Hindsight is an indulgence affordable to most, and its utility never ceases. It allows great liberty—of imagination and scope of analyses. It is a most useful tool when matters of national security are at stake, and on the table of discussions. Lost lives are revisited for that duration of the parleys. And there are no limits to stretching of the vision when in hindsight mode. So when the question appears, during most commemorations—is India better prepared to handle an intrusion like Kargil 1999—the action replay is instant, stark and violent. Myriad visuals, letters, tales and tears make a reappearance from 1999, and before.
In hindsight it is possible to say that the Pakistan Army had deployed some elements for intruding into the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector, for limited durations, over at least a couple of years before they launched the intrusions during the winter of 1998-99. It may seem bizarre now, but there is secondary evidence to support this thesis. And it appears only from the overbearing heat of the LoC. Across the world, the LoC was the hottest boundary zone in that decade. It was live, across the calibre range of lead, all hours, seasons and weathers.
Scores of army men wear gallantry medals earned for actions on the LoC, and across. This was, of course, long before political ownership of ‘surgical strikes’ became the norm. However, there was a major difference in firing patterns along the LoC. While the Kashmir and Rajouri sections of the LoC had always been dominated by small arms fire, with a rare artillery duel, the Kargil sector saw significant cannonry used over a couple of years before the 1999 intrusions. Hindsight overload and an analysis of the pattern of shelling suggest that the Pakistan Army had observation posts within visual range of Kargil town and the surrounding areas. The accuracy of shelling is unlikely to have been simply due to great calculations or map-reading skills of the gunners of the Pakistan Army. The precision with which government assets were targeted, and destroyed, was uncanny and rare for that sector.
The worst shelling was in 1997 and some continued into 1998 as well. Another giveaway of observation posts operating in Indian areas was that the intense firing was seasonal, and ceased once winter set in—suggesting withdrawal of Pakistani observation posts during the cold season. It was, of course, during the winter of 1998-99 that the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry battalions crossed over in significant numbers and occupied Indian posts vacated in winter. This triggered the start of Operation Badr in Pakistan Army parlance, and Operation Vijay in India.
What happened is well known, and why it happened has also been adequately speculated. But will it happen again and is India better prepared is now the key question. The answer to both parts of the question lies in Pakistan’s intent and India’s foresight.
Intent, goal or ambition is largely dependent on capability and a willingness to take risks. How much of these assets does Pakistan posses in the near and foreseeable future is a moot point. It isn’t simply a matter of the Pakistan Army going for it, but utilising all these assets from Islamabad’s arsenal of options. Foresight, anticipation or prescience is a direct product of outstanding analysis based on reading the environment, first-rate intelligence and freedom to conceptualise all scenarios. The military calls it ‘war gaming’. And if the country encourages war gaming, even if they envision far-fetched scenarios, it will boost better preparations for all eventualities. This is really what is required in the complex national security environment India is living in, and surrounded by. Threat preparation exercises are, therefore, vital in devising dynamic plans in an aggressive national security environment.
The environment is indeed aggressive and likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. So will Pakistan mount another Operation Badr type of stealth attack? Or something more overt too. The circumstances that allowed Pakistan to plan and implement Kargil don’t currently exist. There is no megalomaniac military man heading GHQ Rawalpindi, but a rational, professional type of soldier. The international environment has taken a turn since Kargil and then September 11, 2001. With one exception, the world will not tolerate a nuclear armed country running amok in its neighbourhood. And India’s force structure in Kargil will not allow another ingress.
The onus, then, also lies with India keeping a close watch on the circumstances developing in the region and which could influence factors on the ground. This is where foresight comes into play, and how India is able to analyse developments that could lead to another such crisis. It is easy to pronounce pre-emptive strategy from an armchair, but extremely difficult to realise it on the ground. The far better options are to be militarily and diplomatically preemptive, and proactive. But, for that to happen, greater synergy is required between the two ends of South Block, something India has rarely seen since Operation Vijay in Kargil.
In fact, far greater synergy is required within the Ministry of Defence if India has to demonstrate a preventive and proactive posture. Simply thrusting theatre commands on the unwilling is hardly a sensible way to encourage greater interoperability between the three services. A home-grown method involving stages of jointness, from the bottom up, would have been a far more effective route to integration of the armed forces. This bottom-up jointness approach would go a long way in fast streaming operations in remote areas when the chain of command is far and complex. It would have gone a long way in preventing a Kargil that has already happened.
In April-May 2020, the People’s Liberation Army of China undertook an ingress operation in eastern Ladakh that was on the scale of the Pakistan Army’s Kargil intrusions. The major difference was that this intrusion happened in broad daylight, so to say, under human and watchful digital eyes. And the world pretty much looked the other way since the power asymmetries involved are so enormous that instigating the dragon is not a choice. So the intrusions continue and India maintains an enormous mobilisation without commensurate results. The transparency of Kargil is also in stark contrast to the blackout in eastern Ladakh.
Lack of foresight in dealing with China allowed the Ladakh intrusions to happen. Despite the greatest frequency of meetings and summits between the two country’s leaders, Beijing still managed to pull off an ingress of this scale without India being able to prevent it, let alone counter it. More than a military failure, this is a failure of political diplomacy. This then raises the moot question—will India have the forethought and preventive options available when diplomacy is about event management rather than hard-nosed analysis and substance. This extravagance allowed China to undertake a Kargil-type operation, and India has yet not recovered the lands it lost.
In the near future, Pakistan is unlikely to be able to undertake another Kargil-type operation for reasons already highlighted. But this has not prevented India from suffering a similar loss of territory, but this time without being able to recover it. In this aggressive neighbourhood, the intentions of all have to be watched, at all times, with foresight and a wide margin of options at hand as well.
(This appeared in the print edition as "Back To The Future, 1999")
(Views are personal)
Editor-in-chief, Defence & Security Alert
