Importance Of Being Seen

General Musharraf's description of the coming Kashmir elections as "farcical" only confirms that the US secretary of state Colin Powell's mission, which brought him to South Asia two weeks ago, ended in failure not only in India but also in Pakistan. Powell's visit had become necessary because the US was fully aware that Musharraf would not be able to exercise restraint on the LoC forever. Thus, something had to be done to institutionalise the halt to cross-border infiltration as soon as possible. The obvious way was to create an international presence on the LoC, but New Delhi was adamantly opposed to it. Its proposed alternative, to patrol the LoC jointly with Pakistan, also never took off. In the following weeks, cross-border infiltration came down but did not stop. It soon became clear that all Musharraf had done was lower the level to one that India would live with rather than go to war.

Washington was therefore left with only one other string to its bow. If India could hold a demonstrably fair and free election in Kashmir in September-October, if the turnout was satisfactory, and if the party or coalition that won the election contained a fair number of former Kashmiri militants, then this would allow the international community to argue that Kashmiris were no longer being oppressed in Indian Kashmir.

Powell came with a dual purpose. He told Musharraf that Pakistan must cooperate fully in creating an atmosphere of peace for the elections. He must therefore tell the militants already in Kashmir to desist from all intimidatory acts, particularly in the coming two months. Musharraf has dismissed Powell's admonitions. The level of violence in Kashmir has escalated further. Far from being hounded, the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba now feel comfortable enough with the government to warn it that breakaway elements have decided to cease their activities in Kashmir and turn their wrath on the Pakistan government. And if the Kashmir police's information is accurate, no fewer than 40 fidayeen have entered Kashmir to attack various persons and installations as I write.

In New Delhi, Powell made a strong plea to the Vajpayee government to invite international observers to monitor the elections. "A credible election cuts at the heart of Pakistan's strategic interest in this Indian state," he told newsmen at the conclusion of his visit. This statement was revealing. It suggested that US policymakers have become increasingly convinced that the only practicable solution in Kashmir is to make the LoC the international frontier, with or without modifications. This view cannot but have been reinforced by the MORI opinion poll held in Kashmir in April, which showed that only six per cent of Kashmiris want to secede to Pakistan. Since the Pakistan government and public have never been prepared to accept this, something needs to happen that will undermine its conviction that it is Kashmir's manifest destiny to become a part of Pakistan. This outcome, in a demonstrably fair election, would go a long way towards undermining this belief. It would therefore make it easier for Musharraf to make compromises in the future.

New Delhi's response to his suggestion, however, was confused and little short of choleric. Within hours, the MEA made a suo motu announcement that India was totally opposed to any international monitoring of the Kashmir elections and would not even allow NGOs to perform this function. Powell was accused, in veiled terms, of trying to promote the US to the position of a mediator in the dispute, and was compelled to issue disclaimers at a Southeast Asian regional conference meeting.

The MEA's anxieties are understandable. India's experience with international mediation has been execrable, to say the least.In 1948, Britain took the lead, before the UN Security Council, in brushing aside India's complaint of aggression by Pakistan, and focusing all of the Council's attention on the secondary, and purely domestic, issue of determining how to hold a plebiscite. It is largely because of this twist to the original proceedings that the Kashmir dispute even exists today. The MEA cannot therefore be blamed now for being allergic to an international involvement in the Kashmir dispute again.

However, the world is unrecognisably different today from what it was 54 years ago. The following things will happen if India does not allow international observers to monitor the September-October elections: First, Hurriyat, whose strings are being pulled from Islamabad, will be able to present a credible reason to the Kashmiri people for insisting on boycotting the elections. It will thus retain its hold on public opinion, and through it Islamabad will do the same. Second, whatever the result, Pakistan and Hurriyat will claim that the election was rigged. If the National Conference comes back to power, the putative "Third Front" will join the Hurriyat in accusing the NC of having rigged the polls again. This will confirm the accusation in international eyes and destroy India's claim that it has been using force with the utmost reluctance, only to restore the democratic process to Kashmir.

Even if a "Third Front" gets formed and wins the elections, India's position will not be any better. Islamabad and Hurriyat will accuse Front members of having struck a deal with New Delhi to forget their nationalism in exchange for power and money. Since many in Kashmir will believe them, the Front will start its term in office stripped of much of its legitimacy in the public eye, as the Akalis did under S.S. Barnala in Punjab in 1985. As happened to the Akalis, the constant need to prove their nationalist credentials will force the Front to take far more anti-Centre positions than are in the interests of Kashmir. Finally, as it happened in 1987, New Delhi will one day be forced to dismiss the Kashmir government and declare Governor's rule once again.