As things stand, it is evident that the Maoists see their 'people's war' as having entered its penultimate stage, with the encirclement and collapse of the central authority appearing increasingly imminent.
On September 23, 2004, the Nepal government led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, officially invitedthe Maoists for peace talks to resolve the eight year old insurgency, which has already claimed more than10,000 lives. Reacting to the government's official call, Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) Chairman,Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, questioned the status and legitimacy of the incumbent government, thoughhe has not explicitly rejected the call.
Prachanda had denounced Deuba's government when it was installed by King Gyanendra in June 2004, and hasnow reiterated his contempt for a government 'dominated by foreign reactionaries, feudal Palace, and Armygenerals.' He also demanded that the government should clarify the King's position on the Maoists prime agenda- the 'Constituent assembly' - and has condemned military assistance received from foreign countries,especially India.
After his return from the five-day official visit to India, Prime Minster Deuba has urgently worked to restorepeace talks. During his Indian tour, the magnitude and intensity of the conflict had been discussedextensively and the Indian government had expressed concern about the Maoist insurgency, asserting that it wasa 'shared threat' for both the countries.
India also pledged more military assistance for the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and offeredcounter-insurgency training for Nepali security forces. India did, however, qualify that a purely 'militarysolution' could not resolve the crisis in Nepal. India's support has helped Kathmandu adopt a posture of somestrength against the Maoists, but has also intensified the resolve to seek a solution through talks.
The 'All Party' government, which was appointed by the King under Article 127 of the country's constitution,neither has the mandate, nor has it been able to define its 'bottom line' for negotiations with theinsurgents. This was evident in the high-level peace committee's invitation to the insurgents fornegotiations, without any clarity on the agenda of the peace process. Deuba has had a bitter experience withthe Maoists during his previous tenure as Prime Minister in 2001, and is now very cautious and unwilling totake the blame for any possible future failure of the negotiations.
Meanwhile, the government's critical ally, the Communist Party of Nepal - United Maoist Leninist (CPN-UML),has been organizing political meetings all over the country to pressurize the government for peace process,even as it seeks to distance itself from any responsibility for possible failure. Earlier, the CPN-UML GeneralSecretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had held secret talks with the Maoists in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh,shortly after the breakdown of the peace process in August 2003.
On the other hand, the Opposition Alliance led by the Nepali Congress (NC) has again stepped into the streetsto continue their 'anti-regression' demonstrations and strikes in the country and has sought to indict the governmentat every possible opportunity. The continuing political chaos and inadequate cooperation among variousConstitutional forces has facilitated the consolidation of the insurgents' position, and encouraged them toescalate their demands.
Earlier, on September 2, 2004, 'Chairman' Prachanda had bluntly ruled out the possibility of talks with the government,stating that his party would enter into a dialogue only with the "owners of the old regime", withthe eventual objective of direct talks with King Gyanendra. In parallel efforts, the Maoists are trying tointernationalize the issue, seeking governmental assent for third party mediation by the United Nations orother international 'human rights' agency, on the grounds that such 'nonpartisan' intervention was necessaryto hold the King and the government to their assurances in case of talks. However, even as the Maoists urgethe government to create a 'concrete environment' for peace talks, they have continued with their campaign ofviolence against the Security Forces, government officials and common civilians.
The recent success of Maoist affiliates, the All Nepal Trade Union Federation (ANTUF) and All Nepal NationalIndependent Students Union-Revolutionary (ANNISU-R) forcing concessions on their demands after they had cutoff Kathmandu through an 'economic blockade' for over a week, has demonstrated the efficacy with which theMaoists can exploit their sister organizations for disruptive activities in support of their own terrortactics.
To comply with their demands, the government released two ANTUF leaders, Resham Lama and Bishnu BahadurThapa Magar, and also announced the status of the detained Maoist leaders and their cadres in prison.Significantly, such campaigns of political disruption tend to avert or moderate direct condemnation by the'international community'.
In complementary moves, the Maoist strategy of 'protracted war', which was earlier confined to the ruraldistricts, has now rapidly begun to spread towards urban centres, including the capital Kathmandu as well. Therecent economic blockade of Kathmandu, bomb attacks on hotels in the Capital and the demand for closure of 47industries all over the country are a direct attack on the national economy, and on the regime's capacity togovern.
The tourism industry, a major source of revenue - which had largely been exempted from Maoist violence inthe early phases of the movement - has now been totally paralyzed. Maoist efforts are now focused on buildinga strong base in the 'Ring Area' region (the districts surrounding the capital, Kathmandu) to construct whatwould be a final challenge to the central authority.
Since the collapse of the cease-fire on August 27, 2003, the Maoists have abducted more than 19,500 people, largely teachers and students, for their 'educational training' and 'military training' programmes. At the same time, recruitment has been intensified to increase the strength of their cadres. More than 4,500 Village Development Committee (VDC) offices have been demolished and VDC secretaries across the country resigned in order to save their lives.
A virtually country-wide network of extortion has been established and, the Maoists now demand 'taxes' for their 'People's governments' from national and international NGO's, as well as money from district authorities. They now run parallel governments in 21 Districts, and recently started announcing 'economic budgets' for their stronghold areas. Separately, they reportedly conducted an 'election' at Sundarkhala in Kailali district in the Far Western Region to elect the chairman and vice-chairman of the 'Village People's government'. It is clear that the Maoists have now either established dominance in large parts of the country, or demolished the state's authority in regions that they are still to bring under their control.
There are reports that the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM) and the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisation of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) are encouraging the Nepali Maoists to resist or reject any offer of negotiations by the government. The survival and success of the Nepali Maoists is seen by these entities as integral to the broader enterprise of the 'peoples' war' in the entire region.
The government is, at present, confronted not only with a crisis but also a dilemma. The Maoists insist thatthe regime rejects all further military aid by foreign powers - and particularly India - as a precondition toany possible peace process; they have also demanded that the 'terrorist' tag be removed from theirorganization, and that they be allowed to freely engage in 'political activity' without let or hindrance fromthe state's Forces.
However, conceding these demands would simply leave the entire country open to unimpeded Maoist operationsand expansion - since the Maoists have never accepted the government's reflexive conditionality of a layingdown of arms. This has been the pattern of the past, when the Maoists have used periods of negotiations formassive recruitment, training and consolidation, even as they have protested every Military operation orarrest against them as a breach of the 'peace process'.
As things stand, it is evident that the Maoists see their 'people's war' as having entered its penultimatestage, with the encirclement and collapse of the central authority appearing increasingly imminent. Under thecircumstances, the rebels have little motivation - beyond the purely tactical - to negotiate an effectivepeace with the state. The situation in the war-torn Himalayan Kingdom could, consequently, be slated forfurther deterioration in the proximate future.
P.G. Rajamohan is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal