A solution to the boundary dispute continues to elude both sides despite 45 rounds of talks since 1960. This conflict has turned violent and even bloody at times, as seen during the 2020 Galwan valley clash and more recently, in Tawang on December 9.
The bilateral relationship between India and China is characterized by the 3Cs — Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict — wherein boundary disputes form the core of the conflict between the two neighbors. The two countries share a 3,488 kms long shared boundary, but there exists a difference in perception of the border along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as it is not clearly demarcated through bilateral pacts.
Against this backdrop, the clash in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh on December 9 open a pandora’s box of concerns on why border skirmishes have erupted between the two neighbors in recent times. Here we look at the root causes of the differing perceptions at the LAC and why such clashes are a byproduct of one of the longest political battles over boundaries in history:
To begin with, the Indo-China border is divided into three sectors: the western sector (along the state of Jammu and Kashmir), the middle sector (along the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh), and the eastern sector (along the states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh).
While disputed territorial claims are made by each side in each of these three sectors, the western and the eastern sectors are the most vulnerable to direct face offs between the armies. For instance, in June 2020, the Galwan valley along the western sector of the LAC emerged as a site of dispute for the first time since 1962. Twenty Indian Army personnel laid down their lives in the clashes that marked the most serious military conflict between the two sides in decades. China, too, had acknowledged the death of five PLA soldiers during the clash.
The eastern sector is similarly vulnerable to military standoffs. On December 9, the Chinese side allegedly carried out an incursion and attempted to change the status quo, according to Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement in the parliament. ANI reported sources as saying that Indian soldiers confronted around 300 Chinese soldiers. Six Indian Army soldiers sustained injuries in the clashes, which is the most violent since the 2020 Galwan valley skirmish.
Eastern Sector:
First, we take a look at the eastern sector. The boundary along Arunachal and Sikkim, referred to as the McMahon line, was delineated as per the Simla Accord of 1914 by representatives of the British Indian government, China, and Tibet. The McMahon line was named after Sir Henry McMahon, the foreign secretary of the British-run Government of India and the chief negotiator of the convention at Simla.
At present however, China contests this line, arguing that it was signed into effect by the Tibetan government which was not a sovereign state at the time. Consequently, China claims parts of Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang, as a part of Tibet. India has nevertheless continued to push for the maintenance of status quo at the border and has reiterated the McMahon line as the official boundary.
Disputed areas along the eastern border include North Sikkim and Chumbi valley in Sikkim and Namkha Chu, Sumdorong Chu, Asaphila, Longju, Dichu, Yangtse, Fish Tail-1 & 2 in Dibang Valley, and Lamang in Arunachal Pradesh.
Western Sector:
Likewise, along the western sector bordering Ladakh, the two countries contest different perceptions regarding control over Aksai Chin, which at present is illegally occupied by China. The British Indian government had proposed two lines to demarcate the country’s boundaries. In 1865, the Johnson Line proposed including the region as part of Kashmir while the 1893 McDonald Line proposed to include the region as part of China’s Xinjiang province.
Against this backdrop, in a 1950 map, India marked east of the Karakoram range as “Boundary undefined” and China has continued to claim that the Aksai Chin region is an extension of the Tibetan plateau.
Disputed areas along the western border include Pangong Tso lake, Galwan Valley, Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO, Hot Springs-Gogra, Demchok, Chushul, Spanggur Gap, Samar Lungpa, Trig Heights, Chumar, Dumchele, and Kongka La.
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1960 proposed a “Package Deal” offer to resolve the border dispute in both eastern and western sectors. It involved both the countries recognizing the status quo — Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin and Indian sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh. This deal is described as a swap agreement and clubs the disputes along the two sectors under a common banner.
This package deal was firmly rejected by then Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru as he was concerned that any concession, even in the west, would only invite further aggression from Beijing all across the frontier. Justice A.G Noorani summarized India’s stance on this offer, saying “If a thief breaks into your house and steals your coat and your wallet, you don’t say to him that he can have the coat if he returns the wallet. You expect him to return all that he has stolen from you."
The second offer, referred to as the “LAC Plus Solution” involved recognition of the status quo in the east and some concessions by China in the west. But this too was not acceptable to India, and in 1985 it was rejected by the Chinese side as well.
A solution to the boundary dispute continues to elude both sides despite 45 rounds of talks since 1960. This conflict has even turned bloody at times. In fact, as per a government statement in Lok Sabha in 2019, more than 1,000 transgressions were reported along the Indo-China border between 2016-18. Half of these were in 2017 when the Doklam standoff fanned tensions.
Furthermore, India and China have since been engaged in ‘Confidence Building Measures’ (CBMs) on the border and bilateral agreements have been signed in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013.
The 1993 Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas led to the 1996 Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. Two provisions of the 1996 agreement are of specific importance to the 2020 Galwan Valley clash and last week’s Tawang clash:
Article VI (1) of the 1996 agreement, prevents either from opening fire, conducting blasts or hunting with guns or explosives within two kms of the border, on either side. Article VI (4) of the protocol further states that the border personnel are supposed to exercise restraint when a face-face situation arises due to difference in the alignment of LAC or other reasons.
In this regard, reports have revealed that the Chinese side used sticks and canes as weapons in Tawang on December 9, which essentially do not fall in the category of prohibited firearms. Lieutenant General Rana Pratap Kalita told PTI that “It led to some amount of physical violence, but it was contained at the local level resorting to existing bilateral mechanisms and protocols." He said this was followed by a flag meeting at the delegation level at Bumla, wherein the issue was resolved further.
The 2005, 2012, and 2013 agreements have further reinstated the importance of maintaining peace and tranquility along borders and seeking diplomatic routes to resolve any conflicts. Article 1 of the 2005 accord, for instance, reads “The differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations. The two sides will resolve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.”
Besides rounds of talks and CBM agreements, the two sides agreed to appoint Special Representatives (SRs) in 2003 for consultations for a boundary settlement framework. In this regard, 22 rounds of SR-level dialogues have been held so far, with the latest held in New Delhi in December 2019, but a conclusive settlement is still in the pipeline.