PRESIDENT Truman proclaimed his celebrated Four Freedoms in 1948. To those, Bob Hope added a fifth: freedom from humbug. The adage comes to mind in the context of the current debate on India's nuclear test explosions.
The Indian bomb is no more abhorrent than the American, Chinese, Russian, French or British. Nor is the nth state argument particularly impressive when the N-five are licensed to retain and refine their arsenals through sub-critical tests or by computer simulation and, like other adherents, have the right to rescind their accession to the CTBT if faced with the exigency of sovereign defence. Indeed, this was an argument proffered by the United States and Britain before the International Court of Justice which had been asked for an advisory opinion by the UN General Assembly in 1996 on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.
India has consistently advocated complete and universal nuclear disarmament as the best and only means of getting rid of this weapon of mass destruction, with arms limitation and control being intermediate stages along the way. It repeated this after its first test in 1974—and waited. In the event, the NPT and now the CTBT have legitimised nuclear weapons and only sought to freeze a highly unequal and discriminatory status quo.
However, even the status quo seems a charade. Many among those who have decried the Indian tests either possess nuclear arms or enjoy the protection of a nuclear umbrella. NATO's nuclear umbrella has extended eastward to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary despite the end of the cold war. Why? And this geographical proliferation could be but Stage I in a new ostpolitik.
The United States turned a blind eye to proliferation of nuclear capability, and the export of narcotics, Islamic fundamentalism and a new generation of automatic small arms to and through a frontline ally during all the years of the Afghanistan war, as the "evil empire" had to be defeated. The consequences of that blindness have been profoundly painful and disturbing for a country like India.
Nuclear weapons suffer degradation over time. Hence the United States has entered into a highly sophisticated Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programme to maintain the battlefield integrity of its nuclear weapons despite ageing. And consider the extraordinary incongruity and arrogance of power explicit in the CTBT which, it is decreed, cannot enter into force unless India, its staunchest opponent, ratifies it. So in not signing the treaty in September 1996 India was angrily dubbed a "spoiler"!
The strange entry-into-force formula is a multilateral version of the extra-territoriality the US has assumed for domestic laws by proclaiming that third countries trading with states like Cuba, Iran and Libya, with which it has banned commerce, are liable to face sanctions. European nations are protesting this illegal imposition.
It is moot whether India is truly a "spoiler". Rather, the nuclear-missile regime that those-that-have along with their umbrellaed-allies have imposed seeks to prevent "proliferation" of so-called dual-use technology. Many technologies are directly or indirectly dual-use, much depending on the end-configuration. Most frontier technologies will probably be dual-use in this sense. India has already experienced embargoes on high-speed computers, cryogenic engines, a fertiliser/chemical technology that was suspect, etc. Much that is new and exciting in the chemical, bio-technological, metals and materials, electronics, space, information technology and other areas could be dual-use. By what and whose definition?
Dual-use, like beauty, lies in the beholder's eye. And the eye might well behold threats to national jobs, competitiveness, trade, whatever. And he who defies or demurs, faces sanctions. And the ultimate power behind the trade sanctions is military-nuclear sanctions. Indian trading vessels carrying "embargoed" cargo have been intercepted and the suspect merchandise quarantined. Where lies redress when the other party appeals to national interest, let alone national security? In a statement issued by the White House on August 11, 1995, Bill Clinton said: "I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States."
The dual-use regime could retard the technological growth and economic development of independent nations such as India. This is strangely a less articulated but most important reason to oppose technological colonialism. Other unequal social, economic and environmental conditionalities have sprouted and are proliferating. Yet, the message one hears is "if you are with me, it's all right".
Having tested before the CTBT closed in, India has been right to declare no first use and a moratorium on tests. It should logically modestly weaponise—though not deploy—but be willing to negotiate amendments or additional protocols to the CTBT, NPT, FMCT, MTCR, et al. The two-fold objectives should be to secure measured commitments towards the goal of universal and complete disarmament, howsoever long the road, and to correct the distortions that have crept into the world system on account of dual use, extra-territorial and similar discriminatory and arbitrary regimes.
Given reasonable movement in that direction, India too must march in step. The cost of weaponisation, to build a limited deterrent and no more, will not be very huge as both India's nuclear and space programmes have essentially been for peaceful purposes and the bulk of the investments are sunk costs. There must be no nuclear arms race.
Pakistan, like India, was a covert nuclear power. Growing recognition of this had introduced an element of deterrence and movement towards dialogue, with two steps forward and one back. Pakistan's test (albeit with Chinese assistance) does not materially alter the situation. India should keep its cool. Neither is a rogue state and their three wars were among the more "civilised" ones since 1946. Once euphoria and current rhetoric subside, both sides should and probably will move to the table. With war ruled out, ground realities in J&K will shape the agenda and sensible and acceptable solutions can be found.
Sanctions could hurt but must be accepted and used to stiffen national resolve and stimulate internal reform. There must meanwhile be no foolish sabre-rattling, bravado, demonisation of anybody, or jingoism—of which there has alas been some evidence. The Indian tests could in retrospect be a turning point towards building a better and safer world order.
