Escalator To Nowhere

Where do India and Pakistan stand after announcing troop withdrawals from the international border? What are the likely consequences of the crisis, now partially winding down? The most likely one is that leaders in both countries will continue to misread each other. Very different lessons seem to have been learned from the standoff, which bodes ill for war prevention and escalation control in the future.

One reason why misconceptions abound is that strategic analysts in India hold very different views about this exercise in coercion-through-mobilisation to influence Islamabad and Washington. Some believe the threat to go to war was a success, extracting by means of the Bush administration a pledge from Pakistan to stop facilitating terrorism across the Kashmir divide. In this view, mobilising the Indian army realigned US policy towards terrorism in the region—which had wobbled due to the exigencies of fighting inside Pakistan against the remnants of Al Qaeda. Others view it as a misuse of the army that weakened Indian credibility.

Within Pakistan, there appears to be a nearly unified view of the extended crisis. The Pakistan army leadership firmly believes that it called India's bluff. Once the counter-mobilisation was in place, backed up by the N-option, senior Pakistani officers believe they successfully checkmated Indian designs. They also believe that the Indian army is demoralised, not eager to fight. Thus, demands emanating from New Delhi are likely to fall on deaf ears. No Pakistani military leader will yield to 'dictation' from India under these circumstances.

The Indian army leadership cannot feel good about being sent to the frontlines for almost a year without fighting. But it would be a mistake for Pakistan to assume the Indian forces are planning for a stalemate in the event of another conflict, or that they aren't eager to settle scores.

Virtually alone among the international community, the Indian government has spoken with sympathy about the Bush administration's pronouncements regarding military pre-emption. New Delhi, unlike Washington, does not seek to elevate pre-emption from an option to a military doctrine, but it does insist on the right to punish Pakistan for supporting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, Indian officials reject double standards set by Washington regarding the pre-emptive use of force: if the US arrogates to itself the right to "dismantle the infrastructure of terror" in Afghanistan, India certainly retains the right to strike targets on the Pakistani side of the Kashmir divide, where infiltration begins. But these threats have lost credibility in Pakistan as a consequence of the extended standoff.

The situation in South Asia remains ripe for misjudgements in the event of another flashpoint. The Pakistan army's confidence in their ability to fight to a draw along the LoC —the functional equivalent of a 'victory' against a larger foe—mixed with an intense Indian desire to punish those who aid and abet terrorism, make for an explosive mix.

A second apparent consequence of the recent standoff is a common view in Islamabad as well as New Delhi that the Bush administration has failed to deliver on its promises. Indian officials have publicly and repeatedly clarified their judgement that the Pakistani army's support for infiltration has not ceased, as promised by President Pervez Musharraf to US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage and others.

Pakistanis across a wide political spectrum believe the Indian government has missed a real opportunity by belittling President Musharraf's statements regarding infiltration. In this view, after a decade seeking acknowledgement that the Pakistani army supported LoC crossings as well as a public commitment to cease facilitating infiltration, New Delhi has hastened to dismiss these developments while personally denigrating the architect of this initiative.These tactics are unlikely to get India what it wants from Pakistan. The latter hasn't got what it wants from India either, what it expected the Bush administration to deliver, "the resumption of dialogue". Unless dialogue is resumed and pledges regarding infiltration are kept, successful US intervention in the event of another crisis faces longer odds.

For now, war clouds and the threat of pre-emption have receded from the horizon. Another bullet has been dodged, but the underlying dangers of escalation remain in place. India hasn't received satisfaction on the issue of infiltration, and Pakistan continues to see value in highlighting the Kashmir dispute. Both countries have engaged deeply in competing games of brinkmanship, Pakistan by supporting militancy, India by mobilising to fight a two-front war unless infiltration stops. They've little to show for their efforts.

India's decision to partially demobilise while refusing to re-engage Pakistan in dialogue cedes to Islamabad the political high ground. As long as talks are rejected, Pakistani diplomacy can rest on eminently reasonable pronouncements of the need for talks, without having to deal with the fundamental weaknesses of its Kashmir policy. The continued absence of dialogue also means discussions on reducing nuclear risks and controlling unintended escalation are put on hold.

The longer New Delhi's diplomatic posture toward Pakistan remains frozen, the more the LoC is likely to heat up. The same result is likely in the event of an Indian strategy that seeks to engage the newly elected Jammu and Kashmir government, while stifling Islamabad. In the absence of dialogue and an improved political context, there will be little to fall back on in the event of another triggering event.

A military threat of pre-emption requires the credible threat of force and the political will to use it. If New Delhi orders another mobilisation in response to a severe provocation, India will face stark choices—either to fight a war or to risk the further loss of credibility. Better options require a thaw in India-Pakistan relations.