The Peace Impasse

A month has passed since Prime Minister Vajpayee made a sincere offer to resume talks with Pakistan provided Islamabad took credible steps to control cross-border terrorism. Since then, India and Pakistan have sent their high commissioners back to their posts and have agreed to resume the Delhi-Lahore bus service. Air and rail links are likely to follow soon.

The atmosphere is thick with assurances. On the Indian side, there has been more than one hint that India will not insist on a complete cessation of cross-border infiltration for resuming talks. On the Pakistani side, there is no dearth of assurances that terrorists will not be allowed to cross the border. Organisations like the Jaish-e-Muhammad have been banned from entering Kashmir, and several camps have allegedly been closed down.

There has been a significant convergence of views on how the talks should be structured. Both countries now agree that all issues will have to be taken up together, and that the mistakes of Agra must not be repeated. A summit-level meeting between Vajpayee and Pakistan prime minister Jamali and/or Musharraf will have to come at the end of a patient exploration of areas of agreement and discord at lower levels of the two governments.

More important than what the governments are saying is what they are not saying. In sharp contrast to the early '90s, and even Agra two years ago, neither government has laid down a single precondition, or drawn a Lakshmanrekha around any issue. On the contrary, the leaders of both countries have taken pains to fend off insistent questioning on what compromises they are prepared to make, above all, on Kashmir. Typical was Pakistan foreign minister Kasuri's statement earlier this week that it is too early to speak of solutions, and that the ultimate solution would be one in which there would be no defeat for either India or Pakistan.

By far the best augury for the future, however, is the changed tone of the media, and therefore, by reflection, of the intelligentsia in both countries. This is especially apparent in the English language press in Pakistan. Gone is the obsession with why India is willing to talk now; whether it is a sign of weakness and therefore how little Pakistan needs to yield in order to arrive at a settlement. Gone also is much of the self-righteousness on Kashmir that pervaded writing on both sides of the border. Gone also is Pakistan's obsession with the past—the "unfinished business of partition". In its place is an openly expressed concern for the future.

Never before, therefore, have the omens been better. But one more impasse remains to be broken. While India continues to insist that cross-border terrorism must diminish dramatically before talks begin, Pakistan maintains it has done all it can to stop it and is not capable of doing anymore. It is possible to verify statements pertaining to facts, but not to intentions and capacities. Thus, if the infiltration does not come down sharply, taking the next step will require a gigantic act of trust on India's part, a trust that Pakistan has done nothing in the past to inspire.

Is there no way around this impasse? There may be, but finding it will require a sharp break with the precepts on which our policy towards Pakistan has been based so far. First, we need to concede that while Islamabad should prevent jehadis from entering Kashmir, any certification by a foreign country that it has actually done so will open it to attack at home and reduce its capacity to make compromises on substantive issues, especially Kashmir. The best course would, therefore, be to demand a substantial reduction in practice but to go into the negotiations still complaining that cross-border terrorism has not come down.

What is true of cross-border terrorism is also true of the substantive issues that need to be resolved.The enormous difference in size and strength of the two countries makes Pakistanis suspicious of even the most generous terms that India offers. There is therefore a visceral belief in that country that any agreement is almost certain to be an unequal one. In such a climate, every other issue that India and Pakistan settle among themselves is likely to reduce and not increase Islamabad's capacity for compromise on Kashmir. The belief that has underpinned Indian strategy towards Pakistan—that if we can settle other outstanding issues first it will make a settlement on Kashmir easier—is flawed because it ignores the psychology of a small country dealing with a giant neighbour.

One way to get around this is to involve a third party. That is what Pakistan has tried to do since 1948 and what Vajpayee has tacitly done more recently with the US and the European Union. But nations have their own interests to promote, so this could easily turn into a double-edged weapon for both countries. A better way would be to separate the purely political and military issues from the rest and invite mediation or arbitration to resolve the latter. This will leave Islamabad with greater room for manoeuvre on the former.

Today, in addition to Kashmir, India and Pakistan confront consular issues (deportation of criminals, return of fishermen etc); water (riparian) issues; border demarcation issues; trade issues, and peacemaking issues (Siachen, Kargil). Consular, water and border demarcation issues can easily be dealt with through arbitration. Trade issues can be settled within the framework of saarc, with help from member countries. Only peacemaking and Kashmir need to be kept within a strict bilateral framework of negotiation.