Everybody's Buffer State
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AFTER the Taliban's temporary victories this May, the Afghan civil war is once again heading for a stalemate, though the Taliban still hold anadvantage over the Northern Alliance. The civil strife also remains the focus of policymakers around the world. The spectre of a Taliban sweep, almost real just six weeks ago, has reactivated Russian interest. Not that Russia had been ignoring the Afghan situation, but the focus of attention was on European and NATO-related security concerns. This attention has marginally shifted to Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Four events of significance have occurred since June 27, though they have not been taken much notice of by the media. The first was the signing of an "inter-Tajik agreement to restore peace in Tajikistan" under the auspices of the Russian foreign office in Moscow on June 27. The second, a June 26-28 meeting of foreign ministers of Central Asian republics held by Russian foreign minister Yevgeni Primakov on the above occasion to discuss the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan; Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati participated. The third, a bilateral non-governmental conference between Russia and India to discuss the latest developments in Afghanistan and to explore the possibilities of Indo-Russian cooperation to stabilise the situation there. The fourth, a visit by a special envoy of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd to Teheran in an effort to improve bilateral ties and to "discuss the current problems (including Afghanistan) facing Arab and Islamic countries".

Being a participant in the Indo-Russian conference, I was informed about Russian perceptions and orientations on the Afghan situation. The other contemporaneous events referred to indicate the latest approaches towards dealing with the Afghan problem, which would be of interest to India.

First the Russian perceptions. While Moscow acknowledges that the Taliban and their allies will be a dominant factor in Afghan politics in the foreseeable future, it feels all possible efforts should be made to deny them a total military victory. Secondly, the non-Pushtun groups should form part of the power structure in whatever settlement is put in place. In Russia's opinion, Afghanistan's strategic importance has increased as it is a transport junction and a bridge between the landlocked countries of Central Asia and the littoral countries on the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The CIS countries, which are rich in hydrocarbon and mineral resources, are keen to accelerate economic development by increasing exports. Russia is concerned that the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are seeking exclusive access to these markets, to the detriment of Iran, India and possibly Russia.

Another assessment articulated during the Moscow discussions was that the Taliban's objectives and influence should not be under-estimated. In recent weeks, the Taliban have circulated a monograph titled Aj Madrasa Ta Hakumat (from religious schools to governmental authority), in which their overall objective has been described as "the establishment of a genuinely orthodox Islamic government in Afghanistan manned by cadres and scholars trained in the Sunni madrasas". It says the consolidation of an Afghan national identity and its Islamic ethos can be achieved only through the establishment of such a government. The monograph and related commentaries circulating among the Afghan expatriate population in different parts of the world mention that the Taliban are not averse to cooperating with elements of the former royalist government of the King Zahir Shah period. Russian academics also mention that a list of names for a potential Afghan government, in circulation in expatriate Afghan circles, includes a number of prominent figures of Zahir Shah's last cabinet.

The Russian assessment is that ethnicity more than Islam is the active competitive factor in the current phase of the Afghan civil war. They fear that a Pushtun-dominated Afghan government, if it discriminates against the large ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, will generate instability in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which in turn would retard economic progress in the region. The most significant message conveyed was that while Russia would resist a Pak-Saudi-backed Taliban domination of Afghanistan, Russia cannot resist this pressure by any coercive or military means. There was also a reluctant acknowledgement that strategic Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are now inclined towards working out an equation with the West to sort out their regional concerns and are not depending entirely on the Russian federation.

It is in this context that the Primakov initiative of forging the inter-Tajikistan agreement and better ties with Iran took place. It would be relevant to mention that there was also a Pakistan foreign office representation at the Moscow conference. It is interesting that Russia, Iran and other Central Asian republics at the governmental as well as non-governmental levels have remained committed to sustaining a united Afghanistan. For this purpose, the Russians seem willing to negotiate with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Taliban.

Indian interests in Afghanistan, in the light of this evolving situation, could be defined as follows. To the extent feasible, Afghanistan's unity and territorial integrity should be sustained. India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, should resist the propagation of any religious, social or ethnic extremism which can profoundly destabilise Afghanistan's Asian neighbours. Our endeavour should be the formation of a government in Afghanistan which is representative of and responsive to all sections of society. An early solution to the crisis is critical for realising the enormous opportunities for energy and economic cooperation in the Eurasian region. India should actively participate in the creation of a broad coalition of international forces at the inter-government level and through multilateral fora to end the civil conflict and to normalise the situation in Afghanistan.

The message received in Moscow was that Russia would be willing to cooperate with India, Iran, China, the US and even Pakistan to meet this broad objective. Given the emerging economic and strategic significance of Central Asia and Afghanistan, the region should be a particular focus of attention of our foreign policy in the months to come.

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