past. In May 2000 when, as the result of an initiative taken by the PMO, New Delhi released the leaders of the Hurriyat from eight months in jail and expressed its readiness to hold talks with them, Advani immediately declared that the talks would have to be held under the Indian Constitution. That made it impossible for the Hurriyat to accept the offer without being accused in Kashmir of having caved in before or, worse, sold out to the Indian intelligence agencies. In April 2001, when the government appointed K.C. Pant as its negotiator with the Hurriyat, despite abundant indications that references in the government's announcement to talks with other groups in addition to Hurriyat were intended purely as window-dressing to save the face of the Farooq Abdullah government, the Hurriyat categorically refused to meet Pant on the grounds that it was not prepared to board a crowded bus.

As for Abdullah, in sharp contrast to Mufti Sayeed, spared no effort from his first day in office in 1996 to marginalise and whittle down the militant movement instead of trying to entice it into the democratic process, as the Mufti is doing. In this effort, he gradually came to regard the Hurriyat moderates as his adversaries and the pro-Pakistan elements as fellow-travellers, if not allies.

The complete turnaround in the attitude of all parties in Kashmir is a good portent. But the most unambiguous indication of a new seriousness of purpose has come from Pakistan. It comes in the form of an emphatic announcement by the secretary for petroleum and natural resources, M. Abdullah Yusuf, that Pakistan may start buying up to 5 million tonnes of diesel from India instead of Kuwait because it makes 'better economic sense', that is, would prove cheaper. Among possible suppliers, he specifically mentioned Reliance, which has taken a keen, backstage interest in promoting better relations between India and Pakistan in the past several years. It is by no means certain that the ministry's initiative will find favour in all sections of the Pakistan government, but if it does, it will provide proof through deeds and not words that Pakistan has decided to turn its back on confrontation and place its bets on cooperation instead.

Were Pakistan to go ahead with these imports, India would do well to reciprocate by agreeing to allow the Central Asian Gas pipeline to be extended to northern India. This would benefit everyone concerned with the project. It would meet a critical need for energy in northern India, make the project viable for the investors, and earn Pakistan up to 2 billion dollars a year in transit fees. The quantum jump in economic interdependence will also make it easier for the two countries to resolve their political problems. It will certainly make it more difficult for Pakistan to resume its sponsorship of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

For the peace process to make headway, it is essential to build trust between the two nations. After decades of hostility, this will not be easy. Thus it is imperative that New Delhi's talks with the Hurriyat should not be seen in Pakistan as an effort to weaken its bargaining position in relation to India. A great deal of the responsibility for ensuring that this does not happen will fall upon the Hurriyat's leaders. The Hurriyat has already spelt out the requirements for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. These are that it must be honourable (for the Kashmiris), acceptable (to India) and durable (which will only happen if it is acceptable to Pakistan). Moulvi Ansari has expressed his confidence that the Hurriyat will be able to craft a win-win solution for the Kashmir dispute. But this will not be possible if he cannot persuade the jehadi organisations in Muzaffarabad to suspend their operations in Jammu and Kashmir, and in particular wean the Hizbul Mujahideen, the only remaining Kashmiri organisation in the jehad, away from the path of violence.

He will find it very hard to do all this without at least tacit cooperation from Pakistan. And that will require at least a minimum of concurrence between Pakistan and India on the direction in which they will go in their search for a solution to the Kashmir dispute. A delicate, finely orchestrated, triangular negotiation therefore lies ahead. To make it a success, all parties will need to exercise the maximum of restraint and avoid ill-considered remarks to the media. But the auguries are all good, and 2004 can still become a year of fulfillment.