Undoubtedly, the Lahore process has met a serious setback before it could overwhelm 'other options'. Kargil's distraction, if not seen in isolation, only reveals how far away the subcontinent is from reconciliation and how vulnerable the two sides are to militaristic temptations and jingoism. It also shows the tendency of either side to a chain of action and reaction, leaving aside the question of who caused one provocation or the other.
However, the more important lesson from the Kargil imbroglio is that one can't jump the gun beyond a limit and that one has to find room for diplomacy and adjustment, even if it tends to humiliate an inflated sense of nationalism. Although a single provocation and counter-provocation can wash away a whole range of peace efforts, there are such factors beyond our control that bring us back to sanity, even if one is resistant to good advice from outside. Now there is no scope for an ambush and 'third-party intervention' can bring one what could not be achieved without great risk, and should not have, by 'other means'.
The jubilation in New Delhi over 'operation retreat' and dejection in Lahore over 'throwing away a victory' are deceptive. If viewed objectively, or from a non-partisan viewpoint, it was mainly behind-the-scene diplomacy and primarily international mediation that has saved the subcontinent from drifting into a war of unpredictable consequences.
Although India detests 'third-party mediation', it has benefited greatly from the weight of the G-8 and, ultimately, the US which it surprisingly found on its side for the first time. As the post-Kargil scenario unfolds, the stalemate is being reinforced by hardening stances due to over-estimates and distorted expectations. Thanks to an adversarial relationship, the powers that be in both countries have never put one another in a realistic perspective seeing each other in a beneficial light is unthinkable. Amid media hype in nationalistic (read jingoistic, if not fascist), martial tones, the masses are dished out false claims and half-truths, giving politicians a chance to mislead. Exclusivity debars us from mediating the unity of opposites.
It took a long time to talk about talks. The scars left behind by Kargil will again reflect our mutual incapacity to be at peace with one another. Blaming one another is an easy trick to hide one's own skeletons behind the altruistic nationalist cupboard. Encouraged by a diplomatic sweep in its favour, New Delhi is inclined to stretch it beyond realistic limits, especially when the politicians are obsessed with elections and will not like to appear flexible. So, demands are being made on Islamabad, some of which are beyond its capacity or control to concede.
Even if Islamabad concedes the mea's 'three preconditions' to return to composite dialogue, there is no one to talk to in New Delhi after the polls are announced and, especially when the former also finds bilateral dialogue unpromising. Sorting the LoC dispute is again not that intractable a task, but for that too one will have to go back to the negotiation table, if 'third party intervention' is to be kept at bay. And, if, at all, the two sides, with no intent to compromise, reluctantly come to the negotiation table, a diplomacy of deadlock will grind them to a halt.
The peace or reconciliation process will have to be viewed differently from what we have been insisting on from our respective, hardened positions of communal animosity or a chauvinistic, self-righteous, historical illusion. A new vision and a holistic perspective will have to replace the exclusivist 'national consensus' in both countries. Competing annexationism over Kashmir behind the facade of mutually reinforcing national ideologies should give way to thoughts about the interests of the masses and fundamental challenges faced by each country and the region. The conflicting realities need to be reconciled in a way that it does not hurt national territorial egos and without negating the rights of a particular group of people, such as the Kashmiris (sandwiched in protracted crossfire) or holding a billion people hostage to the whims of national security establishments.
Before attempting reconciliation we must realise that those who matter in New Delhi and Islamabad won't let it happen unless they are made to surrender, either by internal compulsion or by global 'intervention'. But while public opinion has been domesticated and politicians are localised, the intelligensia and the media could turn the tables. Unfortunately, there is no one in India or Pakistan who could repeat Najam Sethi. Hence we are left to the mercy of circumstances and international compulsions.
Still, taking encouragement from the recent course of history when disputes like Arab-Israel, Bosnia-Kosovo or the Irish question are being decided against the monolithic will of adversaries, we have to take the course of reconciliation. Instead of toughening stances, let's go straight to the negotiation table. And before going there, take unilateral confidence-building measures. It is futile to throw this 'everything else, but Kashmir' against 'first-Kashmir or nothing else' standpoint. They will take us only to stalemate.
Why can't Kashmir be neutralised or frozen as an issue by demilitarising it for a decade while stopping both 'infiltration' and 'repression'? Even if it is too much now, measures can be taken without compromising positions. Rising above the particular dispute, measures should be taken to explore untapped areas of cooperation. Why should the people not be freed of the quarantine and allowed to discover good in one another? And what's wrong with a Camp David in the subcontinent, if we can give a break to our pseudo 'anti-imperialism'? If not, let's go back on the Lahore-Delhi bus.
(The writer is editor, current affairs, The News, Lahore)
