Who Betrayed Peace?

In the maze of Byzantine intrigue and disinformation that Kashmir has become, it is not easy to sift truth from lies. But the weight of evidence points to the following conclusion: the ceasefire offer was an initiative of the Hizbul but was made with Pakistan’s consent. But once it was on the table, it rapidly took on a life of its own. As it became increasingly clear to Pakistani authorities that they might not be able to control the agenda of the talks either through the Hurriyat or the Hizbul, they began to panic and pull back. This put Salahuddin in an untenable position, reflected in his constantly changing terms and the shortening deadlines for India to meet them. In the end, despite entreaties to extend the ceasefire by the very people in Srinagar whom he had elected to be his interlocutors with Delhi, and fervent appeals of Kashmiris from all walks of life, he called off the ceasefire. After that only one task remained-to pin the blame for its failure on India and not Pakistan. Unfortunately, there was sufficient ambivalence in Delhi’s statements and actions to make this charge, at least superficially, plausible.

The coming days may well see a resumption of the conflict. But so great is the desire for peace in Kashmir and so fierce are the compulsions on Pakistan and India to end the confrontation that there is bound to be a second and a third effort. If those too are not to fail, we need to understand precisely why the first effort failed.

The initiative for a ceasefire originated in the Hizbul. There is a view held by some circles in the home ministry, and reflected by unsourced news stories with New Delhi datelines, that the ceasefire offer was a tacit surrender because the Hizbul could no longer withstand the pressure of the security forces. Pressure was undoubtedly there-in May and June, the security forces had killed 320 militants, of whom 40 per cent had been the Hizb’s. But there is more than enough evidence to show that it was not an initiative of the Kashmiri wing of the organisation alone but had the support of Salahuddin and the Pakistan government. Majid Dar had said during his July 24 press conference that the decision had been taken at a Hizbul majlis-e-shoora in March this year. There was no way Pakistan could not have known of these talks. Also, Salahuddin took only hours to endorse Dar’s announcement.

The initial stands of the Hizbul chief and the Pakistan foreign office also reflected the understanding that had developed between them, for both left negotiations with New Delhi specifically to the Hurriyat Conference. The Pakistan foreign office described it as the sole representative of the Kashmiri people and Salahuddin said that the Hizb would monitor the talks with the Hurriyat.

The Indian authorities responded decisively to the Hizbul’s offer. A meeting of the unified security command on July 25 decided to reduce anti-terrorist operations drastically. Crackdowns (cordon and search operations) were almost completely suspended except where there was specific information concerning the Lashkar-e-Toiba or one of the other jehadi outfits. All units were told to avoid engagements whenever possible, even if they sustained injuries in the initial firing. Precisely this happened at two places to my knowledge on the night of August 6.

As for New Delhi, not only did Atal Behari Vajpayee welcome the Hizbul’s announcement, but on July 28 committed the government to talks on the basis of ‘insaniyat’ without adding the rider that they had to be held within the framework of the Indian Constitution. When the jehadis killed or caused the death of more than 80 Hindus, 33 of them pilgrims on the Amarnath yatra, he immediately announced that he would not allow these to derail the peace talks.

Pakistan began to have second thoughts, however, almost from the word go. The reason was the overwhelming response that the prospect of peace had brought forth from the Kashmiri people. This had become apparent from the moment the government released the Hurriyat leaders from Jodhpur and Jammu jails and announced that it was prepared to enter into a dialogue with them. But the hope and longing for peace took a quantum jump when the Hizbul announced its ceasefire. As I myself saw in Srinagar, the Hizbul and their interlocutors suddenly found themselves being lionised not because they were fighting Indian security forces but because they had had the courage to put the gun down in a search for peace.

From Islamabad’s point of view, this upwelling of the desire for peace posed a deadly danger. For the stronger it was, the more would Kashmiris be prepared to compromise on their demand for independence in exchange for normalcy. This made it more and more likely that a solution hammered out solely by the representatives of the Kashmiris would prove unacceptable. It therefore became imperative for it to somehow maintain control of the agenda for the peace talks. Pakistan had first thought that it could do this through Professor Abdul Ghani Bhat, the current chairman of the Hurriyat. Like a former chairman of the Hurriyat, Ali Shah Geelani, Bhat has never made any secret that his preferred solution was a trifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir, the joining of Kashmir Valley with "Azad" Kashmir and the placement of the new entity under the UN for five years or more till a plebiscite can be held on its future.

