Come July 1, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be completing 100 years. Started in Shanghai in 1921, the party had grown all-powerful under Mao Tse Tung in the initial two decades and again under President Xi Jinping in the past decade. One great achievement of the CCP in the past hundred years was that it has built a society of Han nationalists by constantly harping on a kind of history that kept the Han Chinese at the centre. Till Mao was alive, his was the last word in the party and the government. When he became ill in his final years, he resorted to ‘control through slips’, sending dictates through his relatives and confidants in the form of small notes. Deng Xiaoping, who succeeded Mao, tried to separate the party and the state in an effort to build a modern Chinese state. But as the Deng era declined, the fortunes of the CCP rose again dramatically.
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In 1997, Jiang Zemin coined the concept of Liang Ge Yibai Nian, or Two Centenaries, paving the way for restoring supremacy of the party once again. The first was about the CCP’s centenary in 2021, and the second was about the centenary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. Two Centenaries became the party’s official line when it was placed in writing before the 18th Party Congress in 2012—the year that catapulted Xi to the position of general secretary. In July 2014, Xi articulated the goals of Two Centenaries through phrases like “Chinese Dream” and “Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”. Since then those phrases have become a part of Chinese political lexicon. The party’s supremacy became complete when Xi got the CCP Charter amended in 2017 to include the statement: “Government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east and west—the party leads them all.” A Xiaokang society—moderately well-off—was the target for the CCP centenary, and a “strong, democratic, civilised, harmonious, and modern socialist country” for 2049. A Xiaokang society meant accelerated progress in all areas, including military, space, cyber, economy and even climate protection.
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This background is important to understand the current standoff between India and China. Extreme national pride guides CCP’s actions. It breeds paranoia too. An assertive India or an emerging bond between India and another superpower is reason enough to rattle the CCP. In 1962, the Khrushchev-Nehru friendship was a provocation, while US-India bonding in 2020 was seen as a threat. There could be many other reasons, but the common factor is CCP’s ultra-nationalist pride.
It might be instructive to visit another standoff that occurred 35 years ago, in June 1986, between the two armies. The Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB) jawans, guarding a post south of the Sumdorang Chu river in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh during the summers since 1984 found a major Chinese build-up with semi-permanent structures when they returned after winter in June 1986. In Parliament, the Rajiv Gandhi government was in denial mode citing “perceptional differences”. The political leadership was content with lodging a formal protest on June 26, 1986, which was promptly denied by Beijing. It was General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, the Army chief, who had airlifted an infantry brigade on October 18-20 to the valley and posted it eyeball-to-eyeball with the Chinese, without waiting for political clearance. Called Operation Falcon, this movement came to the knowledge of the political leadership two weeks later. Rajiv Gandhi’s civilian administration was not happy with Gen. Sundarji’s “recklessness”. The general stood his ground and told Rajiv Gandhi’s aide to “make alternative arrangements if you think you are not getting adequate professional advice”. He even went ahead and conducted a tabletop military exercise called Operation Chequerboard in the same area in mid-1987.
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After 11 rounds of border talks, India has clearly told China it should back off to positions across what India regards as the LAC.
The Sumdorang Chu standoff lasted several years, until both sides signed the Peace and Tranquility Agreement in 1993 during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s Beijing visit. The civilian bureaucracy had hit back by refusing to notify Operation Falcon, thus denying any perks for the soldiers who had risked their lives. But Deng Xiaoping, who had initially asked his army to “teach India a lesson”, mellowed down his rhetoric substantially. He invited Gen. Sundarji to China, the permission for which was of course denied by the Indian government.
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Three decades down the line, the Indian Army remains eminently professional. It has learnt its lessons from operations in between. But the important change noticeable was the support of the political leadership. From a 72-day standoff at Doklam near the India-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction to the more-than-a-year-long standoff in Eastern Ladakh, the Indian political leadership has matured into making strategic capital out of the capability and professionalism of the Indian Army.
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There is no Deng in China now. Xi is a leader in the Mao mould and the CCP under him is a highly nationalist entity. War was costly for India in 1987, and Deng realised that it would be costly for China too, which had just embarked on an ambitious economic revival. Three decades later, the Chinese economy is almost five times the size of India’s after the Indian economy contracted in the past one year because of Covid. A nationalist CCP can afford a longer standoff. For India, it is a “should”. Territorial integrity cannot be compromised. On this principle, both political leadership and military professionalism are on the same page. “Proactive diplomacy” at the political level together with “strong ground posturing” at the military level is what the result has been.
In the immediate aftermath of the Sumdorang Chu standoff, the political leadership was willing to give up the valley if the Chinese had agreed to withdraw. In 1993, the political leadership had signed a peace agreement without defining the LAC. The current government has reversed both these legacies. After 11 rounds of border talks, it has clearly conveyed to the other side that they should back off to positions across what India regards as the LAC. After the initial setback at Galwan, the Indian Army moved quickly and took control of strategic heights, forcing China to step back near the Pangong Tso area.
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Perseverance is the key to handling the standoff in other areas. That the Indian side has been firm on its demands became clear when there was no joint statement after the 11th round of border talks on April 10. When Deng treated India as equal in his conversations with Rajiv Gandhi by describing that the 21th century belongs to the two Asian giants, he was patronising a defensive Indian leadership. But when the state councilor and foreign minister of an aggressive CCP government, Wang Yi, called India to meet China “half-way” in early March this year, it indicated that India’s firmness was working.
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The CCP and Xi seem to have hit a logjam as they cannot be seen backing out at this juncture, nor can they allow escalation. They learned from history that mere economic superiority cannot guarantee military victories. The course for both countries could be to turn to the positive page from 1988, when it was decided that pursuing resolution for the border dispute can go hand in hand with pursuit of peace and civility.
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(Ram Madhav is a Member of the RSS national executive and member of India Foundation’s board of governors. Views expressed are personal)
