The Fundamental Idea

An atmosphere of an imminent Indo-Pak war is being built up by a process of competitive posturing at the highest level. Indeed, India’s army chief’s himself seen fit to publicly state that a ‘limited war’ between the two nations is a proximate possibility and this alone has far greater weight than the much larger body of imprudent political rhetoric finding expression virtually from day to day. Apart from the questionable wisdom of the army chief’s assertion, I don’t believe the probabilities of an open war to be as high as present projections make them seem.

But complacency would be the most dangerous failing. There is one general principle: the primary and most effective strategy to avoid war is to prepare for it. To be willing to fight, however, does not imply resorting to the boastful and barren flatulence that characterises our present political discourse. It implies, conversely, the acquisition of a quiet confidence and authority that do not require translation into language. It is obvious that we currently lack these attributes.

There can be no restoration of the national confidence unless we can restore the authority and prestige of government in areas in the country. The first priority, consequently, is to defeat terrorism. Pakistan’s ability to sustain terrorist movements on our soil ties down our forces, weakens the nation’s economy and government, creates the possibility of deepening internal rifts and of balkanisation and tempts the enemy to the greater adventurism of an open war.

But terrorism isn’t going to go away on its own. It can, however, be contained within ‘acceptable’ limits (if such a term can ever be applied to an act of terrorism) but only if controlling and resisting it becomes ‘a way of life’ for each one of us. Only if we, as a nation, realise and accept that a price has to be paid to fight this scourge; that this price, from time to time, may include a sacrifice, not only on the part of nameless and faceless jawans and officers directly confronting the scourge and from their families but from us as well; and that this sacrifice may sometimes be as terrible as the lives of our own children.

The problem with our actions in the past is that we are not taken seriously-and have given no reason for others to take us seriously. We have been begging the international community to impose sanctions and declare Pakistan a ‘terrorist state’. But what have we done? Have we convicted and hanged a single terrorist in Kashmir? Have we suspended trade, or the Samjhauta Express, or even that ludicrous bus to Lahore? Have we formally declared Pakistan a terrorist state and imposed sanctions? Why should the US or Europe do so when we will not?

Fighting terrorism needs a clear mandate that lets our forces to do what’s necessary to crush-and I use the word advisedly-this monster. To create this mandate and to translate it into action on the ground will require radical institutional changes, including legislation, a reform of our senseless judicial and bureaucratic processes and institutions and of the security forces.

In the long run, the greatest weapon for peace is the idea. This is the strength and weakness of Islamic fundamentalists. Their vision of Islam may be a complete perversion of the teachings of the Prophet but gives the ignorant masses something to believe in. But theirs is not the only version of Islam. It is my abiding belief that Islam is nowhere as safe today as it is in India. If we can communicate to the world-even to our enemies-that India’s pluralistic democracy is the greatest guardian not only of Islam but of all faiths, we’d create the germ of the ideas that would defeat the fundamentalists.

If, however, we choose the other ideological path, if we seek to fight their fundamentalism with our fundamentalism, we would destroy not only the Indian nation-state but just as surely the great and evolving civilisational idea that is India.