The Pipeline To Peace

On the first day of his visit to India, Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz invited about two dozen Indian editors and columnists for breakfast. Departing from precedent, he stated at the outset that nothing he was going to say was off the record. I am devoting this column therefore to informing readers of the central issues he raised and his very clear vision of where India-Pakistan relations should go in the coming years. The central point that he drove home repeatedly was that India and Pakistan had to stop thinking of their relations in tactical terms and start to think strategically. Both countries had immense economic potential, and perhaps the best stock of 'human capital' in the world. But neither country had used it to serve its people as they deserved to be served. Our per capita incomes are low and our human development indices are among the poorest in the world. Our mutual hostility is to a great extent responsible. Ending it would open the way to a much fuller realisation of our potential.

Within the constraints of diplomacy, he could not have rejected the past basis for Pakistan's policies towards India more categorically, for these were exemplified by a constant search for tactical advantage on virtually every issue, large or small. He urged India to do the same.

Aziz made it clear that Pakistan sought the change out of self-interest. It had pulled itself back from the edge of bankruptcy five years ago to a point where foreign exchange had ceased to be a constraint on decision-making. It had recorded a 6.4 per cent growth last year and was set to achieve between 6 and 7 per cent this year. He believed 8 per cent growth was attainable in the near future. This would enable Pakistan to establish a position of leadership in its immediate region. Economic ties with Afghanistan would deepen and, with the gas pipeline, which Pakistan would build to meet its own growing energy needs regardless of whether India joined in or not, its ties with Iran and Qatar would increase dramatically. Geography had also given Pakistan a pivotal role—that of an anchor for ensuring stability in West Asia and a portal for parts of Central Asia. That could not be wished away. Pakistan could play this role fully only if reinforced by a powerful and friendly India at its back.

Applying this vision to current Indo-Pak relations, he said there would be no cherry-picking of issues from among the ones included in the composite dialogue. Pakistan would like to address all of them, including Kashmir, simultaneously. He emphasised that the negotiations were a process and cautioned, indirectly, that especially on Kashmir, looking prematurely for solutions was not the way to go. He made it clear that General Musharraf's iftar 'proposal' had not been aimed at India but had been made at a Pakistani gathering to obtain reactions from those present there.

These remarks took away the sudden focus that had developed in the last three weeks upon looking for solutions based on exchanges of territory, and opened the way to looking for solutions that met the needs of the people of Kashmir. Aziz's views reinforced this. He referred more than once to Kashmiris as being stakeholders in the peace process. He emphasised that they needed to be consulted, their wishes taken into account and their welfare safeguarded. But he stopped well short of suggesting that any organisation claiming to represent them be made a party to the discussions. This approach is not very different from the people-centred approach Dr Manmohan Singh has been advocating.

Aziz was also flexible in his listing of Kashmiri organisations that needed to be consulted. He described the Hurriyat as an important organisation in Kashmir whose views needed to be consulted, but not as the sole one. This may have reflected his realisation, at the dinner hosted by the Pakistan high commissioner the previous evening, that Syed Ali Shah Geelani was the only Kashmiri leader who did not support the peace process, and opposed incrementally building links between the two parts of Kashmir as a way towards a lasting solution. As that dinner progressed, it became quite clear that Geelani reflected not the Kashmiris' views but at most those of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir. Significantly, Aziz did not also rule out the mainstream parties as being representative of sections of opinion within Kashmir.

His forthright remarks cleared the overburden of misunderstanding and mistrust that had accumulated because of the grindingly slow progress of negotiations and the consequent tendency of the media to pounce upon, and often repeat out of context, every unguarded remark by the leaders of the two countries. The positive and forward-looking proposal Aziz brought with him was to jointly construct the gas pipeline from Iran and Qatar. Contrary to how his remarks have been represented by mea interlocutors, he did not present this in a confrontational manner. Instead, he emphasised the benefits both countries would derive from the project and asked the Indian government to treat it sui generis and not tag other 'conditionalities' to it. He said Pakistan was already an energy importer and if its growth accelerated, it would have to build the pipeline, with or without India. "But a 24-inch pipeline," he said, "would be far better than a 12-inch one."

Though Aziz played down the pipeline, the importance he attached to it was apparent from the time he spent on it and the fact that he had brought his petroleum minister with him. The pipeline is an excellent opportunity for India to break the logjam of past mistrust through a deliberate act of trust. Some such act is necessary for only trust can beget trust. One hopes New Delhi will seize the chance.