In the course of an otherwise perceptive commentary on the recent confused party alignments in Uttar Pradesh ( Outlook December 13, 1995), Professor Mushirul Hasan recalls the negotiations for a coalition ministry in this state in 1937, and draws comparisons and lessons which are rather far-fetched. His conclusion that the failure of the negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League was due to "excessive ambition combined with opportunism" on the part of the Congress is questionable, and would not stand a critical examination. The political situation in 1937 was much more complex than he makes out.
In the general elections, the Congress won absolute majorities in six out of 11 provinces, and was the largest party in two other provinces. The Muslim League, led by Jinnah, however, met with an electoral disaster. It won 39 out of 107 Muslim seats in Bengal; two out of 87 Muslim seats in the Punjab; three out of 33 Muslim seats in Sindh. It did not win a single Muslim seat in the legislatures of Bihar, the Central Provinces, Orissa and the North West Frontier Provinces. Only in the United Provinces and Bombay did it perform relatively better, winning 27 out of 69 Muslim seats in the former province and 20 out of 29 in the latter. With this poor showing, the Muslim League hardly qualified for a coalition with the Congress in most of the provinces. Indeed, only in two provinces, the United Provinces and Bombay, were there serious negotiations for a coalition.
The new constitution under the Act of 1935 came into force on April 1, 1937. Not until the end of June did the viceroy issue a statement which enabled the Congress to accept office. From the Congress standpoint, the political situation was, however, still fraught with a great deal of uncertainty. It was not sure whether it would receive cooperation from the British bureaucracy, which until recently had been its arch-enemy.
In several provinces, especially in the United Provinces, the official machinery had been furtively used to back parties opposing Congress candidates. We now know that, as late as April 1937, the prosecution of Jawaharlal Nehru for his election speeches was being considered at the highest level in the Government of India. The Congress approach to office acceptance was understandably cautious. A vocal section, headed by Nehru himself, warned that the party might expose itself to demoralisation and dissension. If the Congress was to preserve its character as a militant-nationalist party, it was imperative that the Congress parties in the legislatures should maintain their cohesion.
For nearly four months, March-June 1937, there seemed little prospect of the Congress taking office. Even after the ministries were installed in six provinces, clashes with the governors were expected, and indeed did occur on such contentious issues as the release of political prisoners. If the Congress was able to pull through these crises, it was because it was able to speak with one voice.
There is no doubt that the terms which Maulana Azad offered to Chaudhuri Khaliquzzaman, the leader of the Muslim League party in the United Provinces Legislative Assembly, were very stringent; this was because the Congress was reluctant to admit League representatives into the cabinet without making sure that the cohesion of the ministry would be maintained.
Professor Hasan refers to certain common points between the election manifestos of the Congress and the League. The manifestos of political parties are usually drafted to widen their appeal and need not be taken at their face value. The fact is that there was an almost unbridgeable gulf between the Congress and the League. Three of the basic planks in the Congress programme in 1937 were, opposition to British imperialism, radical agrarian reform, and the democratisation of administration in princely states. On these issues the Muslim League, because of its composition and the nature of its leadership, could never support the Congress. (It is significant that the Muslim League bitterly opposed the measures for tenancy reform piloted by the Congress ministry in the United Provinces in 1937-39.)
In fairness to Jinnah it must be stated that he made no secret of his differences with the Congress. "We shall face the challenge of the Congress," he said, "if they think that the Muslims will accept their policy and programme because our policy and programmes are different in vital respects." ( Leader , April 28, 1937). He did not want a coalition in the United Provinces on a provincial basis. Early in May, the executive committee of the Bombay Provincial Muslim League, with Jinnah in the chair, "appealed to the Muslim members of the United Provinces Legislative Assembly, who had been elected on the League ticket, not to act in such a way as to cause disunion among the Muslims of India by arranging sectional or provincial settlements with the Congress".
If Abul Kalam Azad and Khaliquzzaman (an ex-Congressman whom Jinnah really distrusted) had been able to agree on the terms of the coalition in the United Provinces, the final decision would still have rested with Jinnah. Jinnah's probable stance can be surmised from the negotiations which took place for representation of the League in the Congress ministry in Bombay. K.M. Munshi told me that during the negotiations, Azad and Vallabhbhai Patel were staying with him in Poona, and that Jinnah's terms, brought by Sir Cowasji Jehangir, were such that "the position would have been that Mr Jinnah would have dictated the whole policy of the Bombay government through one or two of his nominees who would threaten to resign at any moment they chose.... Such terms would have imposed the dictatorship of Mr Jinnah over every Congress government in the country".
Professor Hasan tells us that if the Azad-Khaliquzzaman parleys had succeeded, the coalition in the United Provinces would have worked, and would have "tamed Jinnah". Professor Hasan underrates the political skills of the Qaid-i-Azam. Khaliquzzaman was a small fry for a man who was able to bring such stalwarts as Sikandar Hyat Khan and Fazlul Haq, the chief ministers of Punjab and Bengal, to their knees.
