Vir Sanghvi’s Waitingfor the Hindu backlash (Counterpoint, The Hindustan Times, October 14), has some disturbingimplications. The sum and substance of his argument seems to be that if there isa backlash against Indian Muslims they will only have themselves to blame. It iswell-known that in the Indian context ‘backlash’ is a euphemism for apogrom. The term became current against the backdrop of militancy in Punjabduring the early Eighties.
By its extensive, uncritical and irresponsible usage of this term at thattime, the media contributed towards moulding the mindset which gave rise to theNovember 1984 massacre of Sikhs. This was by and large unintended. But then thatis what the interface between the ideological and the material is all about.
One wonders whether Sanghvi is really serious about what he is saying. First,his stereotyping is all too familiar. Muslims are either liberal or fanatic.However, as with the followers of any religion, social reality is much morecomplex. Leaving aside questions of class, linguistic and cultural diversity,conflicting political affiliations and sectarian divisions, one would like tosuggest that the vast majority of ordinary Muslims go about their daily businesswithout taking an explicit ideological/political position on a specific issue,particularly if they are not directly involved in it.
Given the low level of literacy in our country and the very limited reach ofthe media in rural areas, can one assume that poor agricultural labourers(Muslim or otherwise) in remote villages are even aware of what is going on inthe world — let alone take a position?
Second, there could be any number of ideological positions and shades ofopinion between a liberal and a fanatic. A person could, for instance, beanti-America and at the same time anti-Taliban. Incidentally, most Left-wing andliberal Muslims were anti-Taliban long before the US political elite turnedagainst the present regime in Afghanistan. Besides, just as ‘liberal Muslim’is a very vague term, so too is the label ‘fanatic Muslim’.
Someone could adhere to religious rituals fanatically, though sincerely,without being sympathetic to any militant cause. On the other hand, a personmight be totally insincere with regard to the basic tenets of a religion whileat the same time demonstrating a fanatical attachment to some of the symbolsassociated with that religion in order to pursue a terrorist agenda. The latteris precisely what Osama bin Laden has been doing. The Taliban too have simplyappropriated various religious symbols to create a fascist State.
The real precursors of the Taliban State are Mussolini’s Italy, Franco’sSpain, Salazar’s Portugal, Tojo’s Japan, Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, theapartheid State of South Africa, and above all Hitler’s Germany. The Talibanare as ruthless and undemocratic in their pursuit of absolute power as the Naziswere. What distinguishes the two is that Germany was an advanced and highlyindustrialised capitalist country while Afghanistan is an underdeveloped andbackward third world nation. The Taliban are as much a product of the moderncapitalist world as German fascism was.
The problem with looking at this problem in religious terms is that oneoverlooks the close ideological affinity between the Taliban and the Nazis.Sanghvi seems surprised that there is some amount of support for Osama bin Ladenand the Taliban in several countries extending from Britain to Indonesia. Thisis not very difficult to explain.
A number of Right-wing groups/movements throughout the world are now usingBin Laden as a symbol to mobilise support among some Muslims to carry forwardtheir own agenda. Does not the Sangh parivar attract an audience by playing onreligious sentiments in order to promote its politics? Then why should the useof Bin Laden as a symbol by Right-wing groups in India and elsewhere be foundinexplicable? After all, Hitler inspired many ideologues of the ultra-Right(both Hindu and Muslim) in India during the Thirties and Forties.
One is not sure as to how Sanghvi would like to define a ‘liberalMuslim’. There could be Left-wing liberals, middle-of-the-road liberals orRight-wing liberals. A large number of urban upper middle-class liberal Muslimsare extremely pro-American in their outlook and are appalled at the kind ofState that the Taliban have created. Left-wing liberal Muslims often tend to beanti-American. However much one might like to have a neat categorisation (whichis what the creation of stereotypes ultimately aims at), this is not alwayspossible.
A Right-wing liberal Muslim like Salman Khurshid could in a given situationbe as Rightist in his political outlook as a K.R. Malkani. And then what aboutthose whose ideological/political positions lie further to the Left? Most ofthose who belong to the Left and happen to be Muslims prefer to articulate theirpositions in political rather than religious terms. For them the struggleagainst communalism is a political one and has to be carried forward as part ofthe democratic struggle of which electoral processes is an integral part.
All those (and this includes ‘liberal Muslims’) who have beenconsistently championing the cause of secularism, individually and/or throughLeft and other political organisations, are doing exactly what Sanghvi exhorts‘liberal Muslims’ to do — to "fight their own fanatics". What theyhave been engaged in is a broad-based political campaign, a campaign which nevergets adequate exposure in the media.
This brings us to the third problem which needs to be posed. One would liketo draw attention to the complicity of the media in promoting Right-wingreligious politics. Is it not true that during the election campaign of 1977, itwas the media which systematically built up the image of the imam of Jama Masjidas the spokesperson of Indian Muslims? In this it went along with the leadershipof the Janata Party.
This leadership, it should be recalled, included Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L.K.Advani, both of whom actively involved the imam in the Janata election campaignat that time and shared the dais with him on several occasions. Today, thespeeches of the present imam compete with the utterances of the minuscule Delhiunit of the Shiv Sena for space in the media.
Besides, hardly any space is made available to those who have dedicatedthemselves to combating communal politics of all brands. Once in a while a highprofile ‘liberal Muslim’ like Shabana Azmi may get prominent coverage. (Oneis not sure whether Azmi would prefer the label ‘liberal Muslim’ to that of‘Left-wing activist’.) But otherwise, it is only the rabble-rousers who makeit to the headlines.
Where and how would Sanghvi like the ‘liberal Muslims’ to speak up? Issueindividual press statements which will be ignored if the person concerned is nothigh profile? Organise protest marches and signature campaigns which will rarelyget reported? Write letters to the editor which will seldom be published? Orsend in articles/rejoinders which might not even be acknowledged? All this andmore are being done, if only the media would care to have a look.
Yet, in the long run, only a sustained political movement againstcommunalism, intolerance and obscurantism is the answer. This movement could dowith a little support from the media.
Nevertheless, one would like to assure Sanghvi, the struggle for a secularIndia will continue even if that support is not forthcoming.
(The writer teaches history at Hans Raj College, University of Delhi, andis Fellow, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. This article appeared in theHindustan Times of October 30, 2001 and is carried here with the author'spermission)