But as the fervour for peace developed and it became clear that Bhat and Geelani commanded little support among the people. Pakistan, therefore, decided to bypass the Hurriyat and exert control over the agenda for talks through the Hizbul. On July 30, Salahuddin made his first demand that India commit itself to tripartite talks with the Hizbul and Pakistan. However, he did not lay down a deadline by when Pakistan had to be included.

But Pakistan’s anxieties continued to grow. The Hizbul in Kashmir were under the same pressure from Kashmiris to work out a peace as the Hurriyat. The 10 initial conditions it laid down for continuing the ceasefire and holding talks all had to do with normalisation within the state. These included a cessation of crackdowns, extortion and custodial killings by the security forces, a reduction in the number of bunkers and most important of all, the release of political prisoners and an amnesty for former militants who had given up the gun. These demands added immensely to their popularity in Kashmir, but if accepted would enhance the acceptability of the status quo too.

The gap between the Hizbul in Kashmir and Islamabad grew wider after the attack on Hindus on August 1. One tell-tale sign was that while Dar lost no time in condemning it as an inhuman act, Geelani and Bhat demanded an international inquiry to determine who was responsible for the killings. In private they told all and sundry that all the eight concerted attacks (seven on Hindus) were the handiwork of the Indian security forces and were intended to give Pakistan and the jehadis a bad name. Bhat in fact claimed to me that each and every mass killing from the brutal one at Wandhama in early 1998 till August 1, including the killing of Sikhs at Chitsinghpura, was the handiwork of India. My doubts as to whether the Indian security forces would do these killings in army uniforms to advertise their identity when they could so easily have donned Kashmiri clothes were simply swept aside.

The sheer speed with which the Hizbul and the Indian government announced their representatives and set up the first meeting on August 3 fed Pakistan’s fear that even indirect talks through the Hizbul would go out of its control. So it reversed its earlier stand and demanded there should be tripartite talks from the outset. Since it had a great measure of control over Salahuddin, and since he too feared being marginalised by the reception the Hizbul’s offer had received in the Valley, it left it to him to make the demand.

But it was only a pro-forma demand designed to deflect criticism from Pakistan and the Hizbul in PoK for withdrawing from the talks and putting the blame on Delhi. For, Salahuddin gave the Indian government only five days, till August 8, to agree to bring Pakistan into the talks. They knew perfectly well that even if the government was prepared to cave in before an ultimatum given by a guerrilla organisation, this was too short a time to make the change.

Some part of the blame for the breakdown must also be laid at the door of New Delhi and Srinagar. The attempt by anonymous defence or home ministry officials to portray the Hizbul ceasefire as a kind of surrender was duly noted in Kashmir. So were several statements made by government ministers that a solution could be found only within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Thus, even before the first round of talks, the Valley was abuzz with rumours that the Indian government was trying to break the Kashmiri part of the organisation away from the Pakistani. These fears received a huge fillip when the Hizbul representatives arrived at the Nehru guesthouse for off-the-record talks only to find the entire world press waiting for them. This was immediately interpreted by them, and no doubt by Salahuddin and the hawks in Pakistan, as an attempt to expose them, end their capacity for returning to military confrontation and thus reduce their bargaining power in the talks. (Enquiries revealed that the information about the meeting was conveyed to journalists on the phone by the j&k Police at 12 noon on August 3, two hours before the meeting was scheduled to be held. If this was sabotage, it was by Farooq Abdullah’s government.)

In the days that followed, Indians in Srinagar were warned against turning Dar into another Kukka Parrey (the head of the counter-insurgent Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, which played a major role in defeating militancy in 1994 and 1995). That, we were warned, would wipe out the last Kashmiri force that still commanded some respect among the people. Many of its militant cadres and future recruits to insurgency would have no option but to join the jehadis. So pervasive is the distrust and fear of New Delhi that it took some time to make them see Delhi could not ‘turn’ Dar on its own. Dar had to be willing to be turned first.

Vajpayee’s statement in Parliament on August 7 that while a solution could only come within the Constitution, talks to explore possibilities could be held outside it, as had been done with Nagaland, was warmly welcomed in Kashmir. The Hizbul’s own interlocutors spent much of August 8 trying to persuade Salahuddin to extend the ceasefire. But Salahuddin proved adamant and demonstrated in the process just how much of a puppet of Islamabad he really was.

But Pakistan cannot remain adamant forever. Kashmiris have seen a way out of their nightmare and will not let it go. Directly or indirectly, they will continue to put pressure on both New Delhi and Islamabad to resume the dialogue. Vajpayee has clearly shown the way forward. Pakistan has not. The next move must come from Islamabad.