Given its constitutional primacy, this would entail the right to privacy being given the status of non-derogable and non-alienable fundamental right. This would imply that under no circumstances can this right be taken away by the State or other non-state actors even in case of extreme circumstances like a national emergency. Further, certain core aspect of right to privacy cannot be shared even if the individual so wished. This is akin to the way the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution is conceptualized as disallowing the right to commit suicide. The doctrine of non-waiver of fundamental rights is an established constitutional norm that would support such a conceptualization. If privacy takings are of the nature that cause not only extreme individual deprivation but also cumulatively lead to constitutional harms, it is imperative to enlarge the referential canvas to better appreciate their constitutional impact. Constitutional morality as a conceptual idea may provide us with more enriched canvas to review current developments. Simply put, the idea of Constitutional morality refers to certain fundamental values embedded in the Constitution which requires protection vis-à-vis State action and inaction. Further, Constitutional morality also requires that every public official as well private citizens would uphold these constitutional values through their actions. What are these fundamental values? These values are both which are expressly enumerated, for instance, the fundamental right guaranteeing life and personal liberty or democracy (provided in the Preamble to the Constitution) and unremunerated but which can be interpreted from the Constitution, such as federalism which has been identified as part of the basic structure doctrine. Securing the dignity of the individual is one of fundamental values expressly enumerated in the Preamble to the Constitution of India. The right to privacy received explicit recognition by the Supreme Court, as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. It is important to note the constitutional implications of this recognition. This was first applied to review a claim that the Aadhaar project was violative of newly recognised right to privacy. The Court upheld the Aadhaar project subject to specific conditions including the establishment of an effective data protection regime. In its decision, it was held that the ‘legitimate state interest’ standard rather than a ‘compelling state interest’ standard. The Court found that the measure, namely Aadhaar, passed the legitimate State interest test because the measure was proportional. Interestingly at the necessity stage, the Court found that the lack of an alternative measure, that would be equally effective but with a lesser degree of restrictiveness. This begs the question that on whom should the burden rest of justifying the search of alternative measures and in defending the lack of alternative? Clearly it is the State who is proposing the measure. What is confounding is that the Court faulted the petitioner’s failure to suggest alternative measures. On the question of balancing of two competing rights, the Court acknowledged that social entitlements are constitutionally protected and it ensures a right to live life with dignity. The right to privacy also protects individual dignity. It finds that the measure is reasonable as it balances these two aspects of dignity since information collected at the time of authentication is minimal. This is a specious and circular argument. The challenge is not against the provisioning of social welfare benefits. The mechanism of delivering those benefits i.e. Aadhaar is privacy intrusive to say the least. Moreover, the Court is completely aware of its framing this as a facile trade-off since it states that “we are by no means, accepting that when dignity in the form of economic welfare is given, the State is entitled to rob the person of liberty. That can never be allowed. We are concerned with the balancing of the two facets of dignity.” This requirement of balancing would not have arisen in the first place if the measure in question was not Aadhaar, which requires the sacrifice of privacy by citizens in order to access their constitutionally protected social entitlements. In effect, by coercing citizens to make this choice between binaries, it fundamentally reduces social entitlements to privileges and citizens themselves to subjecthood. Here it would be appropriate to also discuss Justice Chandrachud’s dissent on the application of the proportionality principle. He found that the cases cited to justify Aadhaar were inapplicable since those cases related to national security and prevention of crime. He held that the collection of demographic and biometric information in the Aadhaar project, effectively justified the treatment of all citizens as criminals without making a distinction for those indulging in identity fraud and therefore infringed upon the justifiable expectations of privacy of ordinary citizens. Thus he held Aadhaar to be disproportionate to the objective sought to be achieved by the State. The Aadhaar judgement of the Court reflects its failure to appreciate the current reality of how information is collected, stored and shared and also the inability of individuals to assess and negotiate singular actions of information sharing and differentiating them from the cascading effects of information merging and the potential harms which may result from the abuse of such data convergence. This failure is also more problematically reflected in the continued emphasis on individual consent as the fundamental principle for allowing for privacy intrusions, when in fact individuals have little knowledge, information or agency in negotiating such acts of sharing of privacy.