THe 12th non-aligned summit concluded in Durban on the 4th of September. This was the first time Atal Behari Vajpayee participated in a NAM summit. This was also the first time a non-Congress government represented India in the non-aligned movement. The general assessment is the Indian delegation acquitted itself well during the deliberations and showed a capacity to stand firm on issues of vital interest to India, on which some members of the movement took critical or adversarial stances.
Leaving aside the event-specific importance of this summit and the discussions held, a fundamental question to be asked is whether the 12th summit of the movement led to any redefinition of the objectives of the movement in the context of the transformed post-Cold War international situation. It is to be acknowledged that since the end of the Cold War and superpower confrontation, there has been widespread questioning of the relevance of the movement amongst its members. There is also a general awareness amongst the membership of the movement that it lacks unity in perceptions about the challenges that developing countries face. This erodes the centrality of the movement as an instrument to collectively further the political, security and economic interests of the developing countries. There is a shared recognition that NAM would have to redefine its terms of reference, take note of the new challenges that the members collectively face in the new international order being put in place by the advanced countries under the leadership of the US. The three summits held since the end of the Cold War were supposed to engage in the exercise of redefining the role and objectives of NAM. Reviewing the discussions at these three summits and their decisions, one cannot escape the conclusion that the movement has not come to grips with the new international situation.
Lest one is accused of indulging in a sweeping value judgement, an analysis of the ambience and decisions of the Durban summit would be pertinent. Firstly, the lack of political importance attached to the summit manifested itself in the fact that less than half of the 114 member-countries were represented by their heads of state or government. Secondly, bilateral and regional controversies significantly marred the atmosphere. The animosity between Congolese president Laurent Kabila and Nelson Mandela disturbed the atmosphere of the summit. Mandela's references to Kashmir in his inaugural address generated tension with India. The resentment among Islamic members due to the unilateral missile strikes by the US were exacerbated by the US being invited as an observer. Opinion was divided on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security issues. A phenomenon in the general debate of particular negative relevance to India was the large number of delegations expressing critical views about India's nuclear weaponisation and then, as they asserted, the consequent nuclear weaponisation of Pakistan.
Most importantly, there was no substantive agreement on collective or shared policy stances to be adopted regarding broader issues affecting the collective interest of the movement, viz. questions of good governance, institutional safeguards for human rights, international trading arrangements evolving under the WTO, condition-alities affecting transfer of resources and investments, new regimes being put in place by the advanced countries on transfers of technology or even on specific issues like the continuing sanctions against Iraq and Cuba. Nor was there any real unity on the UN's peacekeeping role, UN reforms or the role of multilateral financial institutions.
The Durban declaration, running to nearly 150 pages, deals with all these issues in a non-controversial, anodyne manner. While it refers to most issues of common concern and interest, it generally falls short of affirming a unity of purpose or a capacity to follow coordinated or parallel policies to respond to these concerns and interests. The inherent centrifugal forces resulted in the declaration focusing on the requirements of consensus and papering over differences of opinion rather than reflecting the real orientations of the members. The Durban summit, like all the non-aligned summits since the late '80s, remained a cosmetic exercise.
An assessment of the discussions in the summit on Indian concerns and interests is of particular relevance. Mandela's reference to Kashmir in his capacity as chairman was a departure from normal precedents, but it should not have come as a shock or a surprise to us. Any study of Mandela's policy stances and attitudes since 1992-93 would have indicated that he has a detached, totally impartial view on Kashmir. Referring to Kashmir in his inaugural address also reflected his leitmotif of projecting himself as a leader of the movement transcending the individual concerns of member-countries even if it was an important country like India.
Vajpayee's pointing out "on record" that this reference was unacceptable was valid, but I don't quite see why we should have been so much on the defensive and why we played up the reported apology from South Africa. I do not think there was any clearly expressed apology. All that must have been conveyed was the global context in which Mandela referred to Kashmir. Similarly, a majority of countries were critical of India's nuclear weaponisation and we responded appropriately. It is true that we have taken much satisfaction at there being no reference to Kashmir in the final declaration as well as no criticism of India's nuclear weaponisation in the final document.
We have claimed this as a diplomatic victory. To a limited extent, the claim is valid. We should, however, not ignore the fact that the declaration reflecting our general point of view does not mean that the individual policies of the member-countries have also undergone a parallel transformation. Policy orientations of the members are not going to change because of the declaration. These individual orientations will remain the substance of their policies on these issues of vital concern to India. What India should monitor is the policies that fellow members follow in the coming months and years on these issues instead of reposing our faith in the obfuscatory courtesy and generalities in the declaration.
The reality is that NAM has been progressively marginalised in international affairs. We must make a distinction between remaining "non-aligned" and being a member of the "non-aligned movement". Remaining "non-aligned" will always be relevant to India's foreign policy to ensure that we always retain our freedom of options to be responsive to our interests at any given point of time. Being part of the non-aligned movement, which continues to exist because no member wants to be the first to formally question its relevance, is altogether a different proposition.
